BARBARA R. KAPNICK, J.
The instant proceeding was commenced by a Verified Petition, dated June 28, 2011 (the "Petition") (NYSCEF No. 1)
The following facts are taken from the Petition, unless otherwise noted.
Here, as in the typical residential mortgage-backed securitization, a loan originator, or "Seller," sold portfolios of loans secured by mortgages on residential properties ("Mortgage Loans") to another entity, known as a "Depositor." The Depositor conveyed the Mortgage Loans to petitioner The Bank of New York Mellon ("BNY Mellon" or the "Trustee"), as Trustee, to hold in Trust. Certificates or notes evidencing various categories of ownership interests in the Trusts were then sold through an underwriter to investors. The investors are called "Certificateholders" or "Noteholders" (referred to herein as "Certificateholders" or "Trust Beneficiaries"). A "Master Servicer" was charged with responsibility for, among other things, collecting debt service payments on the Mortgage Loans, taking any necessary enforcement action against borrowers, and distributing payments on a monthly basis to the Trustee for distribution to the Certificateholders.
At issue here are 530 of these Trusts (the "Covered Trusts"), all but seventeen of which are evidenced by separate contracts known as "Pooling and Servicing Agreements" (the "PSAs") under which BNY Mellon is the Trustee. The remainder are evidenced by indentures and related Sale and Servicing Agreements (the "SSAs") under which BNY Mellon is the indenture trustee. The PSAs, indentures, and SSAs are collectively referred to as the "Governing Agreements."
Although each of the Governing Agreements are separate agreements that were individually negotiated and are not entirely identical, the Petition asserts that the terms that are pertinent here are substantively similar. The Governing Agreements each contain a series of representations and warranties made by each Seller for the benefit of the Trust. These include a representation that the Mortgage Loans were underwritten in all material respects in accordance with certain underwriting guidelines; that the origination, underwriting and collection practices of the Seller and Master Servicer have been legal, prudent and customary in the mortgage lending and servicing business; that the Mortgage Loans conform in all material respects to their descriptions in the investor disclosure documents; and that the Mortgage Loans were originated in accordance with all applicable laws.
The Governing Agreements also impose servicing obligations on the Master Servicer, requiring, among other things, that the Master Servicer administer the Mortgage Loans in accordance with the terms of the Governing Agreements and the customary and usual standards of practice of prudent mortgage loan servicers.
Here, a substantial dispute arose concerning the Sellers' alleged breaches of representations and warranties in the Governing Agreements, and the Master Servicers' alleged violations of prudent servicing obligations.
These allegations were set forth in a letter dated October 18, 2010, (the "Notice of Non-Performance") (PTX 108)
The Sellers in each of the Covered Trusts are any or all of Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. ("CHL"), Park Granada LLC, Park Monaco, Inc., Park Sienna LLC and Countrywide LFT LLC. The Master Servicer is BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, formerly known as Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, LP ("BAC HLS"). CHL and its parent, Countrywide Financial Corporation ("CFC"), will be referred to collectively as "Countrywide." BAC HLS and its parent, Bank of America Corporation ("BAC"), will be referred to collectively as "Bank of America." The Institutional Investors took the position that BAC was liable for the obligations of Countrywide with respect to the alleged breaches of the Governing Agreements.
Beginning in November 2010, the Institutional Investors, with the participation of the Trustee, engaged in negotiations with Countrywide and Bank of America in an attempt to reach a settlement for the benefit of the Trusts and to avoid litigation. These negotiations culminated in a settlement memorialized by an agreement, dated June 28, 2011 (the "Settlement Agreement") (NYSCEF No. 3), entered into by BNY Mellon and BAC (the "Settlement").
The Settlement Agreement requires Bank of America and/or Countrywide to pay $8.5 billion (the "Settlement Payment") into the Trusts, allocated pursuant to an agreed-upon methodology that accounts for past and expected future losses associated with the Mortgage Loans in each Trust. It also requires BAC HLS to implement, among other things, servicing improvements that are intended to provide for servicing performance by BAC HLS that is at or above industry standards and will provide a mechanism for BAC HLS to transfer high-risk loans to sub-servicers for more individualized attention.
The Trustee filed this Petition to give Certificateholders an opportunity to be heard in opposition or in support of the Settlement, and to seek an order, among other things, (1) approving the Settlement, and (2) declaring that the Settlement is binding on all Trust Beneficiaries and their successors and assigns.
