STANLEY R. CHESLER, District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court on the motion for summary judgment, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, by Defendants Borough of Cliffside Park (the "Borough"), Donald Keane ("Keane"), Gerald Calabrese ("Calabrese"), and Michael Russo ("Russo") (collectively, "Defendants.") For the reasons stated below, the motion will be granted.
In brief, this case arises from an alleged love triangle, in which Plaintiff Paul Carchietta is the husband, Eliota Carchietta ("EC") is the wife/ex-wife, and Defendant Michael Russo is the alleged rival. In brief, the Amended Complaint alleges that Russo was a police captain with the Cliffside Park Police Department, and that an incident occurred in which Russo detained Plaintiff at the police station. Furthermore, the Amended Complaint alleges that Russo and EC engaged in an adulterous relationship.
Defendants first move for summary judgment on Count Five, against Russo, which asserts a claim, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that the alleged detention violated Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights. Plaintiff bears the burden of proof of a § 1983 violation. "[W]ith respect to an issue on which the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof . . . the burden on the moving party may be discharged by `showing' — that is, pointing out to the district court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case."
Once the moving party has satisfied this initial burden, the party opposing the motion must establish that a genuine issue as to a material fact exists.
Plaintiff's opposition brief contains no citation to any evidence of record. Plaintiff argues, in short, that his testimony raises a factual dispute over whether he was detained by Russo at the police station, and that a jury needs to decide whether to believe Plaintiff's account of the incident, or Russo's. Russo, in reply, argues that Plaintiff's testimony, as contained in his certification, supports only the inference of a subjective belief about detention, and that there is no evidence that would support the inference that Plaintiff's belief in a detention was objectively reasonable.
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." Fairly recently, the Third Circuit summarized the basic principles of the unreasonable seizure inquiry as follows:
Plaintiff offers his certification, dated December 6, 2016, which states that, on December 29, 2009, Russo called him and said, "You have one of those things down here. Come down here and get it." (Pl.'s Cert. ¶ 5.) When Plaintiff presented himself to Russo at the police station, Russo gave him a domestic violence temporary restraining order, and Russo told Plaintiff that the municipal court judge wanted EC to get $600 from Plaintiff. (
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Russo also moves for summary judgment on Count Ten, for an illegal seizure in violation of the New Jersey State Constitution. Plaintiff does not offer a different argument on this point from the argument about Count Five and, indeed, the issues are sufficiently similar that the motion for summary judgment on Count Ten will be granted, for the reasons already discussed.
Russo next moves for summary judgment on Count Eleven, which asserts that Russo and EC conspired to violate Plaintiff's rights, using Russo's state law authority, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Plaintiff does not oppose this part of the motion, and the Court interprets this as an abandonment of Count Eleven. As to Count Eleven, the motion for summary judgment will be granted.
Defendants next move for summary judgment on Counts Twelve through Seventeen, all of which assert claims for violations of state and federally-protected civil rights through unconstitutional practice, custom, and usage of the police department and Borough. Defendants contend that Plaintiff has no evidence of any unconstitutional practice or custom in the police department or Borough. In opposition, Plaintiff makes two arguments. First, Plaintiff contends that "the use of police resources by officers of the CPPD to advance their adulterous relationships [was] so common and well-known as to constitute a policy." (Pl.'s Br. 3.) Setting aside, for the moment, the question of the evidence in support of the contention that police officers customarily used police resources to advance adulterous relationships, the Court queries how, even if true, such a policy would constitute a violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Plaintiff points to no authority for the proposition that either the federal Constitution or that of the State of New Jersey protects a party from spousal infidelity, or from third parties' romantic entanglements with a spouse. Plaintiff has failed to point to any legal basis for a claim that his constitutionally-protected civil rights were violated by this alleged policy. Plaintiff's second point is that this Court should hold the Borough liable for this alleged policy, which fails for the same reason.
Lastly, in opposition, Plaintiff argues that Russo's "persistent telephone calls" to Plaintiff violated his right to be left alone, recognized by the Supreme Court in
In conclusion, Defendants have moved for summary judgment on Counts Five and Ten though Seventeen in the Amended Complaint. Plaintiff has failed to raise any issue that precludes the entry of Judgment as a matter of law, and Defendants have thus demonstrated that they are entitled to Judgment as a matter of law on these claims. Defendants' motion for summary judgment will be granted in its entirety.
For these reasons,