MARK D. PFEIFFER, Presiding Judge.
Joshua DeWitt ("Father") appeals the judgment of the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri ("trial court"), which dismissed without prejudice
Father filed his Petition
Mother answered, in pertinent part, that Child was born in and had always resided in California and had never resided in Missouri. To her responsive pleading, Mother attached documents dated November 5, 2010, from the California Department of Child Support Services reflecting Mother's efforts in the State of California to establish Father's paternity of Child and Father's corresponding child support obligations, which led to Mother's administrative enforcement proceedings in Missouri.
The trial court scheduled multiple hearings for the parties to present briefing and argument regarding jurisdictional issues.
Thereafter, on March 2, 2012, the trial court entered its judgment, finding that it did not have jurisdiction over Child and dismissing the matter without prejudice. Father filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the trial court.
Father appeals.
Matters of jurisdiction are reviewed de novo. K.M.J. ex rel. I.G.M. v. M.A.J., 363 S.W.3d 172, 175 (Mo.App. E.D.2012).
In his sole point, Father asserts that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition for lack of jurisdiction because under Missouri's Uniform Parentage Act ("UPA"), §§ 210.817 to 210.852,
Missouri courts recognize two types of jurisdiction — personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction — and both are based on constitutional provisions. [Webb] ex rel. [J.C.W.] v. Wyciskalla, 275 S.W.3d 249, 252 (Mo. banc 2009). Article V of the Missouri Constitution governs subject matter jurisdiction, and grants circuit courts "original jurisdiction over all cases and matters, civil and criminal." MO. CONST. art. V, § 14. This is a civil case; therefore, the trial court had constitutionally vested subject matter jurisdiction over the matters of paternity, child support, and child custody. Hightower v. Myers, 304 S.W.3d 727, 733 (Mo. banc 2010). However, the circuit court's constitutionally granted subject matter jurisdiction
Multiple uniform laws with different jurisdictional predicates address paternity and interstate issues of child support and custody. The UPA addresses parentage; the UIFSA addresses parentage and child support; the UCCJEA addresses custody and visitation. Therefore, we must examine the interplay among the UPA, the UIFSA, and the UCCJEA.
The fundamental goal of the UPA is to establish "`uniformity among paternity determinations across the state,'" Fry v. Fry (In re Marriage of Fry), 108 S.W.3d 132, 135 (Mo.App. S.D. 2003) (quoting Piel v. Piel, 918 S.W.2d 373, 375 (Mo.App. E.D.1996)), though it is not the exclusive method for determining parentage in Missouri. White v. White, 293 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Mo.App. W.D.2009). Section 210.829.1 states that an action brought under the UPA "may be joined" with an action for "dissolution of marriage, annulment, separate maintenance, support, custody or visitation." Section 210.841.3 provides that a judgment in a UPA proceeding "may contain any other provision directed against the appropriate party to the proceeding" concerning support, custody, visitation, the furnishing of a bond, or "[a]ny matter in the best interest of the child." However, this provision does not independently authorize the grant of relief beyond a determination of paternity; it simply specifies what may be included in a judgment when the UPA action is joined with other actions. State ex rel. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Hudson, 158 S.W.3d 319, 326 (Mo.App. W.D.2005).
Father argues that Mother is subject to personal jurisdiction under section 210.829.2 of the UPA by engaging in sexual intercourse in Missouri. Section 210.829.2 of the UPA provides that: "A person who has sexual intercourse in this state thereby submits to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state to an action brought under sections 210.817 to 210.852 with respect to a child who may have been conceived by that act of intercourse." This subsection "provides a novel ... extension of the `long arm' concept." UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (1973) § 8, 9B U.L.A. cmt. at 429 (2001).
Father also argues that Mother is subject to personal jurisdiction under section 454.1515 of the UIFSA by engaging in sexual intercourse in Missouri. The UIFSA is an alternative statutory method outside of the UPA for determining paternity and support issues, such that section 210.844 of the UPA provides that specified provisions of the UPA
§ 454.1515(a)(6). This subsection (6), which is derived from the UPA (1973) Section 8, provides a factual "affiliating nexus" for the assertion of long-arm jurisdiction over a nonresident individual for purposes of determining parentage or establishing a support order. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT (2001) § 201, 9 PART IB U.L.A. cmt. at 185-86 (2005).
