MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

KAREN B. MOLZEN, Magistrate Judge.

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Plaintiff's Opposed Motion for Protective Order to Stay All Discovery Pending Qualified Immunity Determination. Doc. 22. Having reviewed the parties' positions and all pertinent authority, the Court will deny the motion.

I. BACKGROUND

As alleged in the Complaint, on January 9, 2015, Plaintiff, Detective Jacob Grant, was shot by Defendant Lieutenant Greg Brachle during the course of a $60 undercover drug operation. Doc. 1-1 (Complaint) at 3; Doc. 8 (Brachle's Answer) at 2. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Brachle's actions violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Doc. 1-1 at 24. In response, Defendant Brachle raises the defense of qualified immunity. Doc. 8 at 9.

Early on in these proceedings, the parties agreed to an expedient resolution of Defendant Brachle's qualified immunity defense. As stated in the parties' Joint Status Report and Provisional Discovery Plan ("JSR"), filed on December 8, 2015:

Doc. 11 at 13-14. In accordance with the parties' requests, this Court entered a stipulated Order Adopting the JSR on January 12, 2016, wherein it bifurcated the qualified immunity issue from the rest of the issues in the case and limited discovery "to matters relevant to the question of whether Defendant Brachle violated Plaintiff's clearly established rights under the United States Constitution." Doc. 18 at 1. The Court also adopted the parties' proposed schedule. Id. at 1-2.

Notwithstanding the parties' agreement, Plaintiff filed motions for partial summary judgment on both Defendant Brachle and Defendant City of Albuquerque's affirmative defenses on January 11, 2016. Docs. 15, 16, 17. Most relevant here is Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Defendant Brachle's qualified immunity defense, to which Plaintiff attached his own affidavit and one from retired Albuquerque Police Department Sergeant Glenn Stout. Id. Defendant Brachle responded to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by seeking relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d),1 asserting that he needs to depose Plaintiff and Mr. Stout and to conduct written discovery prior to responding to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. See Doc. 20. To this end, Defendant Brachle served Plaintiff with written discovery on January 15, 2016, to which Plaintiff responded on February 26, 2016. Docs. 19, 32.

In the instant motion Plaintiff requests a stay of all discovery, including that related to qualified immunity, until presiding Chief District Judge Armijo resolves his Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the defense. See generally Doc. 22. Defendants oppose the stay. See Docs. 30, 34. For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that a stay of discovery is inappropriate.

II. ANALYSIS

"As a general rule, discovery rulings are within the broad discretion of the trial court." Cole v. Ruidoso Mun. Sch., 43 F.3d 1373, 1386 (10th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). A court may impose a stay of discovery or impose conditions on available discovery under the authority provided by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)(1), which states that "[t]he court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including . . . forbidding the disclosure or discovery; specifying terms, including time and place, for the disclosure or discovery; [and] . . . limiting the scope of disclosure or discovery to certain matters[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). The court may also stay discovery as part of its inherent power to control its own docket. Baca v. Berry, 806 F.3d 1262, 1269 (10th Cir. 2015) (citing Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706 (1997)).

Plaintiff is correct that qualified immunity should ordinarily be resolved early in the proceedings and, if possible, prior to discovery. Jiron v. City of Lakewood, 392 F.3d 410, 414 (10th Cir. 2004) ("even such pretrial matters as discovery are to be avoided if possible, as inquiries of this kind can be peculiarly disruptive of effective government") (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). Plaintiff is also correct that district courts routinely stay discovery when a dispositive motion addressing the defense is filed. Stonecipher v. Valles, 759 F.3d 1134, 1148 (10th Cir. 2014) cert. denied, Stonecipher v. Valles, 135 S.Ct. 881 (2014) ("because qualified immunity protects against the burdens of discovery as well as trial, a district court may stay discovery upon the filing of a dispositive motion based on qualified immunity"). However, these principles apply when a governmental defendant raises the defense, not when a plaintiff attacks it. Martin v. County of Santa Fe, 626 F. App'x 736, 740 (10th Cir. 2015) (unpublished) ("there is a strong policy justification for staying discovery and for refusing requests for additional discovery once a defendant invokes qualified immunity as a defense.") (emphasis added). This is not to say that the Court cannot grant a stay pursuant to Rule 12(c)(1) or its own inherent powers, but only that Plaintiff's preemptive motion for summary judgment on the qualified immunity defense is not by itself enough to justify the imposition of a stay.

In exercising its discretion to stay proceedings, the Court considers five factors: "(1) the interest of the [defendant] in proceeding expeditiously with discovery and the potential prejudice to the [defendant] of a delay; (2) the burden on the [plaintiff] of proceeding with discovery; (3) the convenience to the Court of staying discovery; (4) the interests of nonparties in either staying or proceeding with discovery; and (5) the public interest in either staying or proceeding with discovery." Sanchez v. Chu, CIV 13-0656 MCA/KBM, Doc. 35 at 2 (D.N.M. Dec. 17, 2013) (quoting Varnell v. Dora Consolidated School District, CIV 12-0905 JCH/GBW, Doc. 36 at 3 (D.N.M. January 11, 2013)). Taken together, these factors favor denying a stay in this case.

It was the intent of the parties to proceed expeditiously with discovery related to qualified immunity so as to resolve the defense early in this litigation, and Defendant Brachle has demonstrated prejudice that would result from a stay — the inability to address Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Accordingly, the first factor weighs in Defendant Brachle's favor. As to the second factor, Plaintiff has not demonstrated how permitting Defendants to pursue narrow discovery limited to the defense, and by extension the facts he offers in support of his Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, is so burdensome as to require a stay. Nor could he, as these matters are precisely what were contemplated by the parties' JSR. Moreover, the parties' agreement in the JSR and this Court's Order adopting it demonstrate that there is no benefit to the Court, nonparties, or the public in staying discovery. Discovery related to the defense has already been served and answered, and the current deadlines will ensure that the qualified immunity issue is resolved early in this case without necessitating the burden of additional discovery unrelated to it.

Wherefore,

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff's Opposed Motion for Protective Order to Stay All Discovery Pending Qualified Immunity Determination (Doc. 22) is denied.