Seibel, U.S.D.J.
Before the Court are Defendants' Motion for summary judgment, (Doc. 90), and Plaintiff's Cross-Motion to strike Defendants' ministerial-immunity defense, (Doc. 103). For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' Motion is GRANTED and Plaintiff's Motion is DENIED.
The following facts are based on the parties' Local Rule 56.1 statements
Plaintiff Joanne Fratello is a former principal of St. Anthony's School (the "School"), a Catholic elementary school located in Nanuet, New York. (See Ds' Counter 56.1 ¶ 13; AC ¶¶ 1, 12, 13, 19.)
The School, which is chartered under the laws of New York, is run by the Archdiocese.
The website of the Catholic Schools in the Archdiocese of New York proclaims that its mission is "to ensure [its] schools are Christ-centered, academically excellent, and welcoming communities that teach students to be life-long learners and leaders energized by fidelity to Christ, the Church, and one another." (Novikoff Decl. Ex. A, at 2-3.)
(Id.) Similarly, the School's mission is to "provide a high-quality, educational experience that enhances each child's spiritual, emotional, intellectual and social growth. Our faculty and staff prepare our students to become future leaders and responsible stewards of God's creation." (See Ds' Counter 56.1 ¶ 7.) Religion is a central part of the School curriculum. (See P's Counter 56.1 ¶¶ 92-97.) At the same time, the School is required, by law, to provide its students with an education substantially equivalent to that of public schools. (Ds' Counter 56.1 ¶ 72.)
The Archdiocese disseminates an Administrative Manual (the "Manual") that delineates policies and procedures for principals and other administrators. (See generally Admin. Manual.)
(Admin. Manual at 023753.) Another letter within the Manual is addressed to principals from Michael Ramos, Associate Superintendent of Schools for Professional Recruitment, and states: "The Catholic school is essential to the Church in fulfilling its teaching mission. .... It is your responsibility as principal to establish a climate which is identifiably Catholic and which nurtures the growth of teachers and students in all dimensions of life." (Id. at 023923.)
The Manual also contains a job description for principals. It states:
(Id. at 023924.) The Manual goes on to describe a principal's role in providing "Catholic leadership" as follows:
(Id. at 023803.) The Manual then lists a multitude of day-to-day responsibilities of the principal, touching on "personnel management," "office management," "public and community relations," "budget and fiscal management," "teacher development," and "evaluation of students," among other responsibilities. (Id. at 023803-07.)
The Archdiocese's website presents a summary of the principal's role in its information to prospective applicants for that post:
(Ds' Counter 56.1 ¶ 22.)
Principals are evaluated by faculty of the school and the church's pastor. (P's Counter 56.1 ¶ 26.) In addition to more secular criteria, a principal is evaluated based on whether he or she "fosters a Christian atmosphere which enables ... students to achieve their potential," "reviews school philosophy and goals with the staff in accordance with current Church documents," and "gives priority to a comprehensive religious education program." (Admin. Manual at 023936, 023942, 023947.) Additionally, principals are asked to fill out a self-evaluation form. (P's Counter 56.1 ¶ 26.) The self-evaluation contains five questions, one of which is, "What are my strengths in the areas of spiritual leadership, instructional leadership, interpersonal relationships and management?" (Admin. Manual at 023942.)
Twenty-three percent of Archdiocese students are not Catholic, and practicing Catholicism is not an explicit job requirement for its teachers, although the Archdiocese may give preference to practicing Catholics. (Ds' Counter 56.1 ¶¶ 42, 44, 46.) The Archdiocese does, however, require that a candidate for the position of principal present a letter indicating that he or she is a practicing Catholic. (P's Counter 56.1 ¶ 21.) The Archdiocese also states that principals must complete the Level 1 and Level 2 Catechist Certification Program within three years of attaining that position. (Admin. Manual at 023808.) The Catechist Certification Program is an online course that "provides theological understandings, spiritual/religious formation and catechetical methodology." (P's Counter 56.1 ¶ 19.) Plaintiff maintains that this certification requirement was aspirational but not strictly enforced by the Archdiocese. (Id. ¶ 18.) Plaintiff also asserts that although she is indeed Catholic, her academic credentials are in education, and she does not have formal training in religion or theology. (See Ds' Counter 56.1 ¶ 4.)
