NOT FOR PUBLICATION

OPINION AND ORDER FOR POSSESSION

CLAIRE C. CECCHI, District Judge.

I. Background

This matter comes before the Court on the application of Plaintiff VW Credit Inc. ("VCI" or "Plaintiff"), seeking preliminary injunctive relief of an Order of Possession and Writ of Replevin (the "Application"). ECF No. 29. Plaintiff filed the Application and supporting documents on November 19, 2019. Id.

On November 21, 2019, the Court entered an Order to Show Cause with Temporary Restraints and Other Relief indicating that without opposition from Defendants by November 26, 2019, the Application would be decided on the papers and "relief may be granted by default." ECF No. 32 at 2. To date, Defendants have not filed any opposition to the relief requested in Plaintiff's Application and the hearing scheduled for December 2, 2019 on the Application was adjourned due to the lack of opposition. Accordingly, the Court decides Plaintiff's Application and considers it unopposed. For reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's Application is granted.

II. Legal Standard

The decision whether to grant or deny a request for a preliminary injunction rests in the discretion of the Court. See Kos Pharms., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 708 (3d Cir. 2004). A party seeking the extraordinary remedy of a preliminary injunction bears the burden of establishing that the following four factors weigh in favor of granting the injunction: "`[1] that [it] is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that [it] is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of the equities tips in [its] favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public interest.'" Ferring Pharms., Inc. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 765 F.3d 205, 210 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Winter v. NRDC, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)).

III. Analysis

The Court relies upon factual assertions underlying Plaintiff's complaint (the "Complaint"), which are incorporated by reference in the Application. ECF No. 29 at 1.

Plaintiff has shown a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of its replevin claim. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 77-81; ECF No. 29 at 2-3.1 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 64(b) allows for replevin in accordance with the replevin procedures applicable under New Jersey state law. To succeed on a claim for replevin, Plaintiff must allege the existence of a debt and the existence of a security interest, perfected or unperfected, and a chattel in possession of the debtor. N.J.S.A. 2B:50-1; New Jersey Court Rule 4:61-2. In this case, VCI has shown both the existence of a debt owed to it by Defendant CTE2, LLC ("CTE2") and a security interest in the collateral presently held by CTE2. ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 10-15; see also ECF No. 29 at 3 ("VCI is a perfected secured creditor with a right to immediate possession of its collateral. CTE2 is in possession of these goods, has failed to pay for the same, and refuses to release them, despite clearly agreeing to do so in the MLSA.... These circumstances demonstrate VCI's likelihood of success on the merits."). VCI has provided contract agreements and other documentation showing it loaned the collateral to Defendants in exchange for payment from vehicle sales and that it is owed outstanding monies. See ECF Nos. 1, 1-1-5 (Complaint and accompanying exhibits showing various agreements between parties); ECF Nos. 4-2, 29-2 (declarations of William Zozokos, Senior Manager at VCI outlining agreements and current status of debts owed). The Court finds that VCI is owed a debt by CTE2 and has a security interest in the collateral held by CTE2, that demand for delivery of possession of the goods and chattels identified has been made on CTE2, and that CTE2 has failed and refused to make delivery of such goods and chattels. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has shown that it is likely to succeed on the merits of its replevin claim.

Next, Plaintiff has shown that it is likely to suffer irreparable harm absent injunctive relief. A plaintiff demonstrates irreparable harm and is entitled to injunctive relief when it is threatened with harm that "cannot be redressed by a legal or an equitable remedy following trial." Nat'l Reprographics, Inc. v. Strom., 621 F.Supp.2d 204, 222 (D.N.J. 2009). Here, Plaintiff has shown that it will suffer irreparable harm if it is not allowed to take possession of the collateral as the collateral consists of vehicles that "are continuing to sit without maintenance and unattended by CTE2, are depreciating in value by the day and are at risk of further damage and depreciation." ECF No. 29-1 at 4. Irreparable harm exists where a defendant dissipates assets and makes it difficult for recovery of damages in the event a judgment is entered in favor of a plaintiff. See Health Professional & Allied Employees AFT/AFL-CIO v. MHA, LLC, No. 17-3301, 2017 WL 6550488, at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 21, 2017) (finding irreparable harm where the depletion of assets by defendant would render a judgment for plaintiff futile). That risk exists here as Plaintiff has alleged that Defendants' dealership is closed down and the business is no longer functioning or paying its bills. ECF No. 29-1 at 1. In addition, requests for injunctive relief are most often granted where the requests involve property that is subject to depreciation and physical damage, as is the case here. See Minard Run Oil Co. v. United States Forest Serv., 670 F.3d 236, 256 (3d Cir. 2011) ("[W]here interests involving real property are at stake, preliminary injunctive relief can be particularly appropriate."). Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff has demonstrated that it will be irreparably harmed absent the granting of a preliminary injunction.

Furthermore, the granting of preliminary relief to Plaintiff outweighs any burden on the Defendants. Defendants Carmine DeMaio and CTE 2 Land, LLC have consented to the injunctive relief requested in the Application (ECF No. 39) and Defendants Frank Holtham and CTE2, LLC have not appeared in this case, nor have they opposed the Application.2 The car dealership previously operated by CTE2, LLC is no longer functioning and there is no present need for the collateral at its current site. ECF No. 29 at 1. Hence, the Court agrees that the balance of the equities tips in favor of Plaintiff.

Finally, the Court also finds that allowing Plaintiff to take possession of the collateral would be in the public interest. It is well-settled that "[t]he public has a strong interest in seeing that property rights are respected." W.S. Int'l, LLC v. M. Simon Zook Co., No. 11-3014, 2011 WL 1832282, at *6 (E.D. Pa. May 12, 2011) (citing Ride the Ducks of Philadelphia, LLC v. Duck Boat Tours, Inc., 138 F. App'x. 431, 434-435 (3d Cir. 2005)). Additionally, the Third Circuit has recognized that if a plaintiff can demonstrate both a likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable injury, "it almost always will be the case that the public interest will favor the plaintiff." Allegheny Inc. v. DQE, Inc., 171 F.3d 153, 158 (3d Cir. 1999). Accordingly, the Court finds that the public interest favors granting injunctive relief to Plaintiff.

For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff has satisfied the standards for preliminary injunctive relief.

THEREFORE, IT IS on this 6th day of December 2019,

ORDERED that:

SO ORDERED.

EXHIBIT "A"

Volkswagen of Union

EXHIBIT B

All parts and accessories maintained at the CTE2, LLC store location at 2155 Route 22 West, Union, New Jersey or the service repair facility location at 1180 Springfield Rd., Union, New Jersey, including but not limited to the foregoing:

A. All parts and accessories that are branded as being Volkswagen parts and accessories, or that bear the label "Genuine Volkswagen Parts".

B. All parts and accessories that are labeled or identified as being solely for use in connection with the operation, repair or replacement of existing parts and accessories on Volkswagen automobiles.

C. Any and all tires located at either CTE2 location.

D. Any and all hydraulic lifts or other repair equipment located at either CTE2 location.