By Order to Show Cause (motion sequence no. 001) signed on June 29, 2011, this Court ordered that notice of the commencement of this special proceeding be disseminated to all Potentially Interested Persons within forty-five (45) days via nine different domestic and international methods or channels of communication.
By Decision/Order dated July 8, 2011 (motion sequence no. 002), the Institutional Investors intervened in this action as intervenor-petitioners to support the Settlement. (NYSCEF No. 39.)
By Order dated August 5, 2011, this Court stated the following in relevant part:
(NYSCEF No. 107.)
On August 26, 2011, the Walnut Place Respondents
Upon remand of this action to this Court, the Trustee, the Institutional Investors and the Respondents (collectively referred to herein as the "parties") began to engage in discovery, as well as motion practice concerning a variety of legal issues.
Under the Governing Agreements, the Trustee holds all right, title and interest in the mortgage loans for the benefit of the Certificateholders. Section 2.01(b) of a representative PSA states the following:
(PTX 71.54.) This provision effectively grants the Trustee the power and authority to commence litigation. See, e.g., LaSalle Bank Nat'l Assoc. v. Nomura Asset Capital Corp., 180 F.Supp.2d 465, 471 (SDNY 2001) (holding that the plain meaning of the phrase "conveys ... all [] right, title and interest" ordinarily includes the power to bring suit to protect and maximize the value of the interest thereby granted).
Inherent in the Trustee's power to commence litigation is the power to settle litigation. Restatement (Second) of Trusts: Power to Compromise, Arbitrate and Abandon Claims § 192 cmt. a (1959); see also IBJ Schroder Bank & Trust Co., 271 A.D.2d 322, 322 (1st Dep't 2000). These powers are discretionary, Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 192 cmt. a, and must be exercised with "reasonable prudence." Id. at § 192. When reviewing a Trustee's exercise of discretion, the Court's role is limited to preventing an abuse of discretion. Restatement (Second) of Trusts: Control of Discretionary Powers § 187, cmt. e (1959).
Id. at cmt. e; see also Matter of Stillman, 107 Misc.2d 102, 110 (Sur. Ct. NY Co. 1980).
It is clear then that judicial intervention is warranted only when there is an abuse of discretionary authority. Haynes v. Haynes, 72 A.D.3d 535, 536 (1st Dep't 2010). "What constitutes an abuse of discretion depends on the terms and purposes of the trust, and particularly on the terms and purposes of the power and any standards or guidance provided for its exercise, as well as on applicable principles of fiduciary duty." Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Judicial Control of Discretionary Powers § 87, cmt. b (2007). Some examples of abuse of discretion include: when a trustee (1) acts in bad faith and receives an improper inducement for exercising the power in question, (2) acts in good faith but for a reason other than to further the purpose of the trust or the purpose for which the power was granted, i.e. using trust funds to make well-intentioned, reasonable distributions when those distributions are not related to the stated purpose of the trust and (3) in exercising a power, acts unreasonably or beyond the bounds of reasonable judgment. Id. at cmt. c. Accordingly, paragraphs (f) and (g) of the PFOJ are approved.
The Respondents principally contend that the Trustee abused its discretion by acting in bad faith (self-interested), outside its discretion and unreasonably.
Accordingly, this Court must determine whether there was any such abuse of discretion which would warrant judicial interference with the Trustee's decision to enter into the Settlement.
CPLR § 409(b) "makes clear that the special proceeding is to be adjudicated in the same manner as a motion for summary judgment." Vincent C. Alexander, Practice Commentaries, CPLR § 409 (McKinney 2013) ("Thus, if the papers fail to raise a triable issue of fact, the court is to grant judgment as a matter of law in favor of the appropriate party. If a triable issue of fact is raised, reference must be made to CPLR 410.") Therefore, the Court will apply the summary judgment standard in making its determination on the papers and proof submitted. See Matter of Friends World College v. Nicklin, 249 A.D.2d 393, 394 (2d Dep't 1998).
It is clear that to decide whether the Trustee abused its discretion, the Court must consider the Trustee's conduct in exercising its power and whether its discretionary power was exercised with "absolute singleness of purpose."
Petitioners argue that the Trustee's decision to accept $8.5 billion, along with document cures and servicing improvements worth billions more, as opposed to pursuing costly and uncertain litigation, was not an abuse of its discretion. (Pet'rs' Br. Supp. 45.) Petitioners contend that the Trustee's good faith is supported by the testimony of several witnesses who testified that the Trustee entered into the Settlement because it believed it was in the best interest of the Certificateholders. (Id. at 41.)
