ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ROBERT J. JONKER, District Judge.

Plaintiff Anthony Jones has filed an objection (docket #40) to Magistrate Judge Hugh W. Brenneman's Report and Recommendation issued January 28, 2014 (docket #39). The Report and Recommendation recommends that this Court grant Defendants' motion for summary judgment (docket #14). When a party objects to a magistrate judge's report and recommendation, the "district judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge's disposition that has been properly objected to. The district judge may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions." Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). De novo review in these circumstances requires at least a review of the evidence before the magistrate judge that is relevant to the findings under attack. Hill v. Duriron Co., 656 F.2d 1208, 1215 (6th Cir. 1981). After conducting a de novo review of the Report and Recommendation, Jones's objections, and the pertinent portions of the record, the Court will adopt the Report and Recommendation in part and grant Defendants' motion for summary judgment.1

I. Background

This Court previously summarized Jones's allegations as follows:

(Opinion, docket #7, Page ID 49-50.) The Court dismissed Jones's Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Shreve and authorized service of the Complaint on Defendants Heyns, Makara, and Randle. The remaining claims are (1) First Amendment retaliation and (2) a claim for injunctive relief on the basis of MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.130 ¶¶ K and L, which Jones alleges are unconstitutional.2 Defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis of the First Amendment retaliation claim. As the magistrate judge expressly noted in the Report and Recommendation, Defendants have not addressed Jones's claim for injunctive relief.

II. Jones's Objections

In the Report and Recommendation, the magistrate judge recommends that this Court grant Defendants' summary judgment motion on Jones's retaliation claims because (1) Jones failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies on the issue of retaliation, and, alternatively, (2) Jones has not established the causation element of his claim because prison administrators found Jones guilty of misconduct. (Report and Recommendation, Docket #39, Page ID 273-74.) Jones makes two objections: (1) in concluding his retaliation claims are unexhausted, the magistrate judge misconstrues his retaliation claim, interpreting it as a challenge to the misconduct itself, rather than a retaliation claim; and (2) the magistrate judge erred on the merits of his claim.3

III. Discussion

For purposes of Jones's objection, the Court need not address whether Jones exhausted his retaliation claims because Jones's retaliation claim fails as a matter of law. To prove a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must establish three elements: (1) the plaintiff engaged in activities protected by the Constitution or statute; (2) the defendant took an "adverse action" that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that conduct; and (3) this adverse action was taken at least in part because of the exercise of the protected conduct. Smith v. Campbell, 250 F.3d 1032, 1037 (6th Cir. 2001). "If the defendant can show that he would have taken the same action in the absence of the protected activity, he is entitled to prevail on summary judgment." Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 399 (6th Cir. 1999). "A finding of guilt based upon some evidence of a violation of prison rules `essentially checkmates [a] retaliation claim." Jackson v. Madery, 158 F. App'x 656, 662 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Henderson v. Baird, 29 F.3d 464, 469 (8th Cir. 1994)).

In this case, the misconduct report indicates that the "MDOC Directors Office" undertook an investigation that revealed that Jones's allegations against Shreve were "unfounded." (Docket #1-1, Page ID 15.) The Office then "approved" the misconduct ticket for interference with the administration of rules. (Id.) Therefore, as in Jackson, Jones was found guilty of violating prison rules, based on evidence in the record, and that finding of guilt precludes any retaliation theory based on it.

Jones objects that his case is similar to Wolfel v. Bates, 707 F.2d 932 (1983). In Wolfel, the Sixth Circuit held that prison authorities violated a prisoner's First Amendment right to seek redress of grievances where they failed to first determine whether the prisoner's statements constituted misconduct before punishing him. Id. at 934. Jones is mistaken. In this case, unlike in Wolfel, the record does not "reveal[] that prison authorities punished [Jones] without first finding [a misconduct violation]." See id. Rather, the record in this case establishes a guilty finding on the misconduct ticket that "essentially checkmates" Jones's retaliation claim. Jackson, 158 F. App'x at 662. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the retaliation claims. Therefore, the Court will adopt the Report and Recommendation to the extent that it recommends that this Court grant Defendant's motion for summary judgment.

As Defendants' motion for summary judgment does not address Jones's claim for injunctive relief, Claim IV challenging the constitutionality of MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.130 ¶¶ K, L remains.4 For purposes of Claim IV, the Court will dismiss all Defendants except Heyns. The purposes are two-fold: first, in his objection, Jones only claims injunctive relief against Heyns, and, second, it mitigates potential jury confusion. Official capacity suits brought under § 1983 "`generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.'" Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (quoting Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978)). "As long as the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity." Graham, 473 U.S. at 166. Unlike individual capacity claims, "official capacity claims do not falter on a defendant's lack of personal involvement." Alame v. Smetka, No. 08-10777, 2009 WL 236073, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 29, 2009) (citing Graham, 473 U.S. at 165-66; Leach v. Shelby Cnty. Sheriff, 891 F.2d 1241, 1245 (6th Cir. 1989)). A governmental entity is liable under § 1983 when "the entity itself is a `moving force' behind the deprivation; thus, in an official-capacity suit the entity's `policy or custom' must have played a part in the violation of federal law." Id. (internal citations omitted). Heyns, as MDOC director, is the appropriate official defendant for Jones's remaining claim.5

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation (docket #39) is ADOPTED IN PART. It is adopted to the extent that it recommends that this Court grant Defendants' motion for summary judgment.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' motion for summary judgment (docket #14) is GRANTED.