ROBERT B. KUGLER, District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court on the motion of Ancora Psychiatric Hospital ("Ancora") for summary judgment on pro se Plaintiff Veronica Graves's claim of race discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
Plaintiff was previously employed by Ancora as a Nursing Services Clerk from 2002 until 2005. (Ex. B to Ancora Br. in Support of Mot. for Summ. J. ("Ancora Br."), New Hires Processing Form.) In 2005, Plaintiff was laid off from employment. (Ex. C to Ancora Br., Letter from Donna L. Ingram, Human Resources Manager, to Plaintiff dated March 29, 2005.) Two years later, on September 17, 2007, Plaintiff was rehired by Ancora as a Technical Assistant 3 ("Tech 3"). (Ancora Statement of Uncontested Material Facts ("Ancora SMF") ¶¶ 8, 13.) Prior to her second employment with Ancora, Plaintiff had taken and passed the Civil Service Exam for the Tech 3 position. (Ex. A to Ancora Br., Deposition of Veronica Graves ("Pl.'s Dep.") 35:12-36:8.) As a Tech 3, Plaintiff's responsibilities included,
Plaintiff began her employment as a Tech 3 under a probationary period commencing on her start date and extending for four (4) months. (Ex. G to Ancora Br., Memorandum from Kathleen Carr, Human Resources Manager to Plaintiff, dated Oct. 15, 2007.) The probationary period could be extended up to six (6) months for cause. (
On November 18, 2007, Plaintiff's first Report of Progress on Probationer reflected a "satisfactory" rating. (Ex. H to Ancora Br., Report on Progress of Probationer dated Nov. 18, 2007.) On January 11, 2008, Doris Vacca, Senior Manager of Scheduling, met with Plaintiff to verbally review a copy of Plaintiff's second Report of Progress on Probationer. (Exs. K (Memorandum by Doris Vacca, dated Jan. 11, 2008) and I (Report on Progress of Probationer, dated Jan. 18, 2007) to Ancora Br.) Plaintiff received an "unsatisfactory" rating in this report.
In a memorandum, Vacca indicated that she tried to explain her concerns to Plaintiff and why she received an unsatisfactory performance review; however, when Plaintiff asked Vacca whether this meant she would be fired, and Vacca replied "no," Plaintiff "asked where to sign and walked away." (Ex. K to Ancora Br.) Vacca asked Plaintiff to sit down in order to "go over issues of concern," however, Plaintiff stated that "she did not want to talk and put on her coat ... [and] began to shout." (
In a memorandum discussing the reasons Plaintiff received an unsatisfactory rating, Vacca stated that Plaintiff had difficulty following directions since her start date, and this difficulty has led to other technicians correcting Plaintiff's work for her. (Ex. J to Ancora Br., Memorandum by Doris Vacca, dated Jan. 10, 2008.) As Plaintiff's responsibilities included staffing and scheduling for three wards, errors included "neglecting to schedule holidays, scheduling staff for more than 5 days in a row, and duplication of staff names on the schedules." (
Due to Plaintiff's performance, Vacca requested that Plaintiff's working test period be extended until March 17, 2008. (Ex. M to Ancora Br., Request for Extension of Working Test Period, dated Jan. 10, 2008.) This request was approved by the Department of Personnel on January 15, 2008. (Ex. L. to Ancora Br., Memorandum from Tina Bailey, Human Resources Personnel Assistant to Doris Vacca, dated Jan. 15, 2008.) Plaintiff acknowledged that her probation period was extended in order to improve her work product. (Pl.'s Dep. 55:20-56:5.)
During the extended probationary period, Plaintiff received two Reports of Progress on Probationer, one dated February 17, 2008, and the other dated March 17, 2008. (Ancora SMF ¶ 25.) Both of these reports reflected an "unsatisfactory" rating. (Exs. N (Report on Progress of Probationer, dated Feb. 18, 2008) and O (Report on Progress of Probationer, dated March 18, 2008) to Ancora Br.) In a memorandum to the Department of Personnel dated March 5, 2008, Vacca noted that Plaintiff's performance continued to be unsatisfactory and thus requested Notice of Termination. (Ex. P to Ancora Br., Memorandum by Doris Vacca, dated March 5, 2008.) She further stated that Plaintiff "fails to follow directions/instructions regarding various aspects of the responsibilities," that she declined Vacca's offer for additional time to learn the staffing system because she "worked in the office previously and ... knew how to ... do the schedules," and that she continued to make a number of "serious" errors which involved staff schedules and inappropriate coverage. (
In a letter to Plaintiff dated March 14, 2008, Alfred Filippini, Manager 2, Human Resources, informed Plaintiff that she was being terminated from employment effective March 17, 2008, due to her overall work history—poor attendance, not following directions regarding aspects of her job—and the fact that her unsatisfactory performance had not improved. (Ex. R to Ancora Br., Letter from Alfred Filippini, Human Resources Manager to Plaintiff, dated March 14, 2008.) Plaintiff was informed that she had the right to appeal the decision of the unsatisfactory rating on her probationary report pursuant to state law within a set amount of time.
