DECISION and ORDER

DAVID N. HURD, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Presently under consideration in this civil rights action brought pro se by plaintiff Jermaine Fann ("Fann" or "plaintiff") is plaintiff's third motion for preliminary injunctive relief. Dkt. No. 37.

II. PROCEEDINGS TO DATE

By his complaint, Fann seeks redress for numerous incidents of alleged wrongdoing that occurred at Auburn Correctional Facility ("Auburn C.F."), where he is presently confined. See generally Dkt. No. 1 ("Compl.").

Upon review of the complaint in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), Fann's First Amendment retaliation claims against C.O. Thomas, C.O. Cornell, C.O. Lovejoy, C.O. Schramm, and Sgt. Ederer (set forth in the First and Fifth Claims) survived sua sponte review and required a response. December Order at 19.1 Plaintiff's remaining claims were dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend. Id.

Fann then sought reconsideration of the December Order with respect to the dismissal of several of his claims. Dkt. No. 9. Upon review, plaintiff's motion was granted in part and denied in part; plaintiff's claims that the visual body cavity searches conducted by defendants C.O. Cornell and C.O. Stienberg on June 3, 2015 and July 9, 2015 violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment were reinstated and a response was ordered. Dkt. No. 25 at 13. In a subsequent order, Auburn Supt. Graham was reinstated as a defendant with respect to plaintiff's Fourth Amendment unreasonable search claims. Dkt. No. 34 at 6.

Defendants have been served and have answered the complaint. Dkt. Nos. 29, 43, 47. A Mandatory Pretrial Discovery and Scheduling Order was issued by Magistrate Judge Christian F. Hummel in March 2016. Dkt. No. 23.2

III. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Preliminary injunctive relief "`is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.'" Moore v. Consol. Edison Co. of New York, Inc., 409 F.3d 506, 510 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997)).

"In general, district courts may grant a preliminary injunction where a plaintiff demonstrates `irreparable harm' and meets one of two related standards: `either (a) a likelihood of success on the merits, or (b) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits of its claims to make them fair ground for litigation, plus a balance of the hardships tipping decidedly in favor of the moving party.'" Otoe-Missouria Tribe of Indians v. New York State Dep't of Fin. Servs., 769 F.3d 105, 110 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Lynch v. City of N.Y., 589 F.3d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

However, when the moving party seeks a "mandatory preliminary injunction that alters the status quo by commanding a positive act," the burden is "even higher." Cacchillo v. Insmed, Inc., 638 F.3d 401, 406 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., 598 F.3d 30, 35 n.4 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, a mandatory preliminary injunction "should issue only upon a clear showing that the moving party is entitled to the relief requested, or where extreme or very serious damage will result from a denial of preliminary relief." Citigroup Global Mkts., 598 F.3d at 35 n.4 (internal quotation marks omitted).3

In his motion, Fann claims that "sometime in February or March 2016" he was subjected to a visual body cavity search in the "strip search area." Dkt. No. 37 at 4. Plaintiff states that this search was part of a search of the entire C-Block, but maintains that all other inmates were searched in their cells. Id. Plaintiff contends that the conditions under which this search was conducted were similar to those under which he was searched by defendants C.O. Cornell and C.O. Steinberg on June 3, 2015 and July 9, 2015. Id. at 3.4 Plaintiff seeks an order prohibiting defendants from "conducting visual body cavity searches in Auburn Correctional Facility, C-Block maintence [sic] area." Id. at 5.

Defendants oppose Fann's motion and urge its denial. Dkt No. 44. Defendants contend that plaintiff has not met the "heavy burden" for the issuance of such relief. In fact, defendants argue that plaintiff has "done nothing more in his current motion than restate the unsupported allegations of his Complaint. . . ." Id. at 2. Defendants note, moreover, that they deny that plaintiff was subjected to a strip search on June 3, 2015, and maintain that the strip search on July 9, 2015 "was performed only after marijuana was found in Plaintiff's possession." Id.

Fann filed a reply in which he restates his belief that he has demonstrated his entitlement to the injunctive relief requested in his motion. Dkt. No. 48. Plaintiff also disputes defendants' description of the July 9, 2015 search. Id. at 2.5

Upon review, Fann has not demonstrated that he is likely to suffer imminent irreparable harm if the requested relief is not granted. While mistreatment of any kind is not condoned, plaintiff's allegations are generally conclusory in nature and do not plausibly suggest that he will suffer irreparable harm if the requested relief is not granted.

Significantly, Fann does not contend that any of the defendants were personally involved in the search which occurred "sometime [i]n February or March." See Dkt. No. 37. Thus, plaintiff's fear that these defendants might physically harm or otherwise mistreat him is purely speculative and, therefore, patently insufficient to make the showing required for the issuance of preliminary injunctive relief. See e.g., Slacks v. Gray, No. 9:07-CV-0501 (NAM/GJD), 2008 WL 2522075, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. June 25, 2008) (allegations of future injury without more do not establish a real threat of injury).

In addition, Fann has also failed to submit proof or evidence which demonstrates a likelihood of succeeding on the merits of his claims or the existence of sufficiently serious questions going to the merits of the claims and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward him. See Covino, 967 F.2d at 77. Plaintiff's allegations, standing alone, are not sufficient to entitle him to preliminary injunctive relief. See Ivy Mar Co. v. C.R. Seasons Ltd., 907 F.Supp. 547, 561 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) ("[B]are allegations, without more, are insufficient for the issuance of a preliminary injunction."); Hancock v. Essential Resources, Inc., 792 F.Supp. 924, 928 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) ("Preliminary injunctive relief cannot rest on mere hypotheticals.").

Based upon the foregoing, Fann's motion for preliminary injunctive relief is denied.

IV. CONCLUSION

Therefore, it is

ORDERED that

IT IS SO ORDERED.