MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ROSLYNN R. MAUSKOPF, District Judge.

Plaintiff Hin Limtung, proceeding prose, brings this action alleging that defendants engaged in a criminal enterprise to fraudulently foreclose on his mortgage. (See Compl. (Doc. No. 1) at ¶ 1.) Specifically, Limtung alleges that defendants have violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961 el seq. ("RICO"), and the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 el seq. ("FDCPA"). For the reasons that follow, Limtung's complaint is dismissed. However, Limtung is granted thirty (30) days from the date of this Memorandum and Order to seek leave to amend the complaint in order to bring his RICO claims in compliance with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rules") 9(b) and 12(b)(6).

BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from Limtung's complaint and assumed true for purposes of this Memorandum and Order. On August 6, 2007, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. ("Wells Fargo") filed a foreclosure lawsuit in Queens County New York Supreme Court against Limtung in connection with a property at 31-70 Crescent Street, Astoria, New York, 11106. (See Compl. at ¶ 31.) On February 19, 2009, the court awarded Wells Fargo summary judgment, and on November 12, 2014, the court signed a Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale. (See Compl. at ¶¶ 35, 65.) During the pend ency of the foreclosure, the mortgage was first assigned by Wells Fargo to EMC Mortgage Corp., which subsequently assigned it to Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB as Trustee of Primestar-H Fund, which subsequently assigned it to Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB as Trustee of Primestar-F Fund I Trust ("WSF"). (See, Compl. at Exs. B, G, K.)

On January 8, 2016, Limtung filed a lengthy complaint alleging that defendants perpetrated a complex conspiracy to secure foreclosure on his property through fraud. (See generally Compl.) For example, Limtung alleges that defendants fraudulently fai led to effectuate service of a Notice of Entry of Default Judgment in the foreclosure action, and engaged in " illegal and unconstitutional" conduct when WSF became the named plaintiff in the foreclosure after its assignment. (See, e.g., Compl. at ¶¶ 50, 55, 57, 63, 64, 80, 81, 98.) Limtung alleges this conspiracy against Wells Fargo, its assignees, officers of the assignees, the assignees' servicing agents, the assignees' lawyers and notaries, various debt collectors, and a court appointed mediator.1 (See id. ¶¶ 2-33.) The complaint also includes numerous conclusory statements, such as that defendants have "actively hidden the illegal transactions and not filed the required Filing to the SEC" and that defendants concealed the in authenticity of documents associated with the foreclosure. (Compl. at ¶¶ 52-61, 160-62.)

Limtung contends that he does not "seek for the Honorable Court to declare that the Foreclosure Judgment that was rendered by the State was erroneous as a result of Extrinsic Fraud Court (this is a function of the State Court's Appellate Division) but seeks this Honorable Court's determination on the Defendant[s'] actions that led to the State Court Judgment and that violated [RICO and] the Mail and Wire Fraud Statutes and that entitle the Plaintiff remedy of monetary damage." (Opp'n (Doc. No 42-6) at ¶ 7.) That is, Limtung argues that the foreclosure was procured by fraud, and thus he is entitled to the value of the foreclosed property: $2,000,000 in money damages. (Compl. at ¶ 1.)

On February 17, 2017, defendants Peter S. Thomas, Jason Burr, Selene Finance LP, Wells Fargo, David McConnell, Jamie Rand, and WSF (collectively, "moving defendants") moved to dismiss the complaint for fai lure to state a claim for which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and failure to plead fraud with particularity pursuant to Rule 9(b). (See Mots. Dismiss (Doc. Nos. 39, 40, 42).)2

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss a cause of action that "fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In order to withstand a motion to dismiss, a complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to `state` a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft. v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the collie to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Matson v. Bd. of Educ., 631 F.3d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). The Court assumes the truth of the facts alleged and draws all reasonable inferences in the nonmovant's favor. See Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 71 (2d Cir. 2009).

