NOT FOR PUBLICATION
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff Tina Renna, the self-described president of the Union County Watchdog Association, Inc., appeals from a January 25, 2012 order dismissing with prejudice her complaint seeking documents under New Jersey's Open Public Records Act (OPRA), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to-13, and the common law right of access from defendant Union County Alliance (UCA). Plaintiff appeals the determination that UCA is not a public agency. Defendant is a not-for-profit entity, consisting of members from "government agencies and authorities, educational institutions, trade, business and professional leagues, civic and cultural organizations, labor unions, hospitals, religious bodies and the like. No individuals or private business corporations... may become members." UCA has the express goal of improving the economy and quality of life in Union County. UCA was created through a grant from Union County and the New Jersey Department of Higher Education. Although it regularly contracts with Union County, it maintains an autonomous board of directors. We determine that because plaintiff did not appeal a prior administrative determination of the Government Records Council (GRC) denying plaintiff access to UCA records, she is collaterally estopped from bringing the current action. See Winters v. N. Hudson Reg'l Fire & Rescue, 212 N.J. 67, 87 (2012). We also agree with the trial court that UCA records are not public records under the common law. We thus affirm the dismissal of her complaint.
Plaintiff initially sought records from the UCA on October 11, 2005. She sought documentation of all expenses associated with the Union County Directions Newsletter's spring and fall 2005 issues. After initially referring the issue of whether or not the UCA is a public agency to the Office of Administrative Law, the GRC ultimately based its determination on the Law Division decision in the case of Miller v. Union County Alliance, No. UNN-L-2909-07 (Law Div. Oct. 3, 2007), appeal dismissed, No. A-1294-07 (Apr. 16, 2008), which held that the UCA is not a public entity for OPRA purposes. On June 25, 2008, the GRC determined that the UCA is not a public agency.
Notably, plaintiff did not file an appeal of the GRC's adverse final agency decision with this court, even though she was entitled to do so pursuant to Rule 2:2-3(a)(2). Instead, approximately three years later, on August 25, 2011, plaintiff submitted an OPRA request to defendant seeking:
1. All bills and receipts pertaining to the production of the Union County Directions Newsletter, January 2010 to date.
2. A copy of each Union County Directions Newsletter produced in 2010 & 2011[.]
3. Meeting minutes of the Union County Alliance Board of Directors for the years 2010 and 2011 to date.
After defendant did not provide the requested records, plaintiff filed a verified complaint and an order to show cause with the Union County Superior Court. She asked the court to find that defendant was a public agency under OPRA and was therefore required to provide requested records to plaintiff, or that the records must be provided under the common law right of access. In a nineteen-page written opinion, the judge analyzed in detail the formation of the UCA, its Board of Directors, and its functions. The judge determined that,
[T]he defendant was not formed by any act of Union County government; no political subdivision has the power to appoint or remove members of defendant's Board of Directors; the defendant has never filed a lawsuit on behalf of Union County or any public entity; the defendant does not utilize any public property in its operations; the defendant has no current or future obligation to provide Union County with property and, in fact, in the event of dissolution, the Certificate of Incorporation bars defendant's assets from being transferred to the County; and, no employees of defendant are registered for PERS1 or have ever sought to be so registered.
Although defendant was created in 1994 by the Union County Manager and two other individuals, initially funded by a $25,000 Union County grant and received as much as $300,000 in one year in contracts from Union County,2 the judge determined that, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1, defendant was not an instrumentality or agency created by a political subdivision, nor was it controlled by a political subdivision.
We review whether a non-profit organization is a "public agency" for the purposes of OPRA de novo. Fair Share Hous. Ctr., Inc. v. N.J. State League of Municipalities, 207 N.J. 489, 493 n.1 (2011) (citing Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995); Tractenberg v. Twp. of W. Orange, 416 N.J.Super. 354, 365 (App. Div. 2010)). "[W]e look at the law with fresh eyes and need pay no deference to legal conclusions reached by the trial court...." Ibid. (citing Manalapan Realty, L.P., supra, 140 N.J. at 378; Tractenberg, supra, 416 N.J. Super. at 365).
