NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

PER CURIAM.

M.M. appeals from a September 26, 2013 judgment that he continues to be a sexually violent predator in need of civil commitment in a secure facility pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA), N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.24 to -27.38. Because the trial court's findings on all elements necessary for civil commitment under the SVPA are supported by clear and convincing evidence, we affirm.

M.M. has been arrested and convicted five times for offenses that are sexual in nature. Specifically, M.M. has been convicted of lewdness after masturbating in a public restroom in Cherry Hill in 1996; third-degree endangering the welfare of a child after following a child into a restroom to observe his genitals in 1997; breach of privacy without consent after watching two boys urinating in a public restroom in Pennsylvania in 1999; and third-degree endangering the welfare of a child after following a boy into a restroom, and attempting to observe the boy's genitals, while masturbating in the restroom in 2000.

Most recently, M.M. was arrested following an incident at a rest stop on the Garden State Parkway on August 4, 2007. There, M.M. followed a twelve-year-old boy into a public restroom and observed him while he was urinating at a urinal. After the boy noticed M.M. and began to move away from him, M.M. followed him and stood next to him at another urinal. M.M. exposed himself to the boy and began masturbating. As these events unfolded, the boy's stepfather entered the restroom and reported that M.M. was exposed, masturbating, and touching the child. Following his arrest, M.M. pled guilty to second-degree sexual assault and was sentenced to a seven-year period of incarceration at the Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center (ADTC) on May 12, 2008.

The State filed a petition to civilly commit M.M. on July 10, 2013 pursuant to the SVPA. The trial court conducted a hearing on September 18, 2013. The State presented two witnesses: Drs. Roger Harris and Debra Roquet. Dr. Harris testified that M.M. had previously received treatment for his sexual behaviors, and continued to offend while receiving treatment. Dr. Harris noted that M.M.'s offenses included stalking and making sexual contact with young boys while in an inpatient treatment facility. Dr. Harris also described incidents of a sexual nature between M.M. and young children of family friends, and noted that his pedophilic tendencies began at a young age. He testified that M.M.'s early incidents did not culminate in arrests or convictions. Additionally, he testified that M.M. received gratification from lying to treatment providers by pretending to progress in treatment. Dr. Harris noted that M.M. exhibited disdain for treatment on numerous occasions.

Dr. Harris concluded that M.M. suffered from pedophilic voyeurism disorders, as well as a possible exhibitionistic disorder. Dr. Harris testified that these conditions affect M.M. emotionally, volitionally, and cognitively, predisposing him to sexual violence and making it difficult for him to control his sexually offending behavior. Dr. Harris concluded that, because of M.M.'s lack of progress in treatment, he is likely to commit acts of sexual violence in the future if released from the Special Treatment Unit (STU). Dr. Harris further testified that his conclusion is supported by M.M.'s score of eight on the STATIC-99R actuarial tool, which correlates to high risk of recidivism. Dr. Harris noted that this score likely underrepresents the risk that M.M. poses to the community. Dr. Harris further stated that, although none of M.M.'s victims suffered physical injury, some victims suffered psychological injury and that M.M.'s future acts of sexual violence could include sexual assault, such as oral sex. Dr. Harris identified one victim that had acted out while at school, which he attributed to the psychological harm the boy suffered after M.M.'s sexual advances.

Dr. Roquet made similar conclusions based on M.M.'s "persistent" stalking and sexual behaviors, despite having been placed on community supervision and treatment. Dr. Roquet noted that M.M. had not benefited from treatment and that he exhibited a "profound lack of remorse." Dr. Roquet also concluded that M.M. scored an eight during her administration of the STATIC-99R actuarial tool (denoting a high likelihood of recidivism), that M.M. suffered from pedophilia and voyeurism disorders, which predispose him to commit acts of sexual violence. She noted that M.M. was, and remains, unable to control his sexual proclivities. Dr. Roquet further noted that M.M. psychologically minimized the effects of his behavior on the children he targeted, and that he has persistently rejected treatment throughout his stays at the ADTC and the STU. She also concluded that M.M. indicated to her that he is a compulsive sexual addict, and ignores consequences when presented with the opportunity to view a boy's genitalia. She, like Dr. Harris, concluded that M.M. was likely to reoffend without further treatment at the STU.