Summary judgment is appropriate where the Court is satisfied that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a);
The burden of establishing the nonexistence of a "genuine issue" is on the party moving for summary judgment.
If the party seeking summary judgment makes this showing, it is left to the nonmoving party to "do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts."
In deciding the merits of a party's motion for summary judgment, the Court's role is not to evaluate the evidence and decide the truth of the matter, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.
"Under Title VII, to make a prima facie showing of race discrimination, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) he or she belongs to a protected class; (2) he or she was qualified for the position; (3) he or she was subject to an adverse employment action despite being qualified; and (4) the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances that give rise to an inference of discrimination."
As to the fourth prong of the prima facie case, whether Ancora's actions give rise to an inference of discrimination, "[c]ommon circumstances giving rise to [such] an inference ... include the hiring of someone not in the protected class as a replacement or the more favorable treatment of similarly situated colleagues outside of the relevant class."
After the plaintiff successfully demonstrates a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant employer to articulate a "legitimate, non-discriminatory reason" for the adverse employment action.
Here, Plaintiff has established a prima facie case of racial discrimination. First, she belongs to a protected class. Second, although the record indicates that she made mistakes during the course of her employment, there is no issue as to whether she was qualified in the first instance; indeed, Plaintiff passed the Civil Service Examination required for employment as a Tech 3. Third, Plaintiff was subject to an adverse employment action, i.e., she was terminated from employment. And fourth, there is sufficient evidence that supports the inference that Plaintiff's termination occurred under circumstances that give rise to an inference of discrimination; namely, that her position was filled by a white employee,
As to whether Ancora has articulated a legitimate and non-discriminatory reasons for Plaintiff's termination of employment, the Court concludes that Plaintiff's supposed inability to properly perform the functions of her job and her recurring attendance problems would qualify as such. However, the Court also concludes that Plaintiff has set forth sufficient evidence that would allow the factfinder to infer that discrimination was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of Plaintiff's termination, and thus Ancora's legitimate and non-discriminatory reasons for Plaintiff's termination are mere pretext.
Although Ancora cites to Plaintiff's attendance history as one of the causes for her termination, the record also shows that white employees were not subject to the same standards with regard to work absences and tardiness.
Based on this evidence, the Court finds that summary judgment is inappropriate, and thus Ancora's motion as to Plaintiff's Title VII claim will be denied.
For the reasons stated above, the Court will deny Ancora's motion. An appropriate order shall issue today.
Ancora also argues that summary judgment is proper as to Plaintiff's claim for "breach of the collective bargaining agreement." (Ancora Br. 11-14.) However, in reviewing Plaintiff's Complaint, styled as "Plaintiff's More Definite Statement," the Court does not construe Plaintiff's reference to a "collective bargaining agreement" as a separate cause of action. Rather, it appears that Plaintiff means to challenge her placement in a probationary period as violative of Title VII. (Doc. No. 26, Pl.'s More Definite Statement ¶ 4.) Indeed, Plaintiff's brief in opposition to Ancora's motion for summary judgment states:
(Pl.'s Opp'n Br. to Ancora Mot. for Summ. J. ("Pl.'s Opp'n Br.") 7.) As an initial matter, to the extent Plaintiff meant to allege a separate cause of action based on a breach of "the collective bargaining agreement," she has simply failed to sufficiently allege, let alone set forth any evidence at this stage of the proceedings, that would support such a claim. Although the Court has afforded Plaintiff great latitude in her pleadings due to her pro se status, there is nothing currently before the Court that would lead it to conclude that Plaintiff's claim is anything more than a claim for race discrimination under Title VII. Indeed, Plaintiff has not provided anything to the Court that would lead it to conclude that her prior employment with Ancora as a Nursing Services Clerk somehow exempted her from the requirement that she again complete a probationary period once she was hired as a Tech 3, an entirely different role.