When Plaintiff applied for the principal position at the School, she was interviewed by the Archdiocese's Principal Search Committee (the "Committee"). (P's Counter 56.1 ¶ 49.) According to Cathleen Cassel, the Regional Superintendent for Rockland County for the Archdiocese and a member of the Committee at the time Plaintiff was interviewed, the Committee sought to hire principals with "strong Christian values" who were dedicated to providing teachers and students with "instruction in religious truth and value, maintaining a set of educational policies which are in conformity with the religious beliefs and moral standards of the Archdiocese and further fostering an educational environment which teaches students how to live in accordance with the teachings of Jesus." (Cassel Decl. ¶¶ 1, 5, 10.)
In 2007, Plaintiff signed a one-year "Lay Principal Contract" with the School, (Ds' Counter 56.1 ¶ 12), subject to renewal annually. The contract provided:
(Id. ¶ 16; see AC Ex. 14, at 2.) The contract did not specify Plaintiff's responsibilities as principal. (AC Ex. 14.)
Upon beginning her tenure as principal, Plaintiff implemented a new prayer system within the School in order to get the students "more involved" in prayer. (P's Counter 56.1 ¶ 66.) Every morning, an eighth grader would meet with Plaintiff, after which Plaintiff would introduce him or her over the loud speaker, and the student would then recite a prayer. (Id. ¶ 67.) Plaintiff would then respond to the prayer by stating, "Praise to you Lord Jesus Christ." (Id.; Weber Decl. ¶ 8.)
Plaintiff's religious involvement with the student body varied depending on the time of year and corresponding holidays
Plaintiff also regularly supervised teachers and their curricula. Teachers were required to submit to Plaintiff each week a copy of their lesson plan books. (Id. ¶ 91.) She mandated that teachers' lesson plan books identify the objective of each lesson, the method by which it would be taught, and the "Value" and "Saint" associated with the lesson. (Id. ¶ 93.) The Value and Saint were to be based on a chart of Catholic saints and corresponding Catholic values that Plaintiff handed out to teachers
In addition to reviewing teachers' curricula, Plaintiff would lead monthly faculty meetings at the School to discuss upcoming events. (Id. ¶ 102.) Each meeting began with a prayer led by Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 103.) She also required that teachers attend a "Standards and Goals" meeting at the beginning of each school year, which she similarly led and began with a prayer. (Id. ¶ 104.)
Another of Plaintiff's responsibilities was overseeing the drafting and dissemination of the St. Anthony's Monthly Newsletter. (Id. ¶ 118.) These newsletters often thanked families for joining her at a school-related mass or invited them to do so. (Id. ¶ 121.) The newsletters also often communicated to parents Plaintiff's joy and enthusiasm in joining with the students in their "spiritual" journey in finding Christ and thanked the parents for their help in facilitating the students' journey. (Id. ¶ 122.) Plaintiff used the monthly newsletter as a vehicle to, among other things, encourage the religious and spiritual learning and growth of the students outside of school and to remind parents of upcoming events of religious significance. (Id. ¶ 123.)
At the end of each school year, Plaintiff would deliver religious messages to the graduating class. At the graduation ceremony for the eighth-grade students, Plaintiff would present a speech. (Id. ¶¶ 83, 124.) These speeches often included religious language and prayer. For example, the speech to her final graduating class closed with the following:
(Weber Decl. ¶ 12; id. Ex. B.) Plaintiff would also include a religious message for the graduating class in the School yearbook. Her words of advice to the Class of 2011 included the following:
(Novikoff Decl. Ex. Q.)
Plaintiff was evaluated by the teachers at the School and by regional administrators. In March 2008, Monsignor Reynolds, the pastor at St. Anthony's, rated Plaintiff as "Excellent" with regard to many criteria
Plaintiff alleges that she first complained about the alleged discriminatory conduct to others in the Archdiocese. (AC ¶ 163.) On October 12, 2011, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, (see Doc. 15 Ex. B), which sent Plaintiff a notice of right to sue dated July 5, 2012, (AC Ex. 1). Plaintiff commenced this action within 90 days of the notice.
On March 5, 2013, Plaintiff filed her Amended Complaint, alleging that Defendants engaged in gender discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and section 296 et seq. of the New York State Executive Law. Plaintiff also asserted state-law claims for breach of contract and promissory estoppel, and sought a declaratory judgment protecting her free exercise of religion.
On April 26, 2013, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. 12.) In a bench ruling, I found that I could not determine whether the ministerial exception applied at the motion to dismiss stage because of the necessarily fact-intensive inquiry that exception necessitates, and because Plaintiff had plausibly alleged that she was not a minister, and had no religious training, duties or functions; that others handled all religiously related activities; and that she was simply a secular administrator doing what a public-school principal would do. (See Doc. 54 Ex. A, at 10.) I therefore directed the parties to engage in limited discovery on the issue. (Id. at 10-11.)