On September 18, 2013, the trial judge placed an oral decision on the record and found that the State proved all elements necessary to commit M.M. by clear and convincing evidence under the SVPA. First, the judge concluded that M.M. was convicted of a crime of sexual violence. Second, the judge concluded, based on the witnesses' testimony, that M.M.'s symptoms would not spontaneously remit and that he required treatment for his disorders, and that M.M. had not progressed in his treatment. The trial judge concluded that both Drs. Harris and Roquet were credible, and that M.M. remains at a high risk of recidivism if not civilly committed to the STU. The trial judge specifically concluded, based on the evidence, that M.M. "is a danger to the health and safety of boys twelve and under." The judge signed an order reflecting his judgment on September 26, 2013, committing M.M. to the STU for treatment, with a one-year review period. This appeal followed.

M.M. argues the following point on appeal:

Our scope of review of a SVPA commitment trial "is extremely narrow." In re Civil Commitment of R.F., 217 N.J. 152, 174 (2014) (quoting In re D.C., 146 N.J. 31, 58 (1996)). We must "give deference to the findings of our trial judges because they have the `opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the "feel" of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy.'" Ibid. (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964)). Moreover, "[t]he judges who hear SVPA cases generally are `specialists' and `their expertise in the subject' is entitled to `special deference.'" Ibid. (quoting In re Civil Commitment of T.J.N., 390 N.J.Super. 218, 226 (App. Div. 2007)). We thus accord a trial court's determination substantial deference; such a decision may "be modified only if the record reveals a clear mistake." D.C., supra, 146 N.J. at 58.

Under the SVPA, "[i]f the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person needs continued involuntary commitment as a sexually violent predator, it shall issue an order authorizing the involuntary commitment of the person to a facility designated for the custody, care and treatment of sexually violent predators." N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.32(a). To classify a person as a sexually violent predator, the State must prove:

M.M. does not challenge the second prong of the test under the SVPA. We accordingly discuss only the first and third prongs of the test here.

We first note that M.M. has unequivocally been convicted of a "sexually violent offense." M.M.'s arrest in 2007 culminated in a guilty plea for second-degree sexual assault. Because sexual assault is explicitly defined as a "sexually violent offense" in the SVPA, we reject any argument that appellant was not convicted of a sexually violent offense. See N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.26(a).

M.M.'s primary contention relates to the third prong of the test. M.M. asserts that, if released, he is only likely to engage in voyeuristic behavior, which is not explicitly defined as a "sexually violent offense" in the SVPA. Accordingly, M.M. argues that the trial court could not conclude that M.M. would be highly likely to be unable to control a sexually violent behavior because the offense of voyeurism is not a "sexually violent offense" pursuant to the relevant statutory language.

"Likely to engage in acts of sexual violence" means the propensity of a person to commit acts of sexual violence is of such a degree as to pose a threat to the health and safety of others. N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.26; see W.Z., supra, 173 N.J. at 130 (explaining that the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence "that it is highly likely that the individual will not control his or her sexually violent behavior and will reoffend."). Such a finding requires "an assessment of the reasonably foreseeable future" based on the danger to others "because of his or her present serious difficulty with control over dangerous sexual behavior." Id. at 132-33. "[T]he final determination of dangerousness lies with the courts, not the expertise of psychiatrists and psychologists." Trantino v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 166 N.J. 113, 174 (2001) (quoting D.C., supra, 146 N.J. at 59).

The third prong of the test requires the court to determine "that the individual poses a threat to the health and safety of others, which is established upon proof by clear and convincing evidence that he or she has `serious difficulty in controlling his or her harmful behavior such that it is highly likely that [he] will not control his or her sexually violent behavior and will reoffend" by committing acts of sexual violence. R.F., supra, 217 N.J. at 186; see also W.Z., supra, 173 N.J. at 130. In determining the likelihood of future sexually violent acts, courts are entitled to rely on a petitioner's inability to control dangerous sexual behaviors. W.Z., supra, 172 N.J. at 132.

In this case, there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court's conclusion that M.M. is likely to engage in acts of sexual violence. In addition to his most recent sexual assault conviction, M.M. has admitted to physically touching numerous other boys.

In their reports and at trial, Drs. Harris and Roquet noted that that M.M.'s conditions predispose him to sexual violence, and that he is highly likely to reoffend unless confined in a secure facility for treatment. The court relied on this evidence and testimony when making its determination finding the experts to be credible. The court also relied on the STATIC-99R actuarial tool, M.M.'s lack of progress in treatment, and his history of ineffective progress during treatment in coming to its conclusion. The court also considered the psychological harm that M.M.'s victims suffered, as well as the potential for future physical harm to M.M.'s victims.

Accordingly, we conclude that the record supports the trial court's determination that each of the elements under the SVPA were proven by clear and convincing evidence.

Affirmed.