When a plaintiff proceeds prose, the plaintiffs pleadings should be held " to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 ( 1976)); see also Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that even after Twombly, courts " remain obligated to construe a prose complaint liberally"). "[T]he mandate to read the papers of prose litigants generously makes it appropriate to consider plaintiffs additional materials, such as his opposition memorandum" at the motion to dismiss stage. Burgess v. Goard, No. 98-CV-2077 (SAS), 1999 WL 33458, at *1 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan 26, 1999) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Notwithstanding the liberal pleading standards granted to a prose plaintiff, if " the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief," dismissal is warranted. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007).3

II. FDCPA

"The FDCPA mandates that any action to enforce liability arising under the act be commenced `within one year from the date on which the violation occurs.'" Boyd v. J.E. Robert Co., No. 05-CV-2455 (KAM), 20 10 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140905, at *18 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2010) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d)). Specifically, "the latest date upon which the one year period begins to run is the date when a plaintiff receives an allegedly unlawful communication." Somin v. Total Cmty. Mgmt. Corp., 494 F.Supp.2d 153 (E.D.N.Y. June 26, 2007). While the FDCPA is subject to equitable tolling, it applies only in "rare and exceptional" circumstances. Berlin v. United States, 478 F.3d 489, 494 n.3 (2d Cir. 2007). "Generally, equitable tolling applies only where defendant has engaged in conduct to conceal wrongdoing and, as a result, plaintiff fails to discover facts giving rise to the claim, despite the exercise of reasonable diligence." Somin, 494 F. Supp. 2d at 158-59.

Here, even assuming that Limtung's conclusory allegations could make out a claim under the FDCPA, those claims are time-barred. The most recent date that Limtung references with respect to an "unlawful communication" under the FDCPA is April 27, 2014. On that date, Limtung alleges that the defendants knowingly submitted false information in a "Referee's Report" to the state court. (Campl. at ¶ 162.) However, Limtung filed the instant complaint on January 1, 2016, over one after the allegedly unlawful communication took place. As such the statute of limitations on the FDCPA claim had run. Furthermore, Lim tung alleges that he "became aware [of] the Defendants' Criminal Scheme on around December 26, 2014." (Campl. at ¶ 87.) Thus, Limtung cannot plausibly assert that the defendants' wrongdoing prevented him 20 16). Accordingly, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar the Court from reviewing Limtung's claims, and the motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) are denied. from discovering facts that might give rise to an FDCPA claim. See Somin, 494 F. Supp. 2d at 158-59. Accordingly, Limtung's FDCPA claims are dismissed with prejudice as time-barred.

III. RICO

RICO grants standing for a civil action to "any person injured in his business or propetty by reason of a violation of [18 U.S.C. § 1962]." 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (c). Under RICO, a plaintiff must plead "( 1) the defendant's violation of§ 1962, (2) an injury to the plaintiffs business or property, and .(3) causation of the injury by the defendant's violation." Commer. Cleaning Servs. v. Colin Serv. Sys., 271 F.3d 374 (2d Cir. 2001). Section 1964 requires the plaintiff to allege "racketeering activity" through one of the predicate offenses listed in § 1961. Here, Lim tung alleges RICO violations through the predicate offenses of mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341 and wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1343. (See Compl. at ¶ 1.)

Limtung's RICO claims are subject to the pleading standards of Rule 9(b). Under Rule 9(b), to allege fraud sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b), a complaint must "`specify the statements it claims were false or misleading, give particulars as to the respect in which plaintiffs contend the statements were fraudulent, state when and where the statements were made, and identify those responsible for the statements.'" Moore v. Paine Webber, Inc., 189 F.3d 165, 172 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting McLaughlin v. Anderson, 962 F.2d 187, 191 (2d Cir. 1992)). Rule 9(b) "applies to RICO claims for which fraud is the predicate illegal act," Moore, 189 F.3d at 172, including where the RICO predicate offense is mail or wire fraud, see, e.g., Powers v. British Vita, P.L.C., 57 F.3d 176, 184 (2d Cir. 1995). Such a complaint must "identify the purpose of the mailing within the defendant's fraudulent scheme," McLaughlin, 962 F.2d at 191, and "allege facts that give rise to a strong inference of fraudulent intent," San Leandro Emergency Med. Group Profit Sharing Plan v. Philip Morris Cos., 75 F.3d 801, 812 (2d Cir. 1996). "[T]o comply with Rule 9(b), `the complaint must: (1) specify the statements that the plaintiff contends were fraudulent, (2) identify the speaker, (3) state where and when the statements were made, and (4) explain why the statements were fraudulent.'" Am. Fed'n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps. Dist. Council 37 Health & Sec. Plan v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 948 F.Supp.2d 338, 346 (S.D.N.Y. June 3, 2013) (quoting Lerner v. Fleet Bank, NA., 459 F.3d 273, 290 (2d Cir. 2006)). "[W]here multiple defendants are accused of mail or wire fraud, plaintiffs must plead with particularity as to each defendant...." United States Fire ins. Co. v. United Limousine Serv., 303 F.Supp.2d 432, 433-44 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2004) (internal citations omitted); accord Spiteri v. Russo, No. 12-CY-2780 (MKB), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128379 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2013).