Father has alleged, and Mother has not denied, that they engaged in sexual intercourse in Missouri and that Child may have been conceived by that act of intercourse. Thus, the trial court had the statutory authority to make a paternity determination.
Because the UTFSA deals strictly with paternity and child support issues, we must look to the UCCJEA to determine whether the trial court has statutory authority to make an initial custody determination regarding Child. Al-Hawarey, 388 S.W.3d 237, 243. This analysis may well result in bifurcated adjudications, where one state adjudicates paternity and child support and another state adjudicates custody and parenting time.
Section 452.740.1 of Missouri's version of the UCCJEA is the exclusive basis for determining whether the trial court is authorized to make a child custody determination. § 452.740.2. Section 452.740.1 provides that:
Under this section, "home state jurisdiction" is prioritized over other "jurisdictional" bases. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT (1997) § 201, 9 PART IA U.L.A. cmt. at 672 (1999). "Home
Father argues that although Child was not present in Missouri when Father's petition was filed, or within the preceding six months, Missouri is still the home state of Child because both of Child's parents resided in Missouri when the petition was filed on June 28, 2011, and as provided in section 452.740.3, Child is not required to be physically present in the state. While Mother denies that she was a resident of Missouri at the time Father filed his Petition, Mother's residency in this case has no bearing on Child's residency, which is — undisputedly — the State of California. Father's argument is nothing more than an attempt to ignore the priority of "home state jurisdiction" by bootstrapping his argument to a subsection (§ 452.740.3) of section 452.740 that only applies if courts with a home state nexus have declined to exercise jurisdiction, § 452.740.1(1), and the court from a state of another "more appropriate forum" has also declined to exercise jurisdiction, § 452.740.1(2).
Alternatively, Father misconstrues the "home state jurisdiction" provision of section 452.740.1. The six-month extended home state provision of section 452.740.1 provides that "home state jurisdiction" continues for six months after a child is removed from the state but a parent continues to reside in the home state. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT (1997) § 201, 9 PART IA U.L.A. cmt. at 672 (1999). The child may not physically be in the state when the parent residing in the home state brings the custody action within six months of the child's removal; but for the home state provision to apply, the child had to reside in the state prior to removal. In this case, there is no allegation or evidence in the record that Child has ever resided in Missouri, let alone that Missouri had ever been the Child's home state. The parties do not dispute that Child was born in California and has resided in that state since his birth; thus, California is Child's home state, and there is no allegation or evidence that the courts of the State of California refuse to exercise jurisdiction over Child. To the contrary, it is undisputed that the California Department of Child Support Services sought and obtained a California court order compelling paternity testing of Child.
Because California is the home state of Child and California has not declined to exercise jurisdiction, the trial court did not have jurisdiction pursuant to the UCCJEA to determine child custody; therefore, the judgment of the trial court dismissing without prejudice Father's petition as to
VICTOR C. HOWARD and ALOK AHUJA, Judges, concur.
We note that the Division's order was not a judgment on the merits on the issue of paternity. Our Supreme Court has held that, "[a]lthough section 454.490 gives a docketed administrative order the `force, effect and attributes' of a circuit court order, the statute does not provide that, upon docketing, the order becomes a judgment of the circuit court." State v. Salazar, 236 S.W.3d 644, 647 (Mo. banc 2007) (quoting State ex rel. Hilburn v. Staeden, 91 S.W.3d 607, 611 (Mo. banc 2002)). "The docketed order can be enforced by the circuit court, but it cannot become an actual judgment of the circuit court absent judicial review." Id. There was no judicial review of the order finding Father financially responsible for Child. "Consequently, the docketed order is not a final judgment of the circuit court." Id. "Holding otherwise would impermissibly substitute an executive branch agency determination for the independent power of the circuit court to render final judgments." Id.
"Thus, although an order of the Division may be enforced to the same extent as a circuit court judgment, § 454.490.1, an order from the Division has no preclusive effect on subsequent litigation on the issue of paternity." Wilson, 317 S.W.3d at 212.