The uncertainty and risk associated with litigation played a large role in the Trustee's decision. According to one of the Trustee's witnesses, Robert Bailey ("Bailey"), the Trustee was prepared for litigation, but decided that the litigation alternative was not reasonable in light of the results that were achieved in the Settlement. (Hr'g Tr. 2482:4-6, July 18, 2013.)
It is also clear that the Trustee placed considerable weight on the fact that the Settlement was supported by twenty-two (22) institutional investors, including arms of the federal government, prominent investment managers acting as fiduciaries for their clients, and institutions managing their own money. (Pet'rs' Br. Supp. 17, 31-32.) The Trustee saw this support as a sign that the Settlement was "market tested." (Hr'g Tr. 3128:7-12, July 25, 2013.)
The Respondents contend that the Trustee acted in bad faith and unreasonably both in its actions while the Settlement was being negotiated and in accepting the terms of the Settlement and the amount of the Settlement Payment.
At the time the Trustee retained Mayer Brown LLP ("Mayer Brown"), Bank of America and ten to twelve of the Institutional Investors were among the firm's clients. (Hr'g Tr. 1561:8-24, 1575:2-24, July 9, 2013.) As a result, Mayer Brown had to obtain conflict waivers before it could represent the Trustee. The conflict waiver executed by Bank of America (R-1072)
Respondents argue that the Trustee "failed [] to represent certificateholder interests," when it hired a law firm that was "ethically barred from zealously representing the interests of all certificateholders," because it could not commence a lawsuit on behalf of the Trustee against Bank of America. (Resp'ts' J.Br. Opp'n 35.)
The Trustee asserts that simply because the law firm it hired was not authorized to commence litigation on its behalf, does not mean Mayer Brown could not meet its ethical duty to represent its client zealously. (Pet'rs' Br. Reply 7.) Moreover, there is no evidence that Mayer Brown violated any duties under the NY Rules of Professional Conduct.
It is not disputed that by letter dated December 9, 2010, the Trustee, the Institutional Investors and Bank of America entered into an agreement to, inter alia, toll any time period that might have been commenced by the issuance of the Notice of Non-Performance under the PSAs, such as the time to cure an event of default (the "Forbearance Agreement"). (PTX 38.3-9.) The Forbearance Agreement also tolled any statutes of limitation, repose or laches applicable to the claims asserted in the Notice of Non-Performance. (Id. at 38.3-4.)
The Respondents argue that "[n]owhere is the Trustee's conflict more clear than in the Trustee's decision to enter the Forbearance Agreement." (Resp'ts' J.Br. Opp'n 36.) The Respondents argue that the Forbearance Agreement tolled the triggering of an event of default under the PSAs, which, if not tolled, would have triggered the Trustee's duty to act under a higher standard of care (prudent person standard) (Hr'g Tr. 1336:8-15, July 8, 2013), would have required the Trustee to make a decision as to whether or not to replace the Master Servicer (id. at 1335:24-1336:4), and would have required the Trustee to give notice of the event of default to all Certificateholders. (Resp'ts' J.Br. Opp'n 36.) Respondents claim that they also would have benefitted from the occurrence of an event of default because if the Trustee failed to cure any such event of default within the cure period, then any group of Certificateholders could sue the Master Servicer directly under the PSAs. (Id.)
The Trustee argues that the evidence shows that the real reason it entered into the Forbearance Agreement was to avoid litigation over the question of whether or not an event of default had occurred as a matter of law, which litigation ultimately would have delayed any prospect of settlement. (Hr'g Tr. 1333:17-24, 1335:22-1336:7, July 8, 2013; Pet'rs' Br. Reply 8.) The Trustee further points out that absent Certificateholders were not harmed by the Forbearance Agreement because any group that met the requirements of the Governing Agreements (see, e.g., PTX 71.136-137 at § 10.08), could have declared their own separate event of default and triggered the subsequent remedies. (Pet'rs' Br. Reply 9.)
