NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

PER CURIAM.

Gloria Schaefer appeals from a final decision of the Board of Review (Board), disqualifying her from receiving unemployment benefits, in accordance with N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a), because she left employment with respondent RHP Staffing Company (RHP) voluntarily, without good cause attributable to the work. She argues she should not have been disqualified from receiving benefits because she was compelled to leave her job due to the "intolerable and unlawful working conditions" that existed at her place of employment and her "decision to accept a `better position' constitutes good cause to voluntarily leave work." As a result, she argues, the Board's final determination of her ineligibility was incorrect.1

The deputy director initially denied Schaefer's claim for benefits after she was terminated from her employment with Coastal Amusements (Coastal), for whom she worked for approximately one month after leaving RHP. She appealed the denial and, after a telephonic hearing, the Appeal Tribunal affirmed the deputy director's initial decision. Schaefer appealed and the Board affirmed. This appeal followed.

Schaefer's employment history is not disputed. Prior to working for Coastal, Schaefer worked for RHP for five years as the "Community Manager" for a manufactured-home park owned by RHP. At the telephonic hearing before the Appeal Tribunal's claims examiner, both Schaefer and RHP's representatives, David Hale and Joseph Carbone, were represented by counsel and testified to their versions of the facts relating to Schaefer's employment and resignation, and discussions about Schaefer returning to work after she resigned.

According to Schaefer, she left work because "the working conditions were unsafe." She complained of confrontations with community residents who were upset with RHP, RHP's refusal to pay vendors, which caused her to be unable to address the residents' concerns, and the presence of bedbugs, other insects, and rats. Schaefer testified that these conditions existed during the entire course of her employment, but that, due to her financial circumstances, she could not leave her employment until she found another job, which she had been looking for from the time she started working for RHP.

The parties also presented their versions of discussions they had regarding Schaefer returning to RHP's employment after she started her new position. Those discussions broke down when RHP refused to meet Schaefer's demands for a higher salary.

After considering the parties' testimony and the exhibits admitted into evidence, the claims examiner issued a written decision affirming the denial of benefits. She first cited the applicable law, relying upon N.J.S.A. 43:21-5,2 N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1,3 and the Supreme Court's opinion in Self v. Board of Review, 91 N.J. 453 (1982).4 Applying that law, the claims examiner rejected Schaefer's contention that she left her job because of unsafe working conditions. She attributed Schaefer's alleged issues to the location and nature of her employment, finding that working "near woods" would naturally create problems with insects and rodents and that, as the manager of a residential community, it was part of her "job to deal with residents even if the[y] get upset." The claims examiner attributed any delay in RHP's attention to repairs and vendors' invoices to RHP being part of a larger corporation that "has procedures for invoice approvals [that] may . . . take time." Because Schaefer worked under these conditions throughout her employment and sought to be re-employed by RHP at a higher salary even after her resignation, the claims examiner concluded that Schaefer left her job "voluntarily without good cause attributable to the work." In addition, she found that, because Schaefer left her subsequent employer after working there for only four weeks, the time worked was "insufficient to remove the disqualification from" her employment with RHP.

We begin our consideration of Schaefer's appeal by recognizing that our "review [of] administrative agency decisions is limited." Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997). We will not disturb the Board's action unless it is "arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable." Ibid. "If the Board's factual findings are supported `by sufficient credible evidence, courts are obliged to accept them.'" Ibid. (quoting Self, supra, 91 N.J. at 459). Because of our deference to the agency and the fact-sensitive nature of the examination into the basis for an employee's departure, the agency's determination carries a strong presumption of reasonableness and, when the agency's findings of fact are challenged on appeal, a claimant carries a substantial burden of persuasion. Gloucester Cty. Welfare Bd. v. State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 93 N.J. 384, 390-91 (1983).

"We [also] defer to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations unless `plainly unreasonable.'" Frazier, supra, 439 N.J. Super. at 134 (quoting In re Election Law Enf't Comm'n Advisory Op. No. 01-2008, 201 N.J. 254, 262 (2010)). "[W]hen [the] agency's decision is plainly mistaken, however, it is entitled to no such deference and must be reversed in the interests of justice." Ibid. (alterations in original) (citation omitted).

We conclude from our review that Schaefer's contentions on appeal are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion, as the Board's decision was supported by "sufficient credible evidence on the record as a whole." R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D). Schaefer failed to satisfy her burden to prove that she left her employment with RHP for "good cause attributable to the work," see N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(c) — reasons beyond "[m]ere dissatisfaction with working conditions [that] are not shown to be abnormal or do not affect health," Domenico v. Bd. of Review, 192 N.J.Super. 284, 288 (App. Div. 1983) — especially given that she endured the conditions about which she complained throughout her entire tenure and chose to leave RHP only after securing new employment at a higher salary.5 See Lord v. Bd. of Review, 425 N.J.Super. 187, 191 (App. Div. 2012) ("[A]n employee's separation will be considered `voluntarily' within the intent of N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) only if `the decision whether to go or to stay lay at the time with the worker alone'" (quoting Campbell Soup Co. v. Bd. of Review, 13 N.J. 431, 435 (1953))); see also N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(b).6

Affirmed.