ESTHER SALAS, District Judge.
This action arises out of pro se Plaintiff Abdul-Jabbar Webster's ("Webster") Complaint alleging slander, false arrest, unreasonable search, excessive force, fabrication of evidence, and violations of his First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights by police officers Paul Wojtowicz ("Officer Wojtowicz") and Jesse D. Hillburn ("Officer Hillburn") (collectively, "Defendants" or the "Officers"). The Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Officers moved for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. (D.E. No. 53). Having considered the parties' submissions in support of and in opposition to the instant motion, the Court decides the matter without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b). For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS-in-part the Officers' motion for summary judgment.
The Officers are employed by the Jersey City Police Department. (SMF ¶ 12). On April 22, 2011, they observed Webster engage in suspected drug activity for nearly two hours. (D.E. No. 53-4, ("Investigation Report") at 2-3). As a result of their surveillance, Officer Wojtowicz approached Webster, who allegedly "struck [him] with a closed fist in the left shoulder" and continued to resist arrest. (Id. at 3). Officer Wojtowicz then "struck Webster with a closed fist" and handcuffed him with Officer Hillburn's assistance. (Id.). According to the Investigation Report, a search incident to arrest uncovered narcotics. (Id. at 3-4).
Webster was subsequently charged with (i) possession of a controlled dangerous substance (i.e., heroin); (ii) possession with intent to dispense or distribute heroin; (iii) possession with intent to dispense or distribute heroin within 1,000 feet of a school; (iv) possession with intent to dispense or distribute heroin within 500 feet of a public housing facility; (v) resisting arrest; (vi) obstructing the administration of law; and (vii) aggravated assault. (SMF ¶ 1; D.E. No. 53-5, ("Indictment") at 2-3). After a jury trial in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Hudson County, Webster was convicted of three counts: (i) possession of a controlled dangerous substance; (ii) possession with intent to dispense or distribute a controlled dangerous substance; and (iii) possession with intent to dispense or distribute a controlled dangerous substance within 1000 feet of school property. (SMF ¶ 2; D.E. No. 53-6, ("Verdict Sheet") at 2-3). The State voluntarily dismissed the charge of possession with intent to dispense or distribute heroin within 500 feet of a public housing facility. (SMF ¶ 4). Webster was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment, with five-year parole ineligibility. (Id. ¶ 5). Webster moved for a new trial and acquittal, but both motions were denied on March motion to impose an extended term of imprisonment. (SMF ¶ 7; D.E. No. 53-9, Order at 2).
On February 25, 2013, Webster filed the instant § 1983 Complaint against the Officers, alleging slander, false arrest, unreasonable search, excessive force, fabrication of evidence, and violations of his First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (D.E. No. 1, ("Compl.") at 1). Specifically, Webster claims the Officers (i) used "excessive force" against him for "no reason" by abusing their authority and that they "beat[,] kick[ed,] and punch[ed him] and [his] back, face and ribs with animalistic mentality . . . while witnesses stood and watch[ed]"; (ii) were "taunting" him prior to the incident, "slandering his character," and using "derogatory statements"; and (iii) violated his Fourth Amendment rights because they had "no reason" to search him and planted "drug narcotics on [him]." (Id. at 4-5). Webster petitions the Court to "discipline these officers" because they have abused their authority. (Id. at 6).
Following the conclusion of fact discovery, the Officers moved for summary judgment on all but Webster's excessive-force and fabrication-of-evidence claims. (D.E. No. 53-1, ("Def. Mov. Br.")). Webster submitted two letters in response to the Officer's motion. (D.E. No. 54, ("Pl.'s First Letter"); D.E. No. 55, ("Pl.'s Second Letter")).
Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party shows that there is "no genuine issue of any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). An issue is "genuine" if it is supported by evidence such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in the nonmoving party's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
Conversely, where the moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, it "must show that it has produced enough evidence to support the findings of fact necessary to win." El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. (SEPTA), 479 F.3d 232, 237 (3d Cir. 2007). "Put another way, it is inappropriate to grant summary judgment in favor of a moving party who bears the burden of proof at trial unless a reasonable juror would be compelled to find its way on the facts needed to rule in its favor on the law." Id. at 238.
