PER CURIAM.
Defendants appeal from a May 23, 2014 order entering judgement for plaintiff after a jury trial and dismissing defendants' counterclaims. We affirm.
We discern the following facts from the record.
On February 27, 2007, plaintiff took control of two-thirds interest in the company after agreeing to purchase Telymonde's share. Differences arose between plaintiff and Marter, and seeking to assert control, plaintiff filed an order to show cause on March 5, 2008. The court granted plaintiff temporary relief and scheduled a hearing for March 28, 2008 on whether to make the injunctive relief permanent. In support of the relief, plaintiff filed an affidavit alleging that Marter was using company money for personal expenditures and hiding company funds in a bank account to which plaintiff did not have access.
On April 9, 2008, the parties consented to a number of interim measures, including WBI hiring a forensic accountant; Marter stepping down as President and turning over the business to plaintiff; Marter accompanying plaintiff to Amboy Bank and Bank of America to authorize him to sign checks on behalf of the company; plaintiff being authorized to copy files located in WBI's computer system; and Marter preserving the company computer for safekeeping in the WBI garage, removing her personal property from the office, and turning over her keys to plaintiff. Neither party would "take draws for their services until further" order of court. WBI would continue to pay $1600 in interest per month to plaintiff for his loan and would give notice to all school boards and Gallco that Marter was stepping down from her position at WBI.
On July 18, 2008, plaintiff filed an amended complaint alleging that Marter misappropriated company funds and resources, neglected various legal duties, and improperly blocked access to the financial records of the company. On December 4, 2008, plaintiff and Marter signed a consent order stipulating to a dismissal without prejudice.
During this time, WBI brought suit against Gallco. In its complaint, WBI complained that Gallco unlawfully seized the buses that WBI had leased from it. When the case was concluded, the court entered order of judgment against Gallco for more than $500,000.
Prior to the consent order dismissing the complaint without prejudice, on May 22, 2008, plaintiff complained about Marter's activity with the company to the Monmouth County Prosecutor, and initiated an investigation against Marter. On October 28, 2009, plaintiff issued a signed statement to the prosecutor's office, including allegations that Marter was misappropriating funds. The prosecutor's office did not pursue criminal charges against Marter.
On March 31, 2011, plaintiff filed the present complaint against Marter and WBI, alleging breaches of the operating agreement, minority member oppression, breaches of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of a loan contract, and conversion. He also filed a claim against defendant Ricky Marter, Marter's husband, and defendant Fariello Bus Service L.L.C.
Donna Marter also filed a counterclaim, alleging defamation because a certification made by Arthur Gallagher, a witness in in the Gallco litigation, revealed an allegedly defamatory statement made by plaintiff in 2008, and on the basis of plaintiff's complaints to the Prosecutor's office on October 28, 2009. On May 30, 2011, plaintiff moved for summary judgment, arguing that the statute of limitations had expired on Marter's counterclaims and that his statements to the prosecutor were absolutely privileged. The trial court granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment dismissing the counterclaims.
The matter proceeded to trial on April 29 and concluded on May 7, 2014. On May 7, 2014, the jury found in favor of plaintiff.
On appeal, defendant first argues that the trial court erroneously granted plaintiff's in limine motions, which we will not address in this appeal.
This appeal concerns a trial judge's application of law to facts, as well as the trial judge's interpretation of law. Accordingly, we review the proceedings de novo. A "trial court's interpretation of the law and the consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference."
"The [entire controversy] doctrine requires a litigant to present all aspects of a controversy in one legal proceeding."
Plaintiff's 2008 complaint cannot form the basis of a dismissal under the entire controversy doctrine as nothing was adjudicated.
We reject defendants' arguments that the motion judge improperly dismissed Marter's counterclaims because they were barred by the statute of limitations and because the allegedly defamatory statements were subject to the litigation privilege. Count one of defendant's counterclaim asserts that plaintiff made false and libelous statements about Marter to Arthur Gallagher, president of Gallco, which were repeated in a certification filed by Gallagher in the Gallco litigation in 2011. Count two asserts that plaintiff made false statements about Marter to the Monmouth County Prosecutor's Office. Neither statement was made within one year of the filing of defendants' counterclaim.
As to the Gallagher statement, Marter argues that the defamation claims arose when she discovered it upon the filing of the Gallagher certification in the Gallco litigation in April 2011. However, "[t]he statute of limitations applicable to the present suit ... does not measure the limitations period in terms of the `accrual' of a cause of action. Instead, it provides that an action must be brought within one year of `the publication' of the alleged libel."
Defendants remaining arguments, that the trial judge erred in barring the recorded minutes of the December 20, 2006 meeting and the Gallco certification from evidence, are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in this opinion.
Affirmed.