Next, Respondents argue that the Trustee acted in bad faith when it chose not to give notice of the settlement negotiations to Certificateholders. (Resp'ts' J.Br. Opp'n 37.) Respondents also contend that the Trustee's decision not to give notice was influenced, at least in part, by the fact that it received an indemnification from Bank of America for its conduct surrounding the negotiations and activities taken pursuant to the Notice of Non-Performance (the "December Indemnity Agreement"). (Hr'g Tr. 1764:20-1765:9, July 11, 2013.) In an e-mail dated December 1, 2010 from counsel for the Trustee, Jason H.P. Kravitt ("Kravitt"), to counsel for Bank of America, Kravitt stated that "[i]t would help us considerably in our decision making process to put aside such notice [to Certificateholders] if indeed we received the very narrow liability indemnity that we discussed with you this afternoon." (R-53.) Respondents argue that the Trustee's request for indemnity shows that it knew it was acting in ways not prescribed by the Governing Agreements. (Resp'ts' J.Br. Opp'n 37.)
The Trustee points out that it was entitled to broad indemnification under the Governing Agreements (see, e.g., PTX 71.115-116 at § 8.05) and that it also had the right to seek assurances that it would be indemnified for certain risks or liabilities. (PTX 71.114 at § 8.02(vi)). Therefore, the Trustee argues that the December Indemnity Agreement cannot be construed as a conflict of interest. Moreover, this Court previously found in its Decision/Order dated May 20, 2013 (NYSCEF No. 825) (motion sequence no. 031) that the December Indemnity Agreement did not raise a "colorable claim of conflict or self-dealing" (id. at 16 n.3), and since issuing that Decision/Order the Court has not been persuaded otherwise.
Respondents further take issue with the following clause found in the Settlement Agreement:
(PTX 1.45-46 (emphasis added).)
Respondents argue that by agreeing to this clause, the Trustee unreasonably agreed to put Bank of America's interests ahead of Certificateholders' interests by tying its hands to the Settlement regardless of any new information that might come to light. (Resp'ts' J.Br. Opp'n 38.)
The Trustee argues that the Further Assurances clause creates a benefit for the Covered Trusts because Bank of America is also locked into the Settlement, regardless of any potential changes, such as the fact that no court has found Bank of America liable on a successor liability theory to Countrywide. (Pet'rs' Br. Reply 9.)
Next, the Court will consider the actual claims released by the Settlement Agreement: (1) claims arising out of the alleged failure to repurchase loans that breached representations and warranties ("loan repurchase claims"), (2) a claim against Bank of America based on its acquisition of Countrywide ("successor liability claim"), (3) claims arising out of Countrywide's failure to deliver all of the required mortgage documentation ("document exception claims"), (4) servicing claims against the Master Servicer ("servicing claims") (see PTX 108; Pet'rs' Br. Supp. 10-14) and (5) claims arising out of the failure to repurchase modified loans ("loan modification claims").
With respect to the loan repurchase claims, the Trustee states that its decision to enter into the Settlement was largely influenced by three important factors: (1) its likely inability to collect more than $4.8 billion from Countrywide, the party with the contractual repurchase obligation; (2) the cost, uncertainty and delay of litigation; and (3) the fact that the expert's estimate of the range of damages recoverable in litigation did not overwhelmingly exceed $8.5 billion and did not account for any legal discounts. (Pet'rs' Br. Supp. 32-33, 35.)
It is clear that the Trustee was concerned that Countrywide would be unable to pay a future judgment that exceeded or even approached $8.5 billion and thought it was reasonable to lock in a one-time, lump sum payment of $8.5 billion on behalf of the Covered Trusts. This was especially so given the fact that it was uncertain, at best, whether Bank of America would be subject to successor liability. (Pet'rs' Br. Supp. 33-34.)
As of February 2011, Bank of America represented that Countrywide had only about $4 billion of claim-paying ability, which raised the issue of whether Bank of America would be liable for Countrywide's debts under a successor liability theory. (Pet'rs' Br. Supp. 13.) The Trustee also considered the risk that Bank of America would put Countrywide into bankruptcy if its repurchase exposure grew too large. (Id.)
To investigate Countrywide's ability to pay claims, the Trustee hired Capstone Advisory Group ("Capstone") to opine on the maximum value that the Trustee could recover from Countrywide. (Pet'rs' Br. Supp. 26.) According to Capstone, Countrywide had, at most, $4.8 billion available to pay unsecured creditors. (PTX 444.5-17.)
