SIEVERS, Judge.
Kevin P. Johnson appeals the entry of a harassment protection order entered by the district court for Douglas County, with a county court judge presiding, in favor of his ex-wife, Felicia A. Johnson. Because we find that the evidence was insufficient to support entry of the harassment protection order by the district court, we must reverse the decision of the court to enter the harassment protection order and remand the cause with directions to vacate the order. Pursuant to our authority under Neb. Ct. R. App. P. § 2-111(B)(1) (rev. 2008), we have ordered this case submitted for decision without oral argument.
BACKGROUND
On January 3, 2011, Felicia filed a pro se form petition and affidavit seeking a harassment protection order against Kevin under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-311.09 (Reissue 2008). In the petition and affidavit, Felicia averred that (1) in December 2004, Kevin punched her in the head several times while she was pregnant; (2) on December 24, 2010, she went to pick up the parties' children from Kevin, and that she heard him "cocking back a handheld gun before answering the door to open it"; and (3) on January 1, 2011, when Kevin came to pick up the parties' children from her, he entered her home uninvited and grabbed their daughter by the arm while swearing at Felicia. Felicia sought an order prohibiting Kevin from imposing any restraint upon her or upon her liberty and prohibiting Kevin from harassing, threatening, assaulting, molesting, or attacking her, or otherwise disturbing her peace. The same day, the court issued an ex parte harassment protection order against Kevin.
At the January 27, 2011, hearing, Kevin and Felicia both appeared pro se. At the hearing, Felicia's "petition and affidavit" was neither offered nor received into evidence. However, at the beginning of the hearing, the trial judge essentially read the contents of the petition and affidavit into the record and asked Felicia if his recitation was accurate as to what she wrote in her affidavit. We include the conversation in its entirety.
THE COURT: Ms. Johnson, in your protection order — or harassment order, this is the copy of the affidavit you filed. It said on December 24th of last year, you went to meet your ex-husband to pick up your children, knocked at the door when you heard your ex-husband say, "Hold on." "After a few seconds, I heard him cocking back a hand-held gun before answering the door to open it. Our children were present when this occurred." And on Saturday, the 1st of January, cooking breakfast, he came to your home to pick up the children, was waiting outside in his car and the children were getting ready to go with him. He uninvitedly entered my home and grabbed our daughter by her arm up out of her chair while swearing at me. And sometime in 2004 or something — but that's so old I can't use it.
Are those two events accurate to what you wrote in here and swore to?
MS. JOHNSON: Yes.
We note that this was the sum of Felicia's "testimony." The court noted that the December 24, 2010, incident "doesn't completely bother me because it doesn't say that anything happened to [Felicia]." The court then asked Kevin about the incident on January 1, 2011, and whether on that occasion Kevin went into Felicia's home uninvited. Kevin's testimony was that he did enter Felicia's home and that although Felicia did not say "come in," Kevin felt like he was invited because "she moved to the side of the door." The trial judge stated, "That's not good enough." The court entered a harassment protection order pursuant to § 28-311.09 in favor of Felicia, and against Kevin, for a period of 1 year. Kevin appeals.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
Kevin, now represented by counsel, assigns that the trial court erred in finding there was sufficient evidence to support the issuance of a harassment protection order. Kevin has also filed a motion for summary reversal. Felecia has not filed a brief.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A protection order is analogous to an injunction. Mahmood v. Mahmud, 279 Neb. 390, 778 N.W.2d 426 (2010). Accordingly, the grant or denial of a protection order is reviewed de novo on the record. Id.
ANALYSIS
At the outset, we note that Felicia's petition and affidavit was neither offered nor received into evidence. Furthermore, she did not testify at the hearing, other than to respond, "Yes," when the court, after having read her petition and affidavit aloud, asked if that is what she had written. Some evidence must be presented at the show cause harassment protection hearing. Mahmood v. Mahmud, supra. "[T]he petition and affidavit cannot be considered as evidence until offered and accepted at the trial as such." Id. at 398, 778 N.W.2d at 443. "The ex parte order does not relieve the petitioner of the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence the truth of the facts supporting a protection order." Id. In Mahmood v. Mahmud, the Nebraska Supreme Court held: "While we do not expect show cause harassment protection hearings to reflect the full panoply of procedures common to civil trials, we do hold that at a minimum, testimony must be under oath and documents must be admitted into evidence before being considered." 279 Neb. at 398, 778 N.W.2d at 443. Felicia has simply failed to offer any evidence, testimonial or documentary, to support the issuance of the harassment protection order. Because the court had no evidence upon which it could base its findings, we find in our de novo review that the evidence is insufficient to support entry of the protection order.
Even if Felicia's petition and affidavit had been offered and received into evidence, the evidence would still be insufficient to support entry of the harassment protection order. Felicia must prove a "course of conduct" to satisfy the definition of harassment. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-311.02(2) (Reissue 2008). Section 28-311.09 states that "[a]ny victim who has been harassed as defined by section 28-311.02 may file a petition and affidavit for a harassment order. . . ." And § 28-311.02(2) states in part:
(a) Harass means to engage in a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person which seriously terrifies, threatens, or intimidates the person and which serves no legitimate purpose;
(b) Course of conduct means a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose, including a series of acts of following, detaining, restraining the personal liberty of, or stalking the person or telephoning, contacting, or otherwise communicating with the person.
Appellate courts give statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning and will not resort to interpretation to ascertain the meaning of statutory words which are plain, direct, and unambiguous. Schuyler Apt. Partners v. Colfax Cty. Bd. of Equal., 279 Neb. 989, 783 N.W.2d 587 (2010). The trial judge clearly based his decision about whether to enter a protection order solely on the January 1, 2011, incident. The trial judge stated that the 2004 incident was "too old" and that the December 24 incident "doesn't completely bother me because it doesn't say that anything happened to [Felicia]."
In our de novo review, we agree. Thus, by all accounts, the issuance of the protection order was based on a one-time occurrence, not a "series of acts," and thus there is no evidence of a "course of conduct" satisfying the definition of harassment.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, after de novo review, we find that the evidence was insufficient to support entry of the harassment protection order. We therefore reverse the district court's entry of the order and remand the cause with directions to vacate the harassment protection order. Because of our disposition of this matter, Kevin's motion for summary reversal is moot.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
