NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

PER CURIAM.

We examine whether a trial judge may enter a stay of execution of a final judgment after the underlying determination has been affirmed on appeal. Defendant, the Estate of Robert Cohen, appeals from an April 22, 2014 order staying execution of a final judgment pending appeal by applying Rule 2:9-5, and allowing plaintiffs, the Estate of Claudia L. Cohen, by and through its executor Ronald O. Perelman, and Samantha Perelman (collectively plaintiff), to post a bond. Plaintiff cross-appeals arguing the stay should be imposed until related litigation is concluded.

Following our review, we conclude the judge had no authority to issue a stay once an appellate judgment issued. Accordingly, we reverse the April 22, 2014 order staying plaintiff's obligation to satisfy the judgment. On the cross-appeal, we reject plaintiff's arguments as lacking merit and affirm the April 11, 2014 order.

The underlying litigation is extensive and accompanied by a complex procedural history. For the purposes of our opinion, we need only provide the core facts leading to entry of the order under review.

The parties involved are family members. Claudia is Robert's daughter. She passed away in 2007, naming Perelman as her executor and Samantha her sole heir. Defendant James Cohen is Robert's son and Claudia's brother. James worked for and with Robert operating the family business. Following Robert's death in 2012, James was named Robert's executor.

In 2004, Robert loaned Claudia $10 million pursuant to the terms of a demand note, requiring annual interest payments and repayment of the principal no later than May 15, 2007. Plaintiff's complaint asserted Robert always assured Claudia any loans she owed him would be forgiven upon his death and she and James would equally share the significant assets accumulated in his estate.

Plaintiff initiated this action against Robert and James alleging James took "advantage of his father's deteriorating health . . . exercised undue and improper influence on his aging and sickly father . . . and used this influence . . . to orchestrate . . . a series of transactions that . . . resulted in the transfer of the vast bulk of the family's assets to himself." Plaintiff's causes of action against James included tortious interference, unjust enrichment, undue influence and fraud emanating from his surreptitious actions to deliberately thwart Robert's ability "to honor his promises" to Claudia and defraud her estate and heir. Against Robert, plaintiff sought to enforce the lifetime promises to provide Claudia or her heir an equal share of the family fortune and sought creation of a constructive trust. Robert filed an answer to plaintiff's complaint, as well as a counterclaim, seeking repayment of the loan, plus interest and costs of collection.

Prior to trial, plaintiff questioned Robert's capacity to proceed with the litigation. That issue was put to rest on June 1, 2009, when, following a multi-day evidentiary hearing, the Chancery judge issued an oral opinion denying the motion to appoint a guardian ad litem for Robert. The judge found Robert's illness compromised his movement and his medication slowed his response time, but his mental faculties, including the ability to understand and make decisions, were strong.

Plaintiff separately filed a complaint for guardianship of Robert. That complaint was dismissed after trial on June 26, 2009.

Trial in this matter concluded with a September 17, 2009 order dismissing all counts of the complaint, two without prejudice pending final determination on Robert's counterclaim and the remainder with prejudice for the reasons stated in the judge's written opinion. Trial on the counterclaim concluded with entry of the judge's written opinion filed on April 8, 2010. She concluded the $10 million transaction was a loan, due and payable by plaintiff, and not intended as a gift. Consequently, the two remaining causes of action previously dismissed without prejudice were found lacking. Final judgment, filed on August 24, 2010, dismissed plaintiff's complaint and entered judgment for Robert. The judgment permitted plaintiff to post a bond to secure the judgment and stayed execution pending appeal.

Plaintiff appealed from the final judgment, arguing the trial judge erred in rejecting the claims Claudia was to share in Robert's estate and the loan was actually a gift. Robert and James cross-appealed seeking reversal of the denial of their application for frivolous litigation costs. A separate related appeal, which was filed by plaintiff's counsel challenging a frivolous litigation counsel fee award, was calendared back-to back with that matter.

We affirmed all Chancery Division orders leading to the final dismissal of plaintiff's complaint and final judgment in favor of Robert for repayment of the loan. Our opinion relied on the substantive determinations made by the trial judge in her various opinions. Estate of Cohen v. Cohen, No. A-0713-10 (App. Div. Oct. 3, 2013) (slip op. at 3-4, 30). However, the separate matter involving an award of counsel fees and costs pursuant to Rule 1:4-8 was subject to remand. Ibid. Because the supersedeas bond remained in place, a stay of the final judgment pending plaintiff's application for certification was entered on November 8, 2013. Certification was ultimately denied on February 19, 2014. Estate of Cohen v. Cohen, 217 N.J. 287 (2014).

On February 1, 2012, before the appeal and cross-appeal were perfected for argument, Robert died. Robert's death spawned new litigation by Samantha, who sought to set aside inter vivos transfers by Robert to James, resurrecting the claim James exerted undue influence over Robert. In this action, Samantha also argued a prior will executed by Robert, which included a provision forgiving outstanding loans he made to his beneficiaries, must be probated.

