NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

PER CURIAM.

Defendant S.R. (Sara)1 appeals from an order finding she abused or neglected her five children. She argues there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of abuse and neglect against her and that the trial court erred in its application of the law. We affirm.

The Division of Child Protection and Permanency (the Division) bears the burden to prove abuse or neglect by a preponderance of the "competent, material and relevant evidence." N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(b); N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.L., 213 N.J. 1, 22 (2013). The statutory definition of an "abused or neglected child" includes one whose

The evidence presented at the fact-finding hearing provided ample support for the trial court's conclusion that the Division satisfied its burden of proof. See N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. I.S., 214 N.J. 8, 25-26, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S.Ct. 529, 187 L. Ed. 2d 380 (2013). We recite the salient facts, presented in the unrebutted testimony of Darlene Mandziuk, an investigator with the Division, and Officer Michael Struthers of the Jersey City Police Department.

At approximately 10:23 p.m. on September 18, 2012, Struthers and another officer were dispatched to Sara's apartment after it was learned a 9-1-1 hang-up call had originated from a phone in that apartment. They found Sara's five children2 alone, with no adults present and no food in the apartment. The oldest, Nell, was eight years old. The youngest, Ben, was eight months old. Seven-year-old Sam said he called 9-1-1 because he was unable to wake up Nell, who was asleep on the couch with the baby. When Struthers was unable to awaken her, the children were taken to the hospital where they were examined.

Sara did not arrive at the hospital until approximately 12:30 a.m. She told the officers she left the apartment around 10:00 that evening to get milk at the corner store and "simply lost track of time." The officers arrested Sara for endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4.

The Division received a referral and Mandziuk went to the hospital that night to investigate the matter. Sara repeated her version of events to Mandziuk. Interviews with Nell and Sam provided the following additional information.

Sara put Sam and two younger boys in their bedroom and told them to stay there. Nell said Sara then left the apartment "to get money somewhere," leaving Nell and the baby in the living room. According to Sam, Sara left the apartment at 5:00 p.m. Nell said Sara often left the children at home alone, leaving her to care for the children, including changing Ben's diapers, making his bottles and putting him to sleep. Nell admitted she was unsure what to do in the case of an emergency. She attempted to provide Mandziuk with her grandmother's phone number in New York but forgot the last four digits.

The Division did not contend that any of the children suffered actual harm when Sara left them alone on the evening of September 18. However, in the absence of actual harm, "a finding of abuse and neglect can be based on proof of imminent danger and substantial risk of harm." A.L., supra, 213 N.J. at 23 (citing N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4)(b)). A "minimum degree of care," as required by the statute, does not refer to merely negligent conduct, but rather "`to conduct that is grossly or wantonly negligent, but not necessarily intentional.'" N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. T.B., 207 N.J. 294, 305 (2011) (quoting G.S. v. Dep't of Human Servs., 157 N.J. 161, 178 (1999)).

Contrary to Sara's argument, leaving her children alone under the circumstances here did constitute gross negligence. Nell was only eight years old, admitted she was unprepared to deal with an emergency and could not provide the full telephone number for her grandmother, who resided in New York. To entrust someone so young with the challenges both ordinary and unexpected of caring for an infant and three other young children falls far short of the minimum degree of care Sara was required to exercise as a parent. Unlike T.B., supra, 207 N.J. at 296, where a mother left her four-year-old child unsupervised for two hours under the mistaken belief that his grandmother was home, there were no emergent or unknown circumstances here that might excuse Sara's lapse. In G.S., supra, 157 N.J. at 181, the Court used the example of a mother leaving a young child alone at home to go shopping as an example of abuse and neglect under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4)(b). There was further evidence to support that conclusion here because, as the trial court found, this was not an isolated instance as Sara frequently left the children alone.

Finally, it was unnecessary for the Division to prove that Sara was aware of the risk to her children created by her behavior. See T.B., supra, 207 N.J. at 306 ("Where an ordinary reasonable person would understand that a situation poses dangerous risks and acts without regard for the potentially serious consequences, the law holds him responsible for the injuries he causes." (quoting G.S., supra, 157 N.J. at 179) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Affirmed.