ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENADATION

PAMELA K. CHEN, District Judge.

Plaintiff Laura A. Marshall ("Plaintiff") initiated this action on June 3, 2011 against her employer, Kingsborough Community College ("KCC"), Stuart Schulman ("Schulman"), and others (collectively, "Defendants"1), alleging discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation. On June 20, 2014, Defendants moved for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the complaint. Though voluntarily withdrawing her Title VI, Section 1983 and Section 1981 claims, Plaintiff otherwise opposed Defendants' motion. This matter was referred to the Honorable Robert M. Levy for a Report, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b).

On July 7, 2015, following oral argument on the motion on April 7, 2015, Judge Levy issued the Report, in which he recommended, in sum, that the Court grant summary judgment in Defendants' favor on Plaintiff's failure to promote and retaliation claims, and deny summary judgment on Plaintiff's hostile work environment claims. (Report at 26.) On August 10, 2015, Plaintiff timely filed her objection to the Report. (Plaintiff's Partial Objection to Magistrate Judge Levy's Report and Recommendation ("Pl. Obj."), Dkt. 54.) Defendants timely responded to Plaintiff's objection on August 17, 2015. (Dkt. 55.)

Plaintiff's lone objection to the Report relates to Judge Levy's recommendation that Plaintiff's retaliation claims be dismissed. (Pl. Obj. at 1.) Plaintiff maintains — and indeed, it is undisputed — that Defendants did not reference or make any argument in their summary judgment motion regarding Plaintiff's retaliation claim, and that Judge Levy sua sponte raised Plaintiff's retaliation claim at oral argument.2 (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff argues that the Court should overrule Judge Levy's recommendation to dismiss Plaintiff's retaliation claims because Defendants did not, in fact, move to dismiss them, and Plaintiff therefore had no opportunity to brief this issue before the oral argument before Judge Levy. (Id. at 1.)

For the reasons set forth below, the Court adopts Judge Levy's Report in its entirety, except as to Plaintiff's retaliation claim. The Court reserves decision on Plaintiff's objection regarding that claim pending Plaintiff's filing of the submission described herein.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When a party objects to a magistrate judge's report and recommendation, the district court makes a "de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made." See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) ("A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made."); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3) ("The district judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge's disposition that has been properly objected to."). "After reviewing the report and recommendation, the Court may `accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge may also receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.'" O'Diah v. Mawhir, No. 08 Civ. 322, 2011 WL 933846, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2011) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C)).

II. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff asks the Court to reject Judge Levy's recommendation to dismiss Plaintiff's retaliation claims because Plaintiff did not have the opportunity to address these claims prior to oral argument before Judge Levy. (Pl. Obj. at 3.) Tellingly, however, Plaintiff does not, and cannot, argue that she did not have the opportunity to supplement her summary judgment submission with respect to her retaliation claims before Judge Levy issued his Report four months later or as part of her objections to the Report. Indeed, despite being on notice after the April 7, 2015 oral argument that her retaliation claims could be dismissed, Plaintiff never sought leave to supplement her summary judgment submission, nor did she seek to do so after receiving the Report, in which Judge Levy recommended the dismissal of her retaliation claims.

In support of her request to disregard Judge Levy's recommendation, Plaintiff relies on cases in which courts have denied motions where the moving party failed to submit a supporting memorandum of law or belatedly raised an argument for the first time. (Pl. Obj. at 5.) Plaintiff also cites cases in which courts have observed that it is not the court's responsibility to make the party's case for them. See, e.g., Scott v. City of New York Dept. of Correction, 641 F.Supp.2d 211, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting that, where plaintiff in a gender discrimination case, failed to cite to evidence to create an issue of fact to defeat summary judgment, it was not the court's responsibility to "scour the record looking for factual disputes") (internal quotation omitted). These cases are plainly inapposite. In particular, the court's observation in Scott that the Court has no duty to make a party's case for it is a far cry from holding that the Court does not have the authority to spontaneously resolve issues in a case.

As Defendants correctly note, the Court has the discretion to grant summary judgment sua sponte, so long as "the party against whom summary judgment is rendered has had a full and fair opportunity to meet the proposition that there is no genuine issue of material fact to be tried." Priestley v. Headminder, Inc., 647 F.3d 497, 504 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 326 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Celotex, the Supreme Court observed that "district courts are widely acknowledged to possess the power to enter summary judgment sua sponte, so long as the losing party was on notice that [it] had to come forward with all of [its] evidence." 477 U.S. at 326.

In Ramsey v. Coughlin, 94 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 1996), the Second Circuit explained the safeguards that district courts must observe with respect to sua sponte grants of summary judgment:

Id. at 74; see Bridgeway v. Citibank, 201 F.3d 134, 139 (2d Cir. 2000).

Here, Plaintiff has had ample notice and opportunity to supplement her summary judgment submission with evidence demonstrating a factual issue with respect to her retaliation claims, but has not done so in the four-and-a-half months since the oral argument. Furthermore, Plaintiff has presented nothing, not even by way of proffer, to suggest that she has evidence not already identified in the summary judgment briefing that would create an issue of fact as to her retaliation claims. Indeed, given that the gravamen of her retaliation and discrimination claims is the same, i.e., that she was not promoted, it is unlikely that Plaintiff has any additional evidence to bring to bear on her retaliation claims. Finally, discovery was completed over two years ago, so there is no argument that Plaintiff needs more to time to obtain the necessary evidence.

Nonetheless, out of an abundance of caution, the Court will permit Plaintiff thirty (30) days from the date of this Memorandum and Order, to identify and describe, by letter submission, additional evidence it would offer to "meet the proposition that there is no genuine issue of material fact to be tried." Priestley, 647 F.3d at 504 (quoting Schwan-Stabilo Cosmetics GmbH & Co. v. Pacificlink Int'l Corp., 401 F.3d 28, 33 (2d Cir. 2005)). Based on this submission, the Court will determine whether additional summary judgment briefing regarding Plaintiff's retaliation claims is warranted. Plaintiff will also identify where in her complaint or elsewhere in this matter she alleges retaliation.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in the Report, the Court grants summary judgment in Defendants' favor on Plaintiff's failure to promote claims, which are dismissed, and denies summary judgment on Plaintiff's hostile work environment claims. The Court reserves decision regarding the recommendation to dismiss Plaintiff's retaliation claims pending Plaintiff's supplemental submission, which is due thirty (30) days from the date of this Memorandum and Order.

SO ORDERED.