Here, Limtung has failed to plead with particularity the mail and wire fraud predicates to RICO in contravention of Rule 9(b). Limtung's lengthy complaint is replete with conclusory allegations of "illegal assignments," "criminal schemes," "false affidavits," and "intrinsic and extrinsic fraud. " (See generally Compl.) However, Limtung fails to either "explain why the statements were fraudulent," Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 948 F. Supp. 2d at 346, or "allege facts that give rise to a strong inference of fraudulent intent," San Leandro Emergency Med. Group Profit Sharing, 75 F.3d at 812. One representative paragraph from the complaint reads:

(Compl. at ¶ 87.) Limtung further alleges that the defendants submitted these and other "fraudulent documents" to the state court in the foreclosure action, (id. at ¶ 87), and that "the Defendants assisted in, implemented and took part in" these actions, (id. at ¶ 85.) Limtung avers that defendants

(Id. at ¶ 75.) Through such statements, Lim tung appears to reveal his own lack of understanding of the mortgage assignment process, rather than make any particularized allegation of fraud. Thus, Limtung has failed to meet the pleading standards of Rule 9(b). Accordingly, defendants' motion to dismiss Limtung's RICO claims for failure to state a claim under Rules 12(b)(6) and 9(b) is granted.

IV. Leave to Amend

Leave to amend "shall be freely given when justice so requires," Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), and "a prose litigant in particular should be afforded every reasonable opportunity to demonstrate that he has a valid claim," Nielsen v. Rabin, 746 F.3d 58, 62 (2d Cir. 2013); accord Ashmore v. Prus, 510 F. App'x. 47, 49 (2d Cir. 2013) ("District courts should generally not dismiss a prose complaint without granting the plaintiff leave to amend."); Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (prose plaintiffs should be given an opportunity to amend if "a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated"). The Supreme Court has interpreted Rule 15 to mean that

Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); see also Ruotolo v. City of New York, 514 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2008).

Here, Limtung fails to plead his RICO claims with sufficient particularity to satisfy the requirements of Rules 9(b) and 12(b)(6). However, in light of his prose status and the fact that he has yet to amend his complaint, Limtung is granted thirty (30) days leave to amend to plead his RICO claims in satisfaction of Rules 9(b) and 12(b)(6). Specifically, Limtung must "(1) specify the statements that [he] contends were fraudulent, (2) identify the speaker, (3) state where and when the statements were made, and (4) explain why the statements were fraudulent." Lerner, 459 F.3d at 290. Should Limtung seek to avail himself of this opportunity, he shall file a proposed first amended complaint, so captioned and bearing the same docket number, and shall plead sufficient facts to support any such claim. Limtung shall also file a brief memorandum of law as to why such an amendment raises a proper claim and is not futile. In the event Limtung seeks to amend, defendants will be given an opportunity to address whether the proposed motion meets the pleading requirements of Rules 9(b) and 12(b)(6).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the moving defendants' motions to dismiss (Doc. Nos. 39, 40, 42.) are granted. Limtung's FCPA claims are dismissed with prejudice. Limtung is granted thirty (30) days from the date of this Memorandum and Order to seek leave to amend his complaint consistent with this Court's ruling.

Although Limtung paid the filing fee to initiate this action, the Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore, in forma pauper is status is denied for purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).

The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to mail a copy of this Memorandum and Order to plaintiff Hin Limtung, prose, at the address listed on the docket and note the mailing on the docket.

SO ORDERED.