Confronted with the possibility that Countrywide would not be able to pay the full amount of any judgment, the Trustee retained an expert, Professor Robert Daines ("Daines") of Stanford Law School, to offer an opinion as to whether Bank of America would be obligated to pay the debts of Countrywide under theories of successor liability or veil piercing. Importantly, at the time of Daines' report, no court had found Bank of America liable on a successor liability theory to Countrywide, although this argument had been put forward in numerous other cases. (Pet'rs' Br. Supp. 28, 34.) Daines opined that a veil piercing claim would likely fail (PTX 444.22) and that a successor liability case would be difficult to win. (PTX 444.55).
Respondents take issue with the reports issued by both Capstone and Daines. First, they argue that Capstone's assignment was artificially limited in scope by the Trustee and it should have addressed potential asset-stripping claims against Bank of America. (Resp'ts' J.Br. Opp'n ¶¶ 83-84.) Next, Respondents contend that the Trustee failed to ask Daines to develop the best possible successor liability case against Bank of America. (Id. at ¶ 81.)
Petitioners reply that Capstone's and Daines' opinions remain unchallenged and the Respondents' criticism ignores the purpose of each of these experts' assignments. (Pet'rs' Br. Reply 16-18.)
Finally, the Trustee hired RRMS Advisors to provide an opinion on potential damages related to CHL's alleged breach of its loan repurchase obligation. (Pet'rs' Br. Supp. 19, 35; Hr'g Tr. 1433:20-1434:13, July 8, 2013.) Without knowing that the parties had reached an $8.5 billion settlement amount
Lin's report was compiled using commercially sensitive data provided by Bank of America reflecting repurchases of Countrywide loans from Government-Sponsored Enterprises (i.e., Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) (the "GSEs"), including detailed breakdowns of the rates of and reasons for repurchase. (Pet'rs' Br. Supp. 12, 19-21; PTX 23; PTX 25.2; PTX 36.6.) Bank of America also provided its loss projection for each of the Trusts aggregated from loan-level information (Pet'rs' Br. Supp. 12; PTX 25.5-11; PTX 36.6) and its comparison of the loans in the Covered Trusts and those purchased by the GSEs. (PTX 31.)
There is no dispute that the GSE repurchase experience was central to the negotiations here. Petitioners argue that according to Lin, the GSE repurchase rate, adjusted upward to reflect differences between the GSE loans and the Covered Trusts, was a reasonable estimate of the defect rate in the Covered Trusts. (Pet'rs' Br. Supp. 20; PTX 444.106.) Petitioners further argue that because Countrywide had no significant repurchase experience with private-label securitizations, there was no established repurchase rate to use from other private-label trusts. (Pet'rs' Br. Supp. 20.) Petitioners point out that aside from the GSEs, monoline insurers had made significant repurchase demands. However, these demands were highly disputed and litigation was ongoing — meaning that they did not provide an actual repurchase rate that could be used as an indication of the level of breaches in a loan population. (Id.)
In addition, Petitioners assert that there are similarities between the loans sold to GSEs and those sold to private-label trusts, including the fact that they were originated on the same underwriting platforms (Hr'g Tr. 1005:17-20, June 11, 2013) and that when many of the loans were originated it was not known whether they would be sold to the GSEs or to the private label market. (Hr'g Tr. 1414: 17-22, July 8, 2013; Pet'rs' Br. Supp. 20.) Petitioners concede that there are some differences between the GSE loans and private label loans, however, they argue that the differences that correlated to breach rate (i.e., loan type, documentation type and early default history) were accounted for by re-weighting the GSE repurchase data, leading to a higher repurchase rate. (Pet'rs' Br. Supp. 21.)
Respondents take issue with the fact that Lin accepted the GSE repurchase data as the basis for his analysis without having any personal knowledge of the GSE repurchase experience and without making any effort to quantify the correlation, if any, between breaches of representations and warranties and loan size, credit quality, loan-to-value ratio and documentation type — all credit risk attributes that are different in the GSE loans and the loans in the Covered Trusts. (Resp'ts' J.Br. Opp'n ¶¶ 66-67.)
Furthermore, Respondents argue that the GSE repurchase data is completely inapplicable to the Covered Trusts. To support this notion, Respondents point to the deposition testimony of Robert Bostrom ("Bostrom"), Freddie Mac's former General Counsel, who participated in the Settlement negotiations as part of the Institutional Investor group, and testified in relevant part as follows:
(R-4142 Bostrom Dep. 95: 6-96:18, Dec. 18, 2012.) Respondents assert that the adjustments made to the data to account for the differences between GSE and private label loans (Hr'g Tr. 1102:15-26, June 13, 2013) were not adequate because they were based on assumptions and judgmental quantifications. (Id. at 1103:11-20.)
