OPINION & ORDER

VERNON S. BRODERICK, District Judge.

Plaintiffs Oscar Sandoval, Esteban Aca, Elmer Bonilla, Henrique Castillo, Edvin Chavez, Felix Maldonado Diaz, Alexandru Dobrin, Enrique Flores, Kerry Nohoth Hernandez-Rodriguez, Pablo Lainez, Jose Luis Maldonado Lopez, Martin Lopez, Edin Muratvoc, Juan Carlos Navarrete-Rodriguez, Kihel Noureddine, Daniele Perugini, Angel Quito, Leonardo Ramon, Flavio Soto, Filiberto Villalba, Edwin Zevallos, and Freddy Zevallos (collectively, "Plaintiffs"), on behalf of themselves and all other similarly-situated individuals in this putative class and collective action, without opposition from Defendants Dave 60 NYC, Inc., Philippe NYC I LLC, Philippe Chow East Hampton LLC, Philippe Chow Holdings LLC, Philippe Chow Mgmt LLC, Philippe Equities LLC, Merchants Hospitality, Inc., Philippe Chow, Abraham Merchant, Joseph Goldsmith, Steven Kantor, Steven Boxer, Richard Cohn, and Adam Hochfelder (collectively, "Defendants"), renew their motion for an order (1) granting preliminary approval of the proposed class and collective action Settlement Agreement and Release (the "Settlement Agreement") reached by the parties in this action; (2) conditionally certifying the proposed class; (3) approving the proposed notice of settlement; and (4) appointing class counsel. (See Docs. 110, 120.) Plaintiffs brought this action alleging that Defendants violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (the "FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq., and New York Labor Law (the "NYLL"), § 190, et seq. For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiffs' unopposed motion is GRANTED.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

The facts underlying this action are detailed in my Memorandum and Order denying Plaintiffs' initial motion, (Doc. 114), so I do not recount them here. On May 12, 2017, Plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion seeking preliminary settlement approval, conditional certification of the proposed class, approval of the proposed notice of settlement, and appointment of Wigdor LLP as class counsel. (Doc. 110.) They filed a memorandum of law in support of their motion, (Doc. 111), as well as the Declaration of David E. Gottlieb, (Doc. 112), on the same date.

On August 31, 2017, I denied Plaintiffs' unopposed motion because § 5.1(E) of the proposed Settlement Agreement contained an overbroad general release. (See Doc. 114, at 4-6.) The parties jointly moved for reconsideration on September 14, 2017, (Doc. 115), which I also denied because it did not meet the standards for granting such a motion, (Doc. 117).

On January 10, 2018, the parties submitted a joint letter informing me that they had reached an agreement (the "Stipulation") to strike the general release language contained in § 5.1(E) such that it has no force or effect. (Docs. 120, 120-1.) The Stipulation provides that it "shall be an addendum to the Settlement Agreement." (Doc. 120-1.) The parties requested that I so order the Stipulation and renewed their request for preliminary approval of the Settlement Agreement, which, apart from the addition of the Stipulation, was identical to the settlement agreement submitted with Plaintiffs' original motion. (Id.) On February 20, 2018, Plaintiffs submitted a letter inquiring whether I needed any additional information with regard to their unopposed motion. (Doc. 123.)

II. Discussion

A. Preliminary Approval of the Class Settlement

District courts have discretion to approve proposed class action settlements. See Maywalt v. Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co., 67 F.3d 1072, 1079 (2d Cir. 1995). The parties and their counsel are in a unique position to assess the potential risks of litigation, and thus district courts in exercising their discretion often give weight to the fact that the parties have chosen to settle. See Yuzary v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 12 Civ. 3693(PGG), 2013 WL 1832181, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2013).

Review of a proposed settlement generally involves preliminary approval followed by a fairness hearing. Silver v. 31 Great Jones Rest., No. 11 CV 7442(KMW)(DCF), 2013 WL 208918, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2013). To grant preliminary approval, a court need only find "probable cause to submit the [settlement] proposal to class members and hold a full-scale hearing as to its fairness." In re Traffic Exec. Ass'n E. R.R.s, 627 F.2d 631, 634 (2d Cir. 1980) (internal quotation marks omitted). Preliminary approval is typically granted "where the proposed settlement appears to be the product of serious, informed, non-collusive negotiations, has no obvious deficiencies, does not improperly grant preferential treatment to class representatives or segments of the class and falls within the range of possible approval." Silver, 2013 WL 208918, at *1 (quoting In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 226 F.R.D. 186, 191 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)).