Notably, the "evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. But the non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); see also Swain v. City of Vineland, 457 F. App'x 107, 109 (3d Cir. 2012) (stating that the non-moving party must support its claim "by more than a mere scintilla of evidence").
Plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for certain violations of his constitutional rights. Section 1983 provides, in relevant part, that:
Thus, to state a claim under § 1983, Plaintiff must allege (i) the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and (ii) that the alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011).
The Officers move for summary judgment on all but Webster's excessive-force and fabrication-of-evidence claims. (Def. Mov. Br. at 2). In support of their motion, they contend that Webster failed to sufficiently plead violations of his First, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Id.). They further argue that Webster's claims for false arrest and unreasonable search and seizure are barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). (Id.). As to any alleged slander claim for statements made prior to trial, the Officers argue that such claim is time barred. (Id.). And if Webster's slander claim is premised on the Officers' statements at trial, the Officers aver that they are immune from liability for their trial testimony. (Id.).
Webster alleges that the Officers violated his First Amendment rights, though he does not specify how. (Compl. at 4-5). A liberal reading of the Complaint suggests that Webster may claim the Officers retaliated against him for practicing his religion. (See, e.g., id. at 5 ("Hilburn told me As-Salamu Alikum that motherfucker."); see also Pl.'s First Letter at 2 ("[W]hy should I be call [sic] to account for someone else['s] actions and deeds because I am Muslim.")).
The First Amendment provides, in part, that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . ." U.S. Const. amend. I. To establish a First Amendment retaliation claim, Webster must prove three elements: "(1) constitutionally protected conduct, (2) retaliatory action sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional rights, and (3) a causal link between the constitutionally protected conduct and the retaliatory action." Koren v. Noonan, 586 F. App'x 885, 887-88 (3d Cir. 2014).
Here, Webster's Complaint fails to satisfy any of the elements necessary to establish a First Amendment retaliation claim. Moreover, the record is devoid of materials from which a fact-finder could find that the Officers violated Webster's First Amendment rights. Indeed, the Complaint does not allege—and the record does not demonstrate—that Webster was engaged in any constitutionally protected activity at the time of his arrest or that his arrest was in any way linked to the constitutionally protected activity. Webster alleges only that the Officers were "taunting" him (Compl. at 4), but does not state or suggest that the taunting was a result of (or otherwise linked to) his constitutionally protected activity. And despite this Court's liberal interpretation, Webster's submissions in opposition to the Officers' motion also do not set forth any facts that would establish a genuine issue for trial. The Officers are therefore entitled to summary judgment on Webster's First Amendment claim.
Webster next asserts that the Officers "deprived [him] of [his] liberty" and had "no reason to search [him]." (Compl. at 5). The Officers interpret these allegations as claims for "false arrest" and "unreasonable search" under the Fourth Amendment,
In Heck, the Supreme Court held that:
512 U.S. at 486-87 (emphasis in original).
Webster alleges that the Officers deprived him of his liberty, which the Officers and this Court will treat as an allegation of false arrest. "The tort of false arrest consists of: (1) an arrest or detention of the person against his will; (2) which is done without proper legal authority or legal justification. If a judgment for [the plaintiff] on his false arrest claim `would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction,' [the plaintiff] would be barred from bringing his cause of action until his conviction was overturned . . . ." Gibson v. Superintendent of NJ Dep't of Law & Pub. Safety-Div. of State Police, 411 F.3d 427, 451 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Heck, 512 U.S. at 487). To determine whether a successful § 1983 action would undermine the validity of a conviction, a district court must make a fact-based inquiry. Id. ("[U]nder Heck, a district court is required only to make a threshold determination as to whether a plaintiff's § 1983 claim, if successful, would have the hypothetical effect of rendering the criminal conviction or sentence invalid. If this threshold is satisfied, the district court's analysis is at an end, and the Heck deferred accrual rule is triggered.") (emphasis in original).