Respondents urge that instead of solely relying on the GSE data, Lin should have at least accounted for the Institutional Investors' data, which showed repurchase exposure ranging from $32.3 to $52.5 billion. (Resp'ts' J.Br. Opp'n 42.) While the Trustee acknowledges that the Institutional Investors created a spreadsheet that projected losses for various subsets of loans in the trusts (PTX 562), this data was not ultimately relied on because the loan performance assumptions were aggressive (Pet'rs' Br. Supp. 22-23; Hr'g Tr. 835:12-16, June 10, 2013) and the numbers were not discounted for any sort of litigation risk. (Hr'g Tr. 392:12-17, June 6, 2013.)
Putting aside the Institutional Investor data, Respondents ultimately contend that to fulfill its duty, the Trustee should have obtained loan files and conducted a loan file review, which would have been at no cost to it under both the PSAs and the December Indemnity Agreement. (Resp'ts' J.Br. Opp'n at 39-40.)
Petitioners concede that the negotiating parties discussed the possibility of reviewing loan files from the Covered Trusts, but that the Trustee decided that a loan file review (i.e., a reunderwriting exercise) was unnecessary in light of Countrywide's GSE repurchase experience, which was based on a loan-by-loan review of over 100,000 Countrywide loan files. (Pet'rs' Br. Supp. 24.) The Trustee also argues that it decided to forego loan file review because it is too uncertain and subjective, often leads to protracted disputes over how to construct a sample and would not have ensured a conclusive or even favorable result to the Covered Trusts. (Pet'rs' Br. Supp. 24-25.)
The Respondents also attack Lin's report on the basis that his analysis utilized flawed methodologies including: (1) only measuring losses from borrower non-payment data or default rates, thereby ignoring material and adverse effects of breaches of representations and warranties, other than borrower default; (2) multiplying the loss estimate by Bank of America's 36% breach rate instead of the Institutional Investors' higher 50-65% breach rate; and (3) multiplying the product of the preceding calculation by Bank of America's 40%, GSE-based success rate, which represents the percentage of loans submitted to Bank of America that would actually be repurchased. (Resp'ts' J.Br. Opp'n 40-42.)
In response, Petitioners contend that the Respondents' argument that payment default is the wrong metric for determining repurchase liability is a "bizarre theory" that is not supported by the record. (Pet'rs' Br. Reply 12.)
With regard to the GSE data, the Petitioners argue that it was reliable, since it came from the same databases that support Bank of America's SEC filings (Pet'rs' Br. Reply 13) and that the repurchase rate employed by Lin's analysis was a reasonable proxy after he made the necessary adjustments to account for the differences between the GSE and private label pools. (Id. at 13-14.)
Finally, the Trustee considered the issue of whether section 2.03(c) of the PSAs, which states that a breach must "materially and adversely affect[]" Certificateholders' interest in a loan before repurchase is required, means, as Bank of America contended during the negotiations, that the Trustee would have to prove causation between each breach and the loan's non-performance to succeed on a loan repurchase claim. (Pet'rs' Br. Supp. 14.) To understand this issue better, the Trustee retained Professor Barry E. Adler ("Adler"), the Bernard Petrie Professor of Law and Business at New York University, to analyze the law and to provide his understanding of the competing interpretations of the "materially and adversely affects" language. (Pet'rs' Br. Supp. 30.) He concluded that Bank of America's interpretation was reasonable, but that there was no way to know which interpretation would prevail in litigation. (PTX 444.88; Hr'g Tr. 4457:16-25, Sept. 17, 2013.)
Respondents argue that Adler is not an expert on PSAs (Resp'ts' J.Br. Opp'n ¶ 86) and that his opinion was flawed and unreasonably narrow. (Id. at 43-44.) Respondents also accuse the Trustee of dictating Adler's conclusion. (Id. at ¶ 87.)
Petitioners respond that there is limited and conflicting case law as to the meaning of the phrase "materially and adversely affects" and, as a result, it was appropriate to apply general principles of contract interpretation. (Pet'rs' Br. Reply 18.) Moreover, petitioners argue that there is no evidence to support the notion that Adler's report was not an independent assessment. (Id.)
