JEROME B. SIMANDLE, Chief District Judge.
In this case, Plaintiff Richard A. Hicks, Jr. brings claims pursuant to § 1983 and New Jersey state law against Camden County, the Camden County Police Department, Officer Carl Tucker, and John Does 1-10, arising from an incident between Plaintiff and Officer Tucker at a bus stop. Before the Court is a motion to dismiss brought by Defendants on the grounds that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is time-barred, and in the alternative, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. For the following reasons, the Court will grant in part and deny in part Defendants' motion.
1. Plaintiff alleges that on June 13, 2014, he was waiting on the sidewalk for a bus when he was approached by Officer Tucker.
2. Plaintiff filed this case in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey on June 14, 2016 [Docket Item 1] and filed an Amended Complaint as of right on July 5, 2016 [Docket Item 3], asserting the following eight claims: excessive force, supervisory liability, unlawful custom and inadequate training, inadequate screening, and a demand for prospective injunctive relief under § 1983; assault and battery; violation of the New Jersey Civil Rights Act; and negligence. Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss [Docket Item 4], which is now fully briefed [see Docket Items 5 & 6.] The Court will decide this motion without holding oral argument pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78.
3. Pursuant to Rule 8(a)(2), Fed. R. Civ. P., a complaint need only contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Specific facts are not required, and "the statement need only `give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'"
4. A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P., may be granted only if, accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a court concludes that the plaintiff failed to set forth fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.
5. First, Defendants seek to dismiss the Amended Complaint because Plaintiff's claims are barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations. Ordinarily, statutes of limitations arguments are raised as affirmative defenses in the answer to a complaint.
6. Here, the parties agree that New Jersey's two-year limitations period for personal injury claims applies to Plaintiff's claims under Section 1983 and New Jersey state law. N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2. The limitations period for a Section 1983 claim begins to run when the claim "accrues," or when the plaintiff "knew or should have known of the injury upon which the action is based."
7. Plaintiff takes the position that his Complaint should not be barred by the statute of limitations for two reasons: first, because his attorney delivered the Complaint in person to the Camden Courthouse and left it in the Clerk's Office drop box for filing on June 13, 2016 at 5:34 p.m.; and second, because even with a one-day delay, he has substantially complied with the statute of limitations. The Court credits counsel's certification, under penalty of perjury, that he delivered the Complaint on June 13 to the drop box at the Clerk's Office and that the document attached as Exhibit "A" is a copy of the envelope in which the complaint was submitted and received at the Clerk's Office at 5:34 p.m. on June 13. While the Court will address the sufficiency of the allegations in the Amended Complaint in this case, the Court reminds counsel that as of May 1, 2006, attorneys are required to submit initial civil pleadings electronically.
8. Defendants next argue that the Amended Complaint must be dismissed because Plaintiff has not alleged plausible grounds for relief under Section 1983 and because the Court should not exert supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's remaining state claims. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant in part and dismiss in part Defendants' motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a civil action for the deprivation of rights against:
To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that "the defendant acted under color of state law to deprive the plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution."
10. Defendants do not discuss, and the Court can find no reason to dismiss, Plaintiff's excessive force claim against Officer Tucker. To allege a claim under Section 1983 for the use of excessive force, a plaintiff must show that a "seizure" occurred, and that that seizure was unreasonable.
11. Here, Plaintiff alleges that Officer Tucker "restrained, subdued, and attacked" Plaintiff by grabbing his arms and pinning him to the ground after Plaintiff refused to provide identification. (Compl. ¶¶ 3-5.) Plaintiff has set forth facts which, if assumed true, are sufficient to show that he was unreasonably seized by Officer Tucker. For these reasons, the Court will not dismiss Count One of the Amended Complaint.
12. Count Two of the Amended Complaint seeks to hold John Doe Defendants liable under Section 1983 for "supervisory liability." It is well settled that "Section 1983 liability cannot be found solely on the basis of
13. Counts Three and Four of the Amended Complaint are directed at Camden County and the Camden County Police Department. It is well established that municipal liability under Section 1983 "may not be proven under the respondeat superior doctrine, but must be founded upon evidence that the government unit itself supported a violation of constitutional rights."
14. Failure to train "can serve as the basis for Section 1983 liability only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the municipal employees come into contact."
15. The allegations of the Amended Complaint regarding inadequate training fall short of this mark. The Amended Complaint contains only brief and vague conclusory assertions that officers have not been properly trained in, inter alia, interacting with citizens and handling evidence and official records, and that the department knew that other people in custody had been physically and mentally abused, without containing the factual grounds for such assertions. (Compl. Count 3 ¶¶ 4-5.) The mere allegation that Plaintiff was falsely arrested and subjected to excessive force, and that some other people have allegedly been treated similarly, is not enough to show that Defendants had an inadequate training program, and more critically, that such failure to train amounted to deliberate indifference. The Court will dismiss Plaintiff's Count Three.
16. Inadequate screening of potential employees will give rise to municipal liability "[o]nly where adequate scrutiny of an applicant's background would lead a reasonable policymaker to conclude that the plainly obvious consequence of the decision to hire the applicant would be the deprivation of a third party's federally protected right."
17. In Count Five, Plaintiff Hicks seeks prospective injunctive relief against the Defendants under Section 1983. Injunctive relief is available in appropriate circumstances under Section 1983,
18. Finally, the Court will also dismiss Plaintiff's claim under Count Eight for negligence. Plaintiff alleges that Officer Tucker owed him a duty "not to expose him to unreasonable harm." (Compl. Count Eight ¶ 2.) Because the essence of Plaintiff's claim is that Officer Tucker acted under color of state law and owed Plaintiff a duty on account of his official role, this Court will construe Plaintiff's claim as one for state-created danger.
19. The Due Process Clause does not impose an affirmative obligation on the state to protect its citizens.
20. The dismissal of Counts Two, Three, Four, Five and Eight of the Amended Complaint will be without prejudice. If Plaintiff Hicks is able to develop and allege plausible factual grounds for these claims to address the deficiencies noted in this Opinion, he may move to amend the Amended Complaint in the future. Any such motion to amend the Amended Complaint must be filed within the time for amending pleadings to be set by the Magistrate Judge in the forthcoming scheduling order under Rule 16(a)(3)(A), Fed. R. Civ. P.
21. An accompanying Order will be entered.
Similarly, Count Seven asserts a claim against Officer Tucker under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 106:6-1, premised on the same conduct as Plaintiff's Section 1983 claim. This Court treats claims under the NJCRA analogously to Section 1983.