On July 16, 2015, the parties filed the Motions now before me, (Docs. 90, 103). Defendants seek summary judgment on all of Plaintiff's claims based on the ministerial exception derived from the First Amendment, (see Ds' Mem. 1),
Summary judgment is appropriate when "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "[T]he dispute about a material fact is `genuine' ... if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A fact is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law .... Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Id. On a motion for summary judgment, "[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating "the absence of a genuine issue of material fact," and, if satisfied, the burden then shifts to the non-movant to present "evidence sufficient to satisfy every element of the claim." Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 137 (2d Cir.2008) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-movant's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-movant]." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Moreover, the non-movant "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986), and he "may not rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation," Fujitsu Ltd. v. Fed. Express Corp., 247 F.3d 423, 428 (2d Cir.2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).
"A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by ... citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials ...." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Where an affidavit is used to support or oppose the motion, it "must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant ... is competent to testify on the matters stated." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4); see Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 310 (2d Cir.2008). In the event that "a party fails ... to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may," among other things, "consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion" or "grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials — including the facts considered undisputed — show that the movant is entitled to it." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2), (3).
The narrow question presented by the parties' Motions is whether Plaintiff's circumstances of employment cause her claims to fall within the ministerial exception, which would preclude her from bringing discrimination and retaliation claims against Defendants. The exception is an affirmative defense, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 694, 709 n. 4, 181 L.Ed.2d 650 (2012), and accordingly Defendants bear the burden of establishing it. "[W]hether the exception attaches... is a pure question of law which this [C]ourt must determine for itself."
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and other employment discrimination laws ordinarily prohibit employers from discriminating against employees and from retaliating against those employees for lodging a complaint based on such discrimination. But First Amendment questions arise about the application of these antidiscrimination laws where the employer is a religious institution. See generally Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S.Ct. 694; Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198 (2d Cir.2008). The U.S. Supreme Court considered the intersection of Title VII and the First Amendment in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. E.E.O.C., That decision and the line of cases that followed govern the instant inquiry, and I examine them below before turning to the facts presented here.
In Hosanna-Tabor, the U.S. Supreme Court held that "a 'ministerial exception,' grounded in the First Amendment, ... precludes application of [antidiscrimination] legislation to claims concerning the employment relationship between a religious institution and its ministers." 132 S.Ct. at 705. The Court reasoned:
Id. at 706; see also Cote, 520 F.3d at 204-05 (discussing several rationales for why, "[s]ince at least the turn of the century, courts have declined to interfere [ ] with ecclesiastical hierarchies, church administration, and appointment of clergy") (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Supreme Court further confirmed, as the Second Circuit and "[e]very Court of Appeals to have considered the question" had previously held, that the ministerial exception does not apply only to "the head of a religious congregation." Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S.Ct. at 707; see also Cote, 520 F.3d at 206-07 (collecting pre-Hosanna-Tabor cases applying exception to organist, music directors, press secretary and staff of Jewish nursing home). The Supreme Court was "reluctant, however, to adopt a rigid formula for deciding when an employee qualifies as a minister." Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S.Ct. at 707. The Court instead thoroughly examined the "circumstances of [the plaintiff's] employment" and delineated a number of factors on which it relied in concluding that the ministerial exception applied in her case. Id. at 707-10.
The Court first examined whether the employee, Cheryl Perich, was "held out" by her employer, a parochial school, as a minister, "with a role distinct from that of most of its members." Id. at 707. Perich was a "called" teacher, meaning she received
The Court next looked to Perich's title — that of "Minister of Religion, Commissioned." Aside from the obvious fact that her title included the word "minister," this title reflected a significant amount of religious training and formal process. She had to complete "eight college-level courses in subjects including biblical interpretation, church doctrine, and the ministry of the Lutheran teacher." Id. Additionally, Perich had to obtain the endorsement of her local church council "by submitting a petition that contained her academic transcripts, letters of recommendation, personal statement, and written answers to various ministry-related questions." Id. Finally, Perich "had to pass an oral examination by a faculty committee at a Lutheran college." Id. All in all, it took Perich six years to fulfill these requirements. "And when she eventually did, she was commissioned as a minister only upon election by the congregation, which recognized God's call to her to teach." Id. Perich's title and the extensive formal training behind it weighed in favor of applying the ministerial exception.
