GLENN T. SUDDABY, Chief District Judge.
Currently before the Court, in this Social Security action filed by Elizabeth J. Gleason Noelle ("Plaintiff") against the Commissioner of Social Security ("Defendant" or "Commissioner") seeking Disability Insurance Benefits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), are (1) United States Magistrate Judge William B. Mitchell Carter's Report-Recommendation recommending that the Commissioner's decision be affirmed and that Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed, and (2) Plaintiff's Objection to the Report-Recommendation. (Dkt. Nos. 16, 17.) For the reasons set forth below, the Report-Recommendation is accepted and adopted.
On May 20, 2011, Plaintiff applied for a period of Disability Insurance Benefits under the Social Security Act. (Administrative Transcript ["T."] at 90.) Plaintiff's application was initially denied by the Social Security Administration. Plaintiff appealed the decision; hearings were held by an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), David S. Pang; and, on April 25, 2014, ALJ Pang issued a written decision finding Plaintiff not disabled under the Social Security Act. (T. at 61-88, 97-114.) Subsequently, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review, rendering the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (T. at 1-5.) On November 2, 2015, Plaintiff filed this action in this Court. (Dkt. No. 1.)
Generally, in his Report-Recommendation, Magistrate Judge Carter rendered the following four findings of fact and/or conclusions of law: (1) the ALJ did not err in evaluating the opinion of Jody Hipple, NP, in assessing the severity of her impairment and ability to work, because (a) the conclusions of nurse practitioners regarding such subjects are not entitled to any special weight, (b) here, the ALJ considered Nurse Hipple's opinion and rejected it on the grounds that the limitations were based primarily on Plaintiff's subjective reports, there were no significant abnormal physical findings to support the limitations, and the limitations were inconsistent with the consultative examiner's examination and opinion, and (c) in any event, despite expressly affording Nurse Hipple's opinion "no weight," he in fact adopted the portion of her opinion regarding the amount of weight that Plaintiff could lift and carry; (2) the ALJ did not err in assessing Plaintiff's credibility, because (a) her activities of daily living could reasonably support the ALJ's conclusion that her statements regarding the limiting effects of her symptoms were not as severe as alleged, and (b) in addition to Plaintiff's activities of daily living, the ALJ relied on objective medical evidence in the record such as treatment notations and testing; (3) the ALJ did not err in determining, at step four, that Plaintiff was capable of performing her past relevant work as a sales manager, because Plaintiff failed to show that her past relevant work as a sales manager was a "composite" job (especially given the hearing testimony of the vocational expert to the contrary); and (4) any error that the ALJ committed in determining, at step four, that Plaintiff's past relevant work included work as a data entry clerk was harmless, because the ALJ properly determined that Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work as a sales manager. (Dkt. No. 16, at Part IV.)
Generally, in her Objections to the Report-Recommendation, Plaintiff asserts the following two arguments: (1) the ALJ erred in assessing Plaintiff's credibility regarding her limitations by (a) penalizing her for doing simply daily activities despite the pain of her disability, (b) relying on the one-time report of Nurse Practitioner Mary Ellen Flannigan, who was not Plaintiff's main treatment source, (c) failing to explain how the ability to perform simple daily activities equates to the ability to perform substantial gainful activity, and (d) ignoring or discounting Plaintiff's very strong work history; and (2) the ALJ erred in evaluating the opinion of Plaintiff's treating Nurse Practitioner, Jody Hipple, because (a) Nurse Hipple's reliance on Plaintiff's complaints of pain (which is, by definition, subjective) was permissible and indeed an essential diagnostic tool, (b) the fact that some of the physical exams of Plaintiff showed "normal results" is (given Plaintiff's complaints of pain) actually evidence of fibromyalgia, and (c) the fact that Plaintiff continued to seek, and receive, medicare care and medications to try to alleviate her symptoms further supports Nurse Hipple's opinion. (Dkt. No. 17.)
When a specific objection is made to a portion of a magistrate judge's reportrecommendation, the Court subjects that portion of the report-recommendation to a de novo review. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). To be "specific," the objection must, with particularity, "identify [1] the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations, or report to which it has an objection and [2] the basis for the objection." N.D.N.Y. L.R. 72.1(c).
When only a general objection is made to a portion of a magistrate judge's report-recommendation, the Court subjects that portion of the report-recommendation to only a clear error review. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2),(3); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), Advisory Committee Notes: 1983 Addition; see also Brown v. Peters, 95-CV-1641, 1997 WL 599355, at *2-3 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1997) (Pooler, J.) [collecting cases], aff'd without opinion, 175 F.3d 1007 (2d Cir. 1999). Similarly, when an objection merely reiterates the same arguments made by the objecting party in its original papers submitted to the magistrate judge, the Court subjects that portion of the report-recommendation challenged by those arguments to only a clear error review.
After conducing the appropriate review, the Court may "accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).
In Part III.A. of his Report-Recommendation, Magistrate Judge Carter correctly recited the legal standard governing judicial review of Defendant's decision. (Dkt. No. 16, at Part III.A.) As a result, this standard is incorporated by reference in this Decision and Order, which is intended primarily for the review of the parties.
As an initial matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff's objections to the Report-Recommendation (described above in Part I.C. of this Decision and Order) repeat arguments previously asserted in Plaintiff's brief in support of her motion for judgment on the pleadings before Magistrate Judge Carter. (Compare Dkt. No. 17, at Points I and II [Plf.'s Objections] with Dkt. No. 11, at Points III and V [Plf.'s Brief].) As a result, the "challenged" portions of the Report-Recommendation are entitled to only a clear-error review.
After carefully reviewing all of the papers in this action, including Magistrate Judge Carter's thorough Report-Recommendation, the Court can find no clear error in the Report-Recommendation: Magistrate Judge Carter employed the proper standards, accurately recited the facts, and reasonably applied the law to those facts. (Dkt. No. 16.) As a result, the Court accepts and adopts the Report-Recommendation in its entirety for the reasons stated therein. The Court notes that, even if it were to subject the challenged portions of the Report-Recommendation to a de novo review, it would find those portions survive that review for the reasons stated in the Report-Recommendation: (1) the ALJ did not err in assessing Plaintiff's credibility regarding her limitations; and (2) the ALJ did not err in evaluating the opinion of Plaintiff's treating Nurse Practitioner, Jody Hipple.