With respect to document exception claims, the Institutional Investors claimed that Section 2.02 of the PSAs required that certain mortgage documents, including the original mortgage notes, be maintained in the mortgage loan files and that missing documents were delaying or preventing foreclosures to the detriment of the Covered Trusts. (Pet'rs' Br. Supp. 13.)
The Trustee argues that to investigate this issue, it generated reports of loan-level data on missing documents and the negotiating parties settled on cure provisions that focused on document deficiencies that were most likely to harm the Covered Trusts. (Pet'rs' Br. Supp. 27.) The Trustee concluded that damages would be difficult to prove in litigation, and that by securing a remedy going forward, the Covered Trusts were able to recover the value of the claims they waived. (Pet'rs' Br. Supp. 40-41.)
Respondents argue that the Trustee never valued the potential document exception liability and that the Settlement's cure provisions eliminate the few protections that the Covered Trusts have against document exceptions. (Resp'ts' J.Br. Opp'n 46-47.) The Respondents claim that the Settlement (1) narrows the loans and defects subject to the cure provision, (2) requires a confluence of multiple document exceptions before triggering a cure, and (3) imposes new causation requirements. (Id. at 47.)
The Petitioners reply that the Respondents ignore the evidence supporting the Trustee's decision to accept the cure provisions, which provide a new value to the Covered Trusts, in that they obligate the Master Servicer (Bank of America) instead of Countrywide to reimburse for document related losses. (Pet'rs' Br. Reply 23.)
With respect to the servicing claims, the Trustee decided that it was more valuable to focus on servicing remedies to create value going forward because of the difficulty of proving that the PSA servicing standard was violated or what damages were caused by any breach. (Pet'rs' Br. Supp. 39.)
Respondents argue that the servicing claims were released without an attempt to value the damages that were caused by past servicing failures. (Resp'ts' J.Br. Opp'n 46.) Respondents further contend that the Settlement's purported servicing improvements are not adequate consideration for releasing the servicing claims because the "new" provisions add little value given that the PSAs already required prudent loan servicing. (Id.)
The Petitioners reply that the Respondents' argument ignores undisputed evidence that the Settlement will require Bank of America to perform at a higher level than the PSAs require by, among other things, requiring sub-servicing of high-risk loans at the Master Servicer's expense and creating automatic financial penalties if Bank of America's servicing falls below quantified standards. (Pet'rs' Br. Reply 22-23; Hr'g Tr. 3038:16-26, July 23, 2013.) Petitioners rely on the expert testimony of Phillip Burnaman ("Burnaman"), who testified that "a reasonable expected monetary value of the servicing improvement as of June 2011, will be [$]2.51 to $3.07 billion." (Hr'g Tr. 2730:2-5, July 22, 2013.) Burnaman further testified that the transfer of high risk loans to speciality sub-servicers is valued at between $2.42 and $2.65 billion (Hr'g Tr. 2768:11-20, July 22, 2013) and that this provision ultimately benefits Certificateholders. (Id. at 2768:21-2769:12).
During the hearing and in its brief in support of motion sequence no. 042 (NYSCEF No. 947), the Triaxx entities ("Triaxx") specifically argue that the PSAs in forty-nine (49) of the Covered Trusts unambiguously require immediate repurchase of modified mortgage loans without regard to whether the modifications were "in lieu of refinance"
In addition, Triaxx argues that the Trustee failed to investigate modified mortgage repurchase claims worth approximately $31 billion. (Id. at 11.) It is clear that the Trustee was aware of the issue and did include it in a list of settlement issues to discuss with Bank of America. (Hr'g Tr. 1927:4-1928:13, July 12, 2013.) Despite this, however, Kravitt testified that the Trustee chose not to evaluate the potential loan modification claims:
(Hr'g Tr. 1922:18-1924:21, July 12, 2013; see also Hr'g Tr. 2170:19-2172:18, July 16, 2013.) Kravitt further testified on cross examination:
(Hr'g Tr. 1925:25-1926:5, July 12, 2013.) Two witnesses for the Trustee, Bailey and Richard Stanley ("Stanley"), also conceded that there was no discussion of the loan modification issue at the trust committee meeting in which the Settlement was approved. (Hr'g Tr. 2408:2-5, 2412:5-11, July 18, 2013; Hr'g Tr. 3195:10-16, 3195:23-3196:13, July 25, 2013.) In fact, Stanley testified he did not recall being updated during settlement negotiations on the topic of loan modifications or the issue of repurchasing modified loans. (Hr'g Tr. 3195:17-22, July 25, 2013.) Also, it is clear that the Institutional Investors did not evaluate Bank of America's potential exposure for loan modification claims. (Hr'g Tr. 972:2-973:2, June 11, 2013.)