After the New Jersey Supreme Court denied certification, plaintiff moved before the Chancery Division to stay execution on the judgment pending resolution of Samantha's probate litigation against Robert's estate. Plaintiff argued: "if Samantha were to prevail in [her undue influence challenge] and establish[ed] that [a prior will] was Robert's last valid will, the [c]ounterclaim [j]udgment would be invalidated." On April 4, 2014, the judge denied plaintiff's motion and compelled the surety to satisfy the judgment within twenty days. This decision was memorialized in an order filed on April 11, 2014.

Plaintiff filed a second motion seeking to stay the April 11, 2014 order pending its appeal, relying on Rule 2:9-5. On April 22, 2014, the Chancery judge granted this motion, conditioned on plaintiff maintaining the bond.

Robert's estate appeals from the April 22, 2014 order. Plaintiff cross-appeals seeking reversal of the April 11, 2014 order denying its stay request pending conclusion of Samantha's related litigation.1

Motions were filed before this court. One motion panel entered an order on June 9, 2014, summarily affirming the grant of a stay of enforcement of the judgment on Robert's counterclaim pending appellate review.

On appeal, Robert argues the April 22, 2014 order improperly exercised jurisdiction to modify a determination of this court. We agree.

An opinion of the Appellate Division constitutes our final judgment, entered on the date the opinion is filed. R. 2:11-3(b) ("The opinion of the appellate court shall include its judgment, and no other form of judgment shall be required. It shall state whether the judgment, order or determination below is affirmed, reversed or modified, or it may provide for final judgment dispositive of the action."). Any request to stay an appellate judgment must be filed with this court within twenty days. R. 2:11-3(d).

Once our judgment finalizes a matter, the "trial judge has the responsibility to comply with [its] pronouncements. . . ." Tomaino v. Burman, 364 N.J.Super. 224, 232 (App. Div. 2003), certif. denied, 179 N.J. 310 (2004). "Clearly the appellate court's instructions to the trial court on remand are binding on that court and the trial court `has no choice but to follow those instructions irrespective of its private view as to their soundness.'" Ibid. (citations omitted) (quoting Pressler, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment on R. 2:11-3 (2004)). "Adherence to this bedrock doctrine is vital to the proper administration and enforcement of the laws, promotes certainty and stability, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial system." Ibid.

During the initial motion, plaintiff proffered staying the order to release the bond within twenty days was appropriate because Samantha's success in the probate litigation might impact the obligation to satisfy the loan. The motion judge correctly denied plaintiff's motion, finding no basis to award a stay. The April 11, 2014 order of enforcement memorialized that determination and carried out our judgment by setting a time frame for plaintiff's satisfaction.

The trial judge correctly denied the motion for a stay on April 11, 2011. However, when plaintiff repackaged the stay request as one merely to stay the order denying a stay, the judge mistakenly overlooked that he lacked authority to consider such a request. "[T]he trial court has no discretion when a mandate issues from an appellate court. It simply must comply." Tomaino, supra, 364 N.J. Super. at 233. "Even where manifestly erroneous, the decision on appeal must be enforced as written, and relief from its direction `can be had only in the appellate court whose judgment it is.'" Ibid. (quoting In re Plainfield-Union Water Co., 14 N.J. 296, 303 (1954)).

When plaintiff filed for a stay, all issues were resolved. The $10 million transfer to Claudia was determined a loan. More importantly, during his lifetime, Robert sued for the loan's repayment, pursuant to the note's contractual terms, and successfully secured a judgment. We affirmed the judgment. If plaintiff desired a stay, the appropriate course of action was to apply to this court. R. 2:11-3(d). We entered a stay, with Robert's consent, pending plaintiff's request for certification. No subsequent application for stay relief was filed. Plaintiff cannot circumvent the defined procedures governing the courts by soliciting such relief from the trial court. Plainfield-Union Water Co., supra, 14 N.J. at 303. Thus, the request for a stay should have been denied because the trial judge lacked authority to stay an appellate judgment.

We also reject any claimed distinction that an appeal from an order denying a stay of a judgment affirmed on appeal is somehow different from the request to stay compliance in the first instance, which was the suggested basis of the April 22, 2014 order. A trial judge has no authority to entertain either request, once a final appellate order is issued.

Further, we reject as wrong plaintiff's assertion of a need to preserve the status quo or a characterization of its request as "provisional relief." The status quo required the judgment's satisfaction. The attenuated hope future success would result when a different party re-litigated whether Robert was subjected to undue influence is unavailing.

The reliance on Rule 2:9-5 is also misplaced. The rule specifically "govern[s] the practice and procedure in the Supreme Court and the Appellate Division of the Superior Court." R. 2:1. It may not be invoked by trial courts. The Chancery Division's reliance on this rule was erroneous. Accordingly, we conclude the April 22, 2014 order staying compliance with our judgment superseded an appellate mandate and must be reversed.

We have considered the arguments advanced by plaintiff on cross-appeal. We conclude the arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in our opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). The stay of enforcement of Robert's judgment, filed on June 9, 2014, is vacated.

The April 22, 2014 order challenged on appeal is reversed. The April 11, 2014 order challenged on the cross-appeal is affirmed, but for different reasons, as set forth in our opinion.