The Court finds that Webster's false-arrest allegation necessarily implies the invalidity of his conviction because if the arrest was not legal, then his conviction is not valid. See, e.g., Wiley v. City of Chicago, 361 F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 2004) (false arrest claim based on allegations that police planted drugs on plaintiff "would necessarily challenge the legality of a prosecution premised on the planted drugs"); Covington v. City of New York, 171 F.3d 117, 123 (2d Cir. 1999) ("[I]n a case where the only evidence for conviction was obtained pursuant to an arrest, recovery in a civil case based on false arrest would necessarily impugn any conviction resulting from the use of that evidence"). And the law is clear: Webster cannot maintain a false arrest claim if judgment in his favor "would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction." Heck, 512 U.S. at 487; Gibson, 411 F.3d at 451.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Webster, the Court will assume that his arrest was effectuated without proper legal authority or legal justification (i.e., without probable cause), as required by the Fourth Amendment. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213 (1979) (noting the "general rule that Fourth Amendment seizures are `reasonable' only if based on probable cause"). If this were true, then all evidence obtained from the search incident to the unlawful arrest (i.e., the heroin Webster was convicted of possessing) is excludable. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-88 (1963) (holding that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applies to evidence obtained following an illegal arrest); United States v. Myers, 308 F.3d 251, 265-66 (3d Cir. 2002) (finding that because police officers lacked probable cause to arrest the defendant, "the evidence that was seized pursuant to that arrest should have been suppressed").
Webster was convicted of possessing narcotics discovered during a search incident to arrest. (Investigation Report at 3-4; SMF ¶ 2; D.E. No. 53-6, Verdict Sheet at 2-3). Thus, a success on his § 1983 claim for false arrest—which would lead to the suppression of evidence found during the search incident to arrest—would "necessarily imply" that he was improperly convicted. As the Third Circuit has noted, "situations such as [Webster's]—where the only evidence supporting the conviction is tainted by a possible constitutional violation that is the subject of a § 1983 action—are perhaps the quintessential example of when the Heck deferred accrual rule is triggered." Gibson, 411 F.3d at 452 (citing Covington, 171 F.3d at 123 ("On the other hand, in a case where the only evidence for conviction was obtained pursuant to an arrest, recovery in a civil case based on false arrest would necessarily impugn any conviction resulting from the use of that evidence.") (emphasis in original)). In other words, Webster is "barred from bringing this cause of action until his conviction [is] overturned." Gibson, 411 F.3d at 451.
Given that Webster's conviction remains valid,
Webster also alleges that he was subject to an unreasonable search in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. (Compl. at 5). The search was conducted "incident to arrest." (Investigation Report at 3). The Officers contend that this claim is also barred by Heck, because if this claim were successful, it too would undermine the validity of Webster's conviction. (Def. Mov. Br. at 11-12).
The Fourth Amendment protects people from "unreasonable governmental intrusion" wherever there is a "reasonable expectation of privacy." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968). Generally, police officers must obtain warrants for searches and seizures. Id. But a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement is a search incident to arrest: "a police officer who makes a lawful arrest may conduct a warrantless search of the arrestee's person and the area `within his immediate control.'" Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 232 (2011) (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969)).
Here, the Court has already determined that Webster's false-arrest allegation is barred by Heck because it necessarily implies the invalidity of his conviction. Because Webster's challenge to his arrest is barred by Heck and because the Officers searched Webster incident to that arrest, Webster's unreasonable-search claim necessarily fails for the same reason. Accordingly, the Court will also grant the Officers' motion on this claim. Like his false-arrest claim, Webster's unreasonable-search claim is also dismissed without prejudice. See Coulston, 651 F. App'x at 143.
Webster further avers that the Officers violated his Fifth Amendment rights, but again fails to provide any additional details. (Compl. at 4-5). He only states that the Officers "deprived me of my Liberty." (Id. at 5).
The Fifth Amendment provides, in part, that "[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . ." U.S. Const. amend. V. Significantly, "the due process clause under the Fifth Amendment only protects against federal governmental action and does not limit the actions of state officials." Caldwell v. Beard, 324 F. App'x 186, 189 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Riley v. Camp, 130 F.3d 958, 972 n.19 (11th Cir. 1997) ("The Fifth Amendment obviously does not apply here—the acts complained of were committed by state rather than federal officials.")).
In this case, it is undisputed that the Officers, as employees of the Jersey City Police Department, are not federal officials. (SMF ¶ 12; Investigation Report at 2-4). The Fifth Amendment—which only protects against federal governmental action—is thus inapplicable here, and Webster's Fifth Amendment claim against the Officers fails as a matter of law. Accordingly, the Court grants the Officers' motion for summary judgment on this claim.