Third, the Court considered whether Perich "held herself out as a minister of the Church by accepting the formal call to religious service" or "in other ways." Id. at 707-08. It found that she had. Indicia of this included that Perich took a special housing allowance on her taxes for those working "in the exercise of the ministry," and that she filled out a post-employment form describing herself as serving "in the teaching ministry." Id. at 708.
Id. (alterations in original) (citation omitted). Thus, because Perich was "a source of religious instruction" and "performed an important role in transmitting the Lutheran faith to the next generation," her job responsibilities weighed in favor of applying the ministerial exception. Id.
In reversing the Sixth Circuit's decision, the Supreme Court also provided guidance as to where the court below had erred. It explained that the Sixth Circuit did not give enough weight to Perich's title (including its attendant training and education); "gave too much weight to the fact that lay teachers at the school performed the same religious duties" as Perich; and "placed too much emphasis on Perich's performance of secular duties." Id.
In any event, in light of the Supreme Court's explicit rejection of "a rigid formula for deciding when an employee qualifies as a minister," Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S.Ct. at 707, I must consider the specific circumstances of Plaintiff's employment in concert with the case law discussed above to make this determination.
As a preliminary matter, parochial schools are considered "religious organizations" for purposes of the ministerial exception. See, e.g., Herx, 48 F.Supp.3d at 1177 (examining application of ministerial exception to parochial school teacher); Dias v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, No. 11-CV-251, 2013 WL 360355, at *4 (S.D.Ohio Jan. 30, 2013) (same); cf. Conlon, 777 F.3d at 833-34 ("It is undisputed that InterVarsity Christian Fellowship is a Christian organization, whose purpose is to advance the understanding and practice of Christianity in colleges and universities. It is therefore a `religious group' under Hosanna-Tabor.") (emphasis in original); Penn v. N.Y. Methodist Hosp., No. 11-CV-9137, 158 F.Supp.3d 177, 181, 184, 2016 WL 270456, at *3, *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2016) (viewing ministerial exception on a "sliding scale," where the more religious the employer institution is, the less religious the employee's functions must be to qualify, and finding that hospital is institution to which exception applies). Because the School is a parochial school, one purpose of which is clearly to advance the understanding and practice of Catholicism, it is a "religious organization" for purposes of the ministerial exception. The sole remaining question is thus whether Plaintiff is a "minister" under the exception.
I first examine whether Plaintiff was "held out" by the Archdiocese and the School as a minister, "with a role distinct from that of most of its members." Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S.Ct. at 707. It is clear from the Archdiocese's description of a principal's position that it does hold principals out as ministers. Unlike other school staff, the principal is required to be a practicing Catholic. (P's Counter 56.1 ¶ 21.) As principal, Plaintiff was tasked with "achieving the Catholic mission and purpose of the school" and being the "animator of the community of faith within the school." (Admin. Manual at 023924.) Further, the principal is described as a religious liaison between the Archdiocese, the parish, the congregation, the students, and the parents, interacting with all entities and fostering a religious community. (Id. at
I next look to Plaintiff's title and the requisite education and training associated with that title. The contract that Plaintiff signed in 2007 was for the position of "Lay Principal." (Ds' Counter 56.1 ¶ 12.) As noted, in order to attain this position, Plaintiff was required to submit a letter confirming that she was a practicing Catholic. (P's Counter 56.1 ¶ 21.) Principals are also, at least in theory, required to complete a Level 1 and Level 2 Catechist Certification Program within three years of attaining that position, (Admin. Manual at 023808), although Plaintiff maintains (and I assume for purposes of these Motions) that this certification requirement was not strictly enforced. (P's Counter 56.1 ¶ 18.) Plaintiff's academic credentials are in education, and she does not have formal training in religion or theology. (See Ds' Counter 56.1 ¶ 4.) Plaintiff's title and training are thus different from some other employees who fell within the ministerial exception. Unlike those cases that involved "called teachers," a "spiritual director," or a "spiritual counselor," for instance, there is nothing inherently religious about the title "Lay Principal." Compare, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S.Ct. at 707 ("called teacher"), Conlon, 777 F.3d at 834 ("spiritual director"), and Rogers, 2015 WL 2186007, at *6 ("spiritual counselor"), with Herx, 48 F.Supp.3d at 1177 ("lay teacher"). And while principals must attest to their Catholic faith and it is at least suggested that they complete Catechist certification, nothing in the record suggests the rigorous level of education, training, and certification attained by plaintiffs such as Perich or other "called" teachers. See Conlon, 777 F.3d at 835. This factor in the inquiry therefore weighs against application of the ministerial exception. See id.
