Filed: Apr. 12, 2012
Latest Update: Feb. 22, 2020
Summary: 10-2425-ag Jakaj v. Holder BIA Videla, IJ A074 855 359 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE
Summary: 10-2425-ag Jakaj v. Holder BIA Videla, IJ A074 855 359 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE N..
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10-2425-ag
Jakaj v. Holder
BIA
Videla, IJ
A074 855 359
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
New York, on the 12th day of April, two thousand twelve.
PRESENT:
DENNIS JACOBS,
Chief Judge,
ROSEMARY S. POOLER,
DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
Circuit Judges.
_______________________________________
MIRELLA JAKAJ,
Petitioner,
v. 10-2425-ag
NAC
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
______________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Mary Elizabeth Delli-Pizzi, Babylon
Village, New York.
FOR RESPONDENT: Tony West, Assistant Attorney General,
Civil Division; Michael P. Lindemann,
Assistant Director, Office of Immigration
Litigation; Lyle D. Jentzer, Civil
Division, United States Department of
Justice, Washington, D.C.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
is DENIED.
Mirella Jakaj, a native and citizen of Albania, seeks
review of a June 15, 2010, order of the BIA affirming the
July 31, 2008, decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Gabriel
C. Videla denying her motion to reopen. In re Mirella
Jakaj, No. A074 855 359 (B.I.A. June 15, 2010), aff’g No.
A074 855 359 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City July 31, 2008). We
assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts
and procedural history of the case. We review the agency’s
denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. Kaur
v. BIA,
413 F.3d 232, 233 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
Because Jakaj’s motion to reopen was untimely, she was
required to establish changed country conditions to except
it from the time limit or that the time limit should be
equitably tolled because she received ineffective assistance
of counsel. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); Cekic v. INS,
435 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2006). The agency found that she
established neither, and accordingly denied her motion as
untimely.
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Jakaj argues that the agency abused its discretion in
failing to consider her evidence about conditions in Albania
and concluding that she did not establish changed country
conditions. This argument is unavailing because the record
does not compel the conclusion that the agency did not
consider Jakaj’s evidence. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t
of Justice,
471 F.3d 315, 338 (2d Cir. 2006) (providing that
this Court will “presume that [the agency] has taken into
account all of the evidence before [it], unless the record
compellingly suggests otherwise”). Indeed, the agency
explicitly discussed the key parts of Jakaj’s evidence of
changed country conditions: her evidence about general
conditions in Albania and her claim that her uncle was
murdered. While the agency did not explicitly address
Jakaj’s evidence that in 1993 masked men looking for her
confronted her family in Albania or that in 2008 a family
member was attacked by masked men, that evidence did not
show a material change in country conditions, as the 1993
incident occurred before Jakaj’s initial removal hearing and
Jakaj did not present evidence establishing the identity or
motives of the 2008 attackers, or why that incident
established a change. See Matter of S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec.
3
247, 253 (BIA 2007) (explaining that in evaluating whether
an applicant has established changed country conditions, the
agency “compare[s] the evidence of country conditions
submitted with the motion to those that existed at the time
of the merits hearing below.”).
Having considered her evidence, the agency did not
abuse its discretion in finding that Jakaj did not establish
changed country conditions. When Jakaj first applied for
asylum in 1997 she asserted that the Socialist Party killed
and threatened its opponents. As the agency reasonably
concluded, any evidence that the Socialist Party continued
to perpetrate political violence did not show a change in
country conditions, but at most that conditions had not
changed despite the 2005 election following which the
Socialist Party lost power. As the agency concluded, the
murder of Jakaj’s uncle in 2004, though regrettable,
established only the continued persecution of her family
(while the Socialist Party was in power), not a change in
conditions in Albania.
Jakaj also argues that the agency erred in failing to
reopen her proceedings based on her allegation of
ineffective assistance of counsel. However, because Jakaj’s
4
motion to reopen was filed nearly ten years after her
initial removal order, she was required to show that she
“‘exercised due diligence in pursuing the case’” in order to
toll the time limits on motions to reopen. See
Cekic, 435
F.3d at 170 (quoting Iavorski v. INS,
232 F.3d 124, 135 (2d
Cir. 2000)). The agency did not abuse its discretion in
finding that she did not meet this burden because Jakaj
submitted no evidence that she pursued her case in any way
between 1998 and 2008.
Id.
Finally, Jakaj was not deprived of due process because
she had an opportunity to present her evidence to the IJ and
BIA in her motion to reopen and the agency did not err in
denying that motion as untimely. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(c)(7)(C); Li Hua Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
453
F.3d 99, 104-05 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that due process
requires that an applicant receive “a full and fair
opportunity to present her claims”).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED. As we have completed our review, the pending motion
for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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