Webster then contends that the Officers violated his Eighth Amendment rights.
Webster's allegations, however, stem from the Officers' actions (i.e., excessive force) during his arrest, not excessive post-conviction sentencing or punishments. (See generally Compl.). Put differently, the Eighth Amendment has no application here. See Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 664. Indeed, Webster's requested relief has nothing to do with his post-conviction sentence; rather, he asks this Court "to discipline these officers." (Compl. at 6). For that reason, the Officers are entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
Webster next argues that the Officers violated his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (Compl. at 4-5), which prohibits states from "depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws," U.S. Const. amend. XIV. A liberal reading of the Complaint suggests that Webster may be asserting that the Officers violated his substantive due process rights by "planting drug narcotics on [him]" and by exercising "excessive force against [him] for no reason." (Compl. at 4-5).
As to Webster's Fourteenth Amendment claim based on fabrication of evidence (i.e., that the Officers planted narcotics on him), the Third Circuit has held that there can be "a stand-alone Fourteenth Amendment claim predicated on the fabrication of evidence." Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 294 (3d Cir. 2014) ("[I]f a defendant has been convicted at a trial at which the prosecution has used fabricated evidence, the defendant has a stand-alone claim under section 1983 based on the Fourteenth Amendment if there is a reasonable likelihood that, without the use of that evidence, the defendant would not have been convicted."); see also Ebuzor-Onayemi v. Union Cty. Police Dep't, No. 16-1869, 2017 WL 1377640, at *3 (D.N.J. Apr. 12, 2017) ("In the Third Circuit, fabrication-of-evidence is a freestanding constitutional tort."). Here, the Officers have not moved for summary judgment on Webster's claim based on his fabrication-of-evidence allegation. Because this issue is not presently before the Court, Webster's claim that the Officers violated his substantive due process rights by "planting drug narcotics on [him]" (Compl. at 4) survives.
The Court finds that Webster's Fourteenth Amendment claim based on his excessive-force allegation, on the other hand, must be dismissed. The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994). The Court has further instructed that excessive-force claims arising in the context of an arrest "are properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's `objective reasonableness' standard, rather than under a substantive due process standard." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388, 395 (1989) ("Because the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against this sort of physically intrusive governmental conduct, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims."). To the extent Webster asserts a substantive due process claim based on the Officers' excessive force during his arrest, the Court will grant the Officers' motion, as that claim must be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment.
In sum, Webster's Fourteenth Amendment claim based on fabrication of evidence survives, but the Court grants the Officers' motion on Webster's Fourteenth Amendment claim based on excessive force during his arrest.
Webster finally alleges that the Officers slandered his character. (Compl. at 3-4). It is unclear from the Complaint whether Webster's slander claim arises from the Officers' accusations at the time of the arrest or from the Officers' testimony at trial. So, the Court will analyze both scenarios.
The Officers contend that Webster's slander claim (if based on accusations during his arrest) is time-barred and must be dismissed as a matter of law. (Def. Mov. Br. at 12). The Court agrees.
In New Jersey, "[e]very action at law for libel or slander shall be commenced within 1 year next after the publication of the alleged libel or slander." N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-3; see also Johnson v. Peralta, 599 F. App'x 430, 432 n.1 (3d Cir. 2015) (noting "one-year limitation on libel or slander"). Here, Webster was arrested on April 22, 2011 (Incident Report at 2), and initiated this lawsuit on February 25, 2013 (Compl.)—i.e., over one year and ten months after his arrest. Webster's slander claim arising from his arrest was filed after the expiration of the one-year statute of limitations and must be dismissed with prejudice.
To the extent Webster's slander claim is premised on the Officers' testimony during his trial, the Officers aver that they are immune from liability and Webster's claim must be dismissed. (Def. Mov. Br. at 12-13). Again, the Court agrees.
The common law has historically "provided absolute immunity from subsequent damages liability for all persons—governmental or otherwise—who were integral parts of the judicial process." Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 335-36 (1983). Such immunity extends to police officers who testify as witnesses at trial. Id. ("Nothing in the language of [§ 1983] suggests that such a witness belongs in a narrow, special category lacking protection against damages suits.");
For these reasons, the Court GRANTS-in-part the Officers' motion for summary judgment. An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