Eight months after the judge's decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided Winters. In the context of public employee discipline, the Court held that when a plaintiff chooses not to fully present his termination defense of a violation of the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA), N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to-14, in an administrative forum, he is estopped from later raising a CEPA claim in the courts. Winters, supra, 212 N.J. at 71. The Court stated,
A litigant should not be permitted to participate in the administrative system designed to promote a fair and uniform statewide system of public employee discipline, see In re Herrmann, [192 N.J. 19, 37] (2007) (recognizing legislative charge to Commission's predecessor to supervise consistency in public employee disciplinary matters), raise a retaliation defense (as plaintiff did here), and then hold back on the defense in an attempt to save it for later duplicative litigation. No efficient and respected system of justice can permit the spectacle, and resulting disrepute, of inconsistent litigated matters involving the same transactional set of facts, notwithstanding that the forums embrace judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings.
[Id. at 72-73.]
Similarly here, plaintiff sought records involving Union >County Directions Newsletters and received an adverse administrative determination that the UCA was not a public entity as defined by OPRA and therefore not bound to provide records. Three years later, plaintiff again sought Union County Directions Newsletters pursuant to OPRA. When the information was not provided, she filed a complaint in court. Unlike in Winters, where the employee chose not to present a defense in order to save it for future litigation, here plaintiff boldly filed the same claim in court without appealing a prior adverse administrative ruling to this court.
Our Supreme Court has long recognized that "`[a]dministrative tribunals can and do provide a full and fair opportunity for litigation of an issue[.]'" Id. at 87 (quoting Hennessey v. Winslow Twp., 183 N.J. 593, 600 (2005)). Therefore, administrative tribunal decisions regarding issues that are later presented to a court may in fact trigger the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Ibid.; see also Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 (1982). Although N.J.S.A. 47:1A-7 states that "[a] decision of the [GRC] shall not have value as a precedent for any case initiated in Superior Court[,]" the application of collateral estoppel does not fall within this limitation.
Collateral estoppel is an equitable principle that applies
[w]hen an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.
[Winters, supra, 212 N.J. at 85 (alteration in original) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 (1982)).]
Collateral estoppel facilitates the promotion of society's values, including "`finality and repose; prevention of needless litigation; avoidance of duplication; reduction of unnecessary burdens of time and expenses; elimination of conflicts, confusion and uncertainty; and basic fairness.'" Ibid. (quoting Olivieri v. Y.M.F. Carpet, Inc., 186 N.J. 511, 522 (2006)).
Collateral estoppel applies in the context of administrative tribunals only if the tribunal afforded the parties "`significant procedural and substantive safeguards,'" comparable to those accorded to litigants in the courts. Id. at 87 (quoting Olivieri, supra, 186 N.J. at 524); see also Ensslin v. Twp. of N. Bergen, 275 N.J.Super. 352, 369 (App. Div. 1994), certif. denied, 142 N.J. 446 (1995). When complaints are filed with the GRC, formalized administrative processes have been established to ensure fairness as to both complainants and respondents.3 See generally Gill v. N.J Dep't of Banking and Ins., 404 N.J.Super. 1 (App. Div. 2008). Plaintiff does not contend that the GRC's procedures are institutionally deficient.
Plaintiff does claim that the GRC's determination was unfair because it based its decision that the UCA was not a public entity solely on "an unpublished, trial-level decision, whose opinion and reasoning is not even in the record before the [c]ourt." This argument could certainly have been raised by plaintiff in a direct appeal of the 2008 GRC decision.
Although we need not consider whether plaintiff was entitled to the UCA records under the common law as plaintiff does not present any argument in her appellate brief on this issue, Sklodowsky v. Lushis, 417 N.J.Super. 648, 657 (App. Div. 2011), we affirm the trial judge's decision on this point substantially for the reasons expressed in her January 25, 2012 written opinion.
Affirmed.
