NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
PER CURIAM.
The narrow focus of this appeal is whether the Commissioner of Education erred in concluding in his August 12, 2014 final agency decision that the Little Ferry school district1 was financially responsible for the public education of petitioners' three minor children for the 2013-14 school year, and consequently owed tuition to the Cresskill school district for that year.2 We affirm.
The dispute concerns the "O'K."3 family, which resided in the Borough of Cresskill for about twenty years up until October 2011. Up through that time, the three minor children in the family attended public school in Cresskill. Each of the minor children received special education and related services. In October 2011, the O'K. family lost their home through a foreclosure. Thereafter, the family moved in with the maternal grandmother in Little Ferry and lived in the lower level of the house.
On October 30, 2012, the maternal grandmother's home became uninