OPINION AND ORDER

J. PAUL OETKEN, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on an appeal from a bankruptcy judge's decision granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff below, Appellee Eugene I. Davis, Litigation Trustee for the Quebecor World Litigation Trust (the "Trustee"), and against Appellant Clarklift-West, Inc. ("Clarklift-West" or "Appellant").

Pursuant to Rule 8018 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, "[t]he appellant must serve and file a brief within 30 days after the docketing of notice that the record has been transmitted or is available electronically." Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8018(a)(1). Clarklift-West failed to file a brief in the time set out in Rule 8018. The Court issued an order on May 26, 2015, requiring Appellant to show cause by June 10, 2015, why this appeal should not be dismissed. (Dkt. No. 5.)

On June 10, 2015, attorney Robert Biegler1 filed, by mail, a declaration concerning the reasons that Clarklift-West had failed to file a brief within the time set out in the Bankruptcy Rules.2 Subsequently, at the Court's direction, the parties filed briefing on the question of the appropriate sanction, if any, for Clarklift-West's failure to file a brief within the limits set out in Rule 8018. The Trustee asks that the appeal be dismissed. (Dkt. No. 11 ("Trustee Br.").) Clarklift-West asks that its attorney's neglect be excused and that the Court set a briefing schedule for the appeal. (Dkt. No. 12 ("Appellant Br.").)

I. Discussion

A. Legal Standards

Bankruptcy Rule 8018 provides that "[i]f an appellant fails to file a brief on time . . . the district court . . ., after notice, may dismiss the appeal on its own motion." Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8018(a)(4). Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b)(1) permits an extension of time under the rules, even "after the expiration of the specified period," where "the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect." Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b)(1).3 The Supreme Court has interpreted the excusable neglect standard to permit courts to "accept late filings caused by inadvertence, mistake, or carelessness, as well as by intervening circumstances beyond the party's control." Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 507 U.S. 380, 388 (1993).4 In this determination, a district court should "`tak[e] account of all relevant circumstances surrounding the party's omission,' including `[1] the danger of prejudice to the debtor, [2] the length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, [3] the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant, and [4] whether the movant acted in good faith.'" In re Enron Corp., 419 F.3d 115, 122 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 395) (brackets in Enron).

The Second Circuit "has `taken a hard line in applying the Pioneer test.'" Seinfeld v. WorldCom, Inc., No. 06 Civ. 13274 (DLC), 2007 WL 987867, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2007) (quoting Enron, 419 F.3d at 122), aff'd sub nom. In re WorldCom, Inc., 283 F. App'x 876 (2d Cir. 2008) (summary order). Under this approach, the Pioneer factors are not given equal weight. See Silivanch v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 333 F.3d 355, 366 (2d Cir. 2003). While "three of the factors" of the Pioneer test "usually weigh in favor of the party seeking the extension," the Second Circuit "focuse[s] on the third" of the four factors: "`the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant.'" Id. (quoting Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 395).

The Court of Appeals has indicated that the "failure to follow the clear dictates of a court rule will generally not constitute . . . excusable neglect." In re Lynch, 430 F.3d 600, 604 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (quoting Canfield v. Van Atta Buick/GMC Truck, Inc., 127 F.3d 248, 250-51 (2d Cir. 1997) (per curiam)). Thus, "[w]here the rule is entirely clear, . . . a party claiming excusable neglect will, in the ordinary course, lose under the Pioneer test." Enron, 419 F.3d at 123 (quoting Silivanch, 333 F.3d at 366-67.) Other courts have generally applied the Pioneer test in a similar manner. See id. at 123-24 (citing cases from the First, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits).

B. Application

Here, as in many cases, three of the four factors weigh only marginally in either direction on the question whether to permit a late filing by Clarklift-West. See Silivanch, 333 F.3d at 366. On the first factor, there appears to be little danger of prejudice from the delay to any party; on the second, the length of the delay—at this point, several months—is not extreme but is also "not insignificant" in the context of Rule 8018, which sets a 30-day time limit for filing an appellate brief, see Seinfeld, 2007 WL 987867, at *3; and on the fourth factor, there is nothing in the record that establishes that Clarklift-West's delay can be attributed to conduct in bad faith. See Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 395. But as the Second Circuit has directed, the Court must take a close look at the third factor, and examine both whether the applicable rule setting the time limit was clear and the reason that Clarklift-West did not file its appellate brief on time.

First, the rule establishing the time limit in question here is entirely clear. As set out above, Rule 8018 states: "The appellant must serve and file a brief within 30 days after the docketing of notice that the record has been transmitted or is available electronically." Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8018(a)(1). The time limit set out in the rule is unambiguous.

Nor was there any possibility of excusable confusion by counsel about the date on which the time to file the brief began to run. Clarklift-West filed a notice of appeal in the bankruptcy court on November 18, 2014. (Bk. No. 10-1568, Dkt. No. 57.) Clarklift-West filed a designation of the record on appeal on March 18, 2015, and the Trustee filed a counter designation on March 20, 2015. (Bk. No. 10-1568, Dkt. Nos. 58-60.) The same day, the bankruptcy court's docket reflected that this action, 15 Civ. 2112, was opened in this Court. (Bk. No. 10-1568, Dkt. No. 61.) Further, the bankruptcy docket noted that the "record of appeal is complete and available electronically." (Bk. No. 10-1568, Dkt. No. 62 (capitalization altered).) Accordingly, it was plain that Clarklift-West's brief was to be filed within 30 days after March 20, 2015. And even if there were any question on this point, this Court's docket contains a notation dated March 20, 2015, which states, "Appellant Brief due by 4/20/2015." (See No. 15 Civ. 2112, unnumbered docket entry following Dkt. No. 4.)

Second, the reasons offered by Clarklift-West for Biegler's delay in filing the brief fail to establish excusable neglect. Appellant states that its counsel "did not see" the notice of transmittal of the record, but provides no cogent reason that he did not do so. (See Appellant Br. at 2 ("For whatever reason, Appellant's counsel did see Appellee's Counter Designation, but[] did not see the Court's Notice of Transmittal.").) The oversight is particularly hard to understand given that a notification of the notice of transmittal was sent by the bankruptcy court's ECF system to an e-mail address associated with Biegler. (See Trustee Br. Ex. A.)

In a declaration, Biegler states that he "believed and understood" that he would receive a briefing schedule from the Court. (Dkt. No. 9 ("Biegler Decl.") ¶ 5; see also Appellant Br. at 1.) This rationale is inadequate. "[T]he appellant's counsel [is] obligated to check the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure to determine the applicable deadlines for filing his client's appellate brief." Seinfeld, 2007 WL 987867, at *3-4 (holding that the contention that "counsel did not file an appeal out of his belief that the Court would enter a scheduling order setting the filing date deadline" was "inexcusable"). Furthermore, if Biegler had reviewed this Court's docket, he would have seen that the deadline for the appellant's brief had already been set. "[I]nadvertence, ignorance of the rules, or mistakes construing the rules do not usually constitute `excusable' neglect," Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 392, and the Court holds that they do not here.5

Biegler also notes that he had emergency surgery on April 24, 2015, and has been recuperating since. (Dkt. No. 12, Ex. 1 ("Second Biegler Decl.") ¶ 5.) He states that his illness began in "mid[-]April 2015." (Id.) But this is largely beside the point. On March 20, 2015, Biegler should have apprised himself of the transmittal of the appellate record, and by that time should have been aware of the briefing schedule set by Rule 8018. Biegler's illness did not begin until afterward, leaving him ample time to seek an extension before the deadline. Thus, the illness has little relevance to the issue at hand.

As courts have noted in this context, "an appellant's loss of the right to bring an appeal due to the inadvertent mistakes of his counsel may seem unjust." Seinfeld, 2007 WL 987867, at *3. However, "the legal system would groan under the weight of a regimen of uncertainty in which time limitations were not rigorously enforced—where every missed deadline was the occasion for the embarkation on extensive trial and appellate litigation to determine the equities of enforcing the bar." Id. (quoting Enron, 419 F.3d at 123).

For all these reasons, the Court concludes that Biegler's neglect is inexcusable under the precedent of this Circuit. Accordingly, Clarklift-West's appeal is dismissed.

II. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Clarklift-West's appeal is DISMISSED. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this matter.

SO ORDERED.