GARY L. SHARPE, Senior District Judge.
In his complaint, pro se plaintiff Arrello Barnes asserts numerous claims arising out of his confinement in the custody of the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS). See Dkt. No. 1. Plaintiff also filed a motion for preliminary injunctive relief, seeking an Order of this Court directing that DOCCS Rule 105.13 (Gangs) "be suspended or amended." Dkt. No. 4.
Upon review of the complaint in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), this Court concluded that plaintiff's claims that he was disciplined without due process and in violation of his First Amendment rights required a response from defendants Coveny, Maxwell, Borowski, Ollies, Whitford, Frazier, Mahuta, Hanson, McKeighan, Bell, Narkiewicz, West, Annucci, and Venetozzi. See Dkt. No. 10 ("September Order") at 21-22. Plaintiff's remaining claims were dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim. Id. at 22.
Plaintiff submitted an amended pleading which reflected the Court's rulings in the September Order. See Dkt. No. 18 ("Am. Compl."). The amended complaint was accepted for filing and is the operative pleading.
Following service of process, defendants filed a motion to conditionally dismiss this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Dkt. No. 30.
Currently before the Court is a renewed motion from plaintiff seeking preliminary injunctive relief. Dkt. No. 53.
Preliminary injunctive relief "`is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.'" Moore v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 409 F.3d 506, 510 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997)). "In general, district courts may grant a preliminary injunction where a plaintiff demonstrates `irreparable harm' and meets one of two related standards: `either (a) a likelihood of success on the merits, or (b) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits of its claims to make them fair ground for litigation, plus a balance of the hardships tipping decidedly in favor of the moving party.'" Otoe-Missouria Tribe of Indians v. New York State Dep't of Fin. Servs., 769 F.3d 105, 110 (2d Cir. —) (quoting Lynch v. City of N.Y., 589 F.3d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted)). However, when the moving party seeks a "mandatory preliminary injunction that alters the status quo by commanding a positive act," the burden is "even higher." Cacchillo v. Insmed, Inc., 638 F.3d 401, 406 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., 598 F.3d 30, 35 n.4 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, a mandatory preliminary injunction "should issue only upon a clear showing that the moving party is entitled to the relief requested, or where extreme or very serious damage will result from a denial of preliminary relief." Citigroup Global Mkts., 598 F.3d at 35 n.4 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In his first motion for preliminary injunctive relief, plaintiff contended that Rule 105.13 (Gangs) is "very similar to unconstitutional Rule 105.12." Dkt. No. 4 at 2.
Upon due consideration, the Court found that plaintiff had failed to make the showing required for issuance of the relief requested. September Order at 20-21. As stated in the September Order, plaintiff's contentions regarding the constitutional infirmity of Rule 105.13 were not sufficient to entitle him to preliminary injunctive relief. Id.
In his renewed motion, plaintiff reasserts his claim that DOCCS Rule 105.13 (Gangs) is unconstitutional and that "DOCCS employees are using the rule to infringe on inmate(s) freedom of speech, and place them in a special housing unit (SHU)." Dkt. No. 53 at 1. In support of his motion, plaintiff alleges that on May 10, 2016, Southport Correctional Facility C.O. Brown (not a defendant) was overheard telling other officers that he was going to "ransack Barnes cell and find something that is gang." Id. at 4.
Defendants oppose plaintiff's motion and urge its denial. Dkt. No. 54. In addition to contending that plaintiff has not made the showing required for the extraordinary relief he is seeking, defendants maintain that "the instant renewed-motion should be denied because plaintiff seeks relief against an individual (Officer Brown) and entity (DOCCS) that are not parties to this action." Id. at 3.
Upon review, the Court finds that plaintiff's renewed motion seeking injunctive relief must be denied. Plaintiff's claim that C.O. Brown acted improperly is unsubstantiated and affords no basis for the issuance of injunctive relief in this action. Similarly, plaintiff's belief that he is likely to receive unwarranted inmate misbehavior reports for Rule 105.13 (Gang) violations in the future, no matter how sincere, does not suffice. Plaintiff has failed to substantiate any allegations of irreparable harm with evidence in admissible form or to demonstrate, with evidence, a "clear showing" that he is entitled to the relief requested, or that "extreme or very serious damage will result from a denial of preliminary relief." Citigroup Global Mkts., 598 F.3d at 35 n.4 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Based upon the foregoing, plaintiff's motion is denied.