Having reviewed Plaintiff's submissions, including the proposed Settlement Agreement and Stipulation, (Doc. 120-1), I conclude that the Settlement Agreement and Stipulation are the result of substantial investigative efforts,1 arm's length negotiations,2 and the assistance of a neutral mediator, and that terms are within the range of possible settlement approval. The parties' Stipulation to strike the general release contained in § 5.1(E) cures the defect identified in my previous order. As such, I preliminarily approve the Settlement Agreement.

B. Conditional Certification of the Proposed Class and Appointment of Class Counsel

I provisionally certify for settlement purposes the following "Settlement Class" under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e): all tipped service employees including servers, bartenders, bussers, and runners, who worked at Defendants' locations of Philippe Restaurants between January 27, 2010 and April 21, 2017. (See Doc. 120-1 § 2.7.)

To be certified under Rule 23(a), a class must meet that section's four requirements—numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation—as well as one element of Rule 23(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b). The Class has greater than forty putative members, (Gottlieb Decl. ¶ 48), and can therefore be presumed sufficiently numerous, cf. Consol. Rail Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park, 47 F.3d 473, 483 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that "numerosity is presumed at a level of 40 members"); joinder would be impractical given the relative size of the claims at issue and modest financial resources of the class members; and judicial economy favors avoiding individual actions, particularly where the defendant is amendable to a class settlement. The Named Plaintiffs and putative class members share common issues of fact and law, including whether Defendants unlawfully failed to pay wages to class members for work performed offthe-clock; whether Defendants unlawfully applied a minimum wage tip credit by permitting purported non-service employees to participate in the tip pool; whether Defendants unlawfully withheld tips or gratuities; whether Defendants furnished inaccurate wage statements; and whether Defendants withheld "spread of hours" pay. For many of the same reasons, Plaintiff's claims are typical of those of the Settlement Class. There is nothing to suggest that Plaintiff's interests are antagonistic to those of the other class members. Finally, the proposed Settlement Class satisfies Rule 23(b)(3) because "questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members," Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3), and because "class adjudication . . . will conserve judicial resources and is more efficient for class members," see Silver, 2013 WL 208918, at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted).

In addition, I appoint Plaintiff's counsel, Wigdor LLP, and in particular David E. Gottlieb, as class counsel. Rule 23(g)(1)(A) requires that a district court consider the following in appointing class counsel: "(i) the work counsel has done in identifying or investigating potential claims in the action; (ii) counsel's experience in handling class actions, other complex litigation, and the types of claims asserted in the action; (iii) counsel's knowledge of the applicable law; and (iv) the resources that counsel will commit to representing the class." Based upon the investigations done by Wigdor LLP in this case, their efforts in litigating, negotiating, and settling this case, and their previous work as class counsel in similar cases in this Circuit, see, e.g., Munir v. Sunny's Limousine Service, Inc., 13-CV-01581 (VSB), Dkt. Nos. 145, 155 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2015); Cordero v. New York Institute of Technology, 12-CV-3208 (GRB), Dkt. Nos. 60, 72 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2016); Alom v. 13th Street Entertainment, 14-CV-8707 (SN), Dkt. Nos. 71, 80 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2016); Raniere v. Citigroup Inc., 11-CV-2448 (RWS), Dkt. Nos. 163, 174 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 29, 2015), I conclude that they meet the requirements of Rule 23(g).

C. Approval of Class Notice

Rule 23(c)(2)(B) requires that:

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B). After review, I conclude that the notice proposed by Plaintiff, (Doc. 112-5), constitutes the best notice practicable under the circumstances and meets the requirements of due process. It also satisfies all of the seven elements of Rule 23(c)(2)(B).

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the parties' joint request, (Doc. 120), is GRANTED. I hereby set the following settlement procedure:

SO ORDERED.