Filed: Mar. 13, 2012
Latest Update: Feb. 22, 2020
Summary: 11-667-cv Airgas Specialty Gases Inc. v. Kumar UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION
Summary: 11-667-cv Airgas Specialty Gases Inc. v. Kumar UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ..
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11-667-cv
Airgas Specialty Gases Inc. v. Kumar
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for
2 the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan United
3 States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of New York, on
4 the 13th day of March, two thousand twelve.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 BARRINGTON D. PARKER,
8 RICHARD C. WESLEY,
9 Circuit Judges,
10 SIDNEY H. STEIN,*
11 District Judge.
12 _____________________________________
13
14 Airgas Specialty Gases Inc.,
15
16 Plaintiff-Appellee,
17
18 v. 11-667-cv
19
20 Shivesh Kumar,
21
22 Defendant-Appellant.
23
24 _____________________________________
25
26
27 FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE: Lori B. Alexander, Jason R.
28 Stanevich, Littler Mendelson,
29 P.C., New Haven, Connecticut.
*
Judge Sidney H. Stein, of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by
designation.
1
2 FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: Shivesh Kumar, pro se, Cheshire,
3 Connecticut.
4 Appeal from an order of the United States District
5 Court for the District of Connecticut (Thompson, C.J.).
6 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
7 AND DECREED that the order of the district court is
8 AFFIRMED.
9 Appellant Shivesh Kumar, proceeding pro se, appeals the
10 district court’s order granting the motion of Appellee
11 Airgas Specialty Gases Inc. (“Airgas”) to enforce a
12 settlement agreement that the parties entered into in May
13 2010. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
14 underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and
15 the issues on appeal.
16 As an initial matter, although the district court did
17 not enter a separate judgment in this case after issuing its
18 order granting Airgas’s motion, this Court nonetheless has
19 jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291
20 because the order clearly indicated the district court’s
21 intent that the order be the final decision in this case.
22 See Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381, 387-99
23 (1978).
24 In reviewing a district court’s decision whether to
2
1 enforce a settlement agreement, we review its findings of
2 fact with respect to the agreement for clear error and its
3 legal conclusions de novo. See Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Omega,
4 S.A., 432 F.3d 437, 443 (2d Cir. 2005).
5 Under Connecticut law, a contract is unambiguous where
6 “its language is clear and conveys a definite and precise
7 intent.”
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation
8 omitted). If a contract does not define a given term, the
9 court should “look to the plain meaning of the language to
10 ascertain whether there is ambiguity” and may refer to
11 “widespread custom or usage” to define the term. Lee v. BSB
12 Greenwich Mortg. Ltd. P’ship,
267 F.3d 172, 178 (2d Cir.
13 2001)(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
14 Kumar argues on appeal that the district court erred in
15 finding that Airgas had satisfied its obligation under the
16 settlement agreement to change Kumar’s record in its Human
17 Resource Management System (“HRMS”) to “reflect a voluntary
18 quit as opposed to an involuntary termination” because the
19 screen shot of Kumar’s record provided by Airgas indicates
20 that the reason for Kumar’s termination was “Resignation-
21 Other Position.” Kumar contends that “Resignation-Other
22 Position” does not mean the same thing as “voluntary quit.”
23 According to Kumar, the notation “Resignation-Other
3
1 Position” falsely indicates that he took another position in
2 the same company (Airgas).
3 Kumar’s argument is without merit. A “voluntary” act
4 is one that is “performed, made, or given of one’s free
5 will,” Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary Unabridged 2564
6 (3d ed. 1961), and to “quit” means “to give up employment,”
7 id. at 1867. Thus, a voluntary quit means to “give up
8 employment” “of one’s free will.” “Resignation” is defined
9 as “[t]he act . . . of surrendering or relinquishing an
10 office,” Black’s Law Dictionary 1336 (8th ed. 2004), and
11 “quit” is a synonym of the verb “resign,” see Roget’s Int’l
12 Thesaurus at entry 448.02 (6th ed. 2001).
13 Kumar has provided no support for his contention that
14 “Resignation-Other Position” suggests a transfer within the
15 same company, and in any event, interpreting the phrase in
16 that manner is not inconsistent with a finding that he left
17 his original position voluntarily. See Omega Eng’g,
432
18 F.3d at 446. Thus, the district court correctly held that
19 Airgas had satisfied its obligation to modify Kumar’s HRMS
20 record to “reflect a voluntary quit” by changing the reason
21 for Kumar’s termination to “Resignation-Other Position.”
22 Kumar also argues that the district court erred in
23 finding that Airgas had provided Kumar with “proper
4
1 documentation” of its modification of Kumar’s HRMS record
2 because the screen shot provided by Airgas was allegedly
3 “truncated,” as evidenced by the location of the “scroll
4 thumb” on the scroll bar in the screen shot. However, as
5 Kumar has conceded, the settlement agreement merely requires
6 Airgas to provide Kumar with “documentation” of the change,
7 and does not mandate that the documentation be in a specific
8 form. Therefore, the district court did not err in finding
9 that Airgas’s screen shot satisfied the terms of the
10 settlement agreement. See Lee, 267 F.3d at 178.
11 We have considered all of Kumar’s arguments and find
12 them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the order
13 of the district court.
14
15 FOR THE COURT:
16 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
17
18
5
