R. BARCLAY SURRICK, District Judge.
Presently before the Court are pro se Defendant Gagandeep S. Mangat, M.D.'s Motion to Dismiss Complaint (ECF No. 10) and pro se Defendant Vimal H. Patel, M.D.'s Motion to Dismiss Complaint (ECF No. 12). For the following reasons, Defendants' Motions will be denied.
Plaintiff filed a Complaint in Confession of Judgment on May 15, 2019. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) A copy of the Summons and Complaint were served on Defendants Gagandeep S. Mangat, M.D. and Vimal H. Patel, M.D. ("Moving Defendants") on October 3, 2019, 141 days later. (ECF Nos. 5 & 6.) Moving Defendants filed nearly identical motions to dismiss on October 15, 2019 (ECF Nos. 10 & 12), asserting that the Complaint should be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m), which states in relevant part that:
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). Plaintiff opposes the motions, arguing that the ordinary service of process rules do not apply to confession of judgment complaints. Plaintiff is correct.
"Under Pennsylvania law, parties may, in certain circumstances, create a contract with an automatic right to a money judgment upon a party's default." S&T Bank v. Zokaites, No. 10-1748, 2011 WL 1298171, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2011). This is known as a confessed judgment, which, "by its very nature, is a final judgment under Pennsylvania law." Id. at *2 (citing Pa. R. Civ. P. 2956). "Once a complaint in confession of judgment is filed, the prothonotary is required to enter judgment in conformity with the confession. A confession of judgment is then a very powerful tool because it places the power to enter an immediate judgment in the hands of one party to a contract." Id. at *1 (internal citation omitted). Federal courts may entertain confessions of judgment on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. See id. at *2. Plaintiff's Complaint alleges diversity jurisdiction. (Compl. ¶¶ 3-8.)
"The right to enter judgment upon a confession contained in an instrument is a common-law right which may be exercised without the necessity of suit, i.e., service of process, pleading and judicial determination." FDIC v. Steinman, 53 F.Supp. 644, 651 (E.D. Pa. 1943). With regard to the interplay between this common law right and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Nat'l Leasing Corp. v. Williams, 80 F.R.D. 416, 418-19 (W.D. Pa. 1978) (emphasis added); accord Beneficial Mutual Savings Bank v. Philippopoulos, No. 11-2348, 2012 WL 3235165, at *2 n.6 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 2012). In Philippopoulos, the defendant objected to improper service of process of a confession of judgment complaint. The court rejected the challenge, reasoning that by authorizing the confession of judgment, the defendant "waived her right to challenge entry of confessed judgment based on lack of service," and "requiring formal service of the Complaint would be inconsistent with the essential purpose of the [confessed judgment]." Id.
Here, according to the Complaint and agreements appended to the Complaint, Moving Defendants similarly agreed to allow Plaintiff to enforce the confessed judgments "without prior notice or opportunity for a hearing." (Compl. Exs. H & I.) Moreover, as in Philippopoulos, Moving Defendants do not claim that their waivers are invalid or unenforceable. See 2012 WL 3235165, at *2.
Since Moving Defendants have waived their right to demand adherence to the notice and service rules under Rule 4, their Motions will be denied.
An appropriate order follows.