Despite the apparent failure to evaluate the potential loan modification claims or to include them in the total liability calculations, these claims are released by the Settlement Agreement. (Hr'g Tr. 1928:14-1930:10, July 12, 2013; PTX 1.33-34 at § 9(a)(iii).) Moreover, Triaxx argues that to the extent that any of the PSAs contained language that supported the notion that loans modified for any reason, including loss mitigation modifications, had to be repurchased, that language will be extinguished by the Settlement Agreement. (Hr'g Tr. 1931:10-1935:22, July 12, 2013.)
On redirect, Kravitt simply concluded that the Trustee did "consider the issue of loan modifications during the negotiations," without offering any explanation whatsoever as to what the Trustee actually did to evaluate the claims. (Hr'g Tr. 2138:19-21, July 15, 2013.) Rather, Kravitt stated that the Trustee did not seek a specific recovery for loan modifications because it decided that (1) Bank of America had the better legal argument, namely, that the language in the PSAs did not require it to repurchase loans modified for loss mitigation purposes; (2) since loss mitigation modifications were favored by both state and federal governments, it did not think Bank of America would agree to repurchase the loans that were modified on that basis; and (3) it wanted to focus on strong arguments. (Hr'g Tr. 2138:22-2140:13, July 15, 2013.)
Despite Kravitt's testimony that Bank of America had the stronger legal argument on this issue, there is no evidence to suggest that the Trustee evaluated Bank of America's legal argument that the language in the PSAs do not require repurchase of modified loans. Certainly, as the Trustee did with the "materially and adversely affects" language, it could have retained an expert to opine on the contract interpretation of the various provisions of the PSAs that address the repurchase of modified loans. It appears, however, that the Trustee did not do so. Also, the fact that loss mitigation loan modifications may have occurred as a result of certain policy decisions has no bearing on whether or not the PSAs required the repurchase of such modified loans.
After reviewing the voluminous record and carefully considering the arguments presented by all counsel, this Court finds that, except for the finding below regarding the loan modification claims, the Trustee did not abuse its discretion in entering into the Settlement Agreement and did not act in bad faith or outside the bounds of reasonable judgment.
With respect to the loan modification claims, as stated by Petitioners in footnote seven (7) of their reply brief, the issue of whether any of the PSAs mandate the repurchase of modified loans is not before this Court. What is before this Court, however, is the issue of whether the Trustee abused its discretion in settling the loan modification claims. On this issue only, the Court finds that the Trustee acted "unreasonably or beyond the bounds of reasonable judgment," (supra at 25), in exercising its power to settle the loan modification claims without investigating their potential worth or strength. (See Hr'g Tr. 2684:10-19, July 19, 2013 (Trustee's corporate trust law expert states that a Trustee cannot release a claim without understanding its value).) As a result, paragraphs (h), (i), (j), (k) and (t) of the PFOJ are approved to the extent that they do not apply to the loan modification claims.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the Settlement Agreement is approved except to the extent that it releases the loan modification claims. Entry of judgment is hereby stayed for a period of five (5) business days until February 7, 2014.
The Court thus, throughout this decision, adopts some of the factual findings, in whole or in part, in the context of discussing particular issues, but will not ultimately convert these findings into a Final Order and Judgment. This Court believes it has made the appropriate determinations required of it by this Article 77 proceeding.
The Chicago Funds have brought a case against the Trustee alleging misconduct, which is currently pending before the Hon. William H. Pauley III in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (the "Federal Action"). The Chicago Funds take issue with paragraphs o, p, and q of the PFOJ, which they construe as orders that could preclude the adjudication of their claims in the Federal Action and argue that those particular portions of the PFOJ should not be entered.
The Knights specifically argue that it was unreasonable for the Trustee to release the servicing claims without first valuing them, especially because the Trustee was aware of multiple alleged servicing violations when the Knights filed an action against the Trustee for an accounting to address the servicing problems.
Petitioners reply that any agreement it made to accept consideration that differs from what the Governing Agreements provide does not constitute an "amendment," because if it were to be construed as an "amendment" then no trustee would ever be able to settle trust claims. (Pet'rs' Br. Reply 19-20.)