I next turn to whether Plaintiff "held herself out as a minister of the Church by accepting the formal call to religious service," Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S.Ct. at 707, or "in other ways," id. at 708. The Supreme Court in Hosanna-Tabor and the Northern District of Illinois in Herzog v. St. Peter Lutheran Church both found that "called teachers" had accepted a formal call to religious service by virtue of their positions and held themselves out as ministers as evidenced by, for example, taking special housing allowances on taxes for those working "in the exercise of the ministry." Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S.Ct. at 708 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Herzog v. St. Peter Lutheran Church, 884 F.Supp.2d 668, 673 (N.D.Ill.2012). Plaintiff did not accept any such formal call, nor did she claim ministerial status for tax or other formal purposes, so this factor weighs against the exception. But it does not weigh strongly because Plaintiff undoubtedly knew she would be perceived as a religious leader. The Archdiocese describes acceptance of the principal position as "accept[ing] the vocation and challenge of leadership in Catholic education." (Admin. Manual at 023753.) Whether Plaintiff ever saw this description of the position or not, she had to verify her Catholic practice and answer questions about her Catholic leadership and vision when applying for the position. (Cassel Decl. ¶ 11.) In accepting this "vocation," Plaintiff became the head of an undeniably Catholic institution. And the record demonstrates that Plaintiff held herself out to the school community as a religious authority in many ways — for example, by leading prayers for the student
Fourth, I must examine whether Plaintiff's job responsibilities "reflected a role in conveying the Church's message and carrying out its mission." Id. at 708 (majority opinion).
Plaintiff's arguments against applying the ministerial exception are unpersuasive. As Hosanna-Tabor and other case law instructs, it does not matter what percentage of time Plaintiff spent on secular or administrative matters as compared to leading prayer or otherwise conveying the message of the Archdiocese and Catholic church, nor does it matter that other "lay" teachers engaged in similar religious activities as Plaintiff. See id. at 708-09 (majority opinion); Preece, 2015 WL 1826231, at *5; Herzog, 884 F.Supp.2d at 674. The argument that Plaintiff was acting at the direction of the Archdiocese and the Monsignor is similarly unpersuasive. Were this determinative, none of the plaintiff's in the cases discussed above would fall under the ministerial exception. See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S.Ct. at 708; Conlon, 777 F.3d at 835; Cannata, 700 F.3d at 178-79;
Considering the factors discussed in Hosanna-Tabor and the totality of Plaintiff's circumstances of employment, I find on balance that the ministerial exception applies. While Plaintiff's title and attendant training and education weigh against application of the exception, and while Plaintiff's not claiming to be a minister weighs slightly against it as well, the other factors discussed above — the distinct ministerial role the Church assigns her and, most significantly, Plaintiff's job responsibilities — carry far more weight. And as the Supreme Court has cautioned, the inquiry is not intended to consist of a "rigid" checklist but is instead a holistic examination of an employee's circumstances. Id. at 707-08; see Cannata, 700 F.3d at 176 ("Any attempt to calcify the particular considerations that motivated the Court in Hosanna-Tabor into a `rigid formula' would not be appropriate."); id. at 177 (application of exception does not depend on finding that Plaintiff satisfies same considerations that motivated finding in Hosanna-Tabor); see also Conlon, 777 F.3d at 835 (applying the ministerial exception even though not all Hosanna-Tabor factors were satisfied). While Plaintiff may not regard the religious aspect of her job as nearly as significant as the secular aspects, there can be no real doubt that Plaintiff "furthered the mission of the church and helped convey its message." Cannata, 700 F.3d at 177.
Accordingly, Defendants have carried their burden of establishing on the undisputed facts that Plaintiff falls within the ministerial exception to Title VII, and summary judgment in favor of Defendants is appropriate.
In addition to her federal antidiscrimination and retaliation claims, Plaintiff further alleges violations of New York State Executive Law section 296 et seq. and breach of contract. (AC ¶¶ 206-29.) The "traditional 'values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity'" weigh in favor of declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction where all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial. Kolari v. N.Y.-Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir.2006) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350, 108 S.Ct. 614, 98 L.Ed.2d 720 (1988)). Having determined that all of the claims over which this Court has original jurisdiction should be dismissed, and having considered the factors set forth in Cohill, I decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's remaining state-law causes of action. See id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)).
For the reasons stated above, Defendants' Motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and Plaintiff's Cross-Motion to strike Defendants' ministerial-immunity defense is DENIED. The federal claims are dismissed with prejudice and the state claims are dismissed without prejudice. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the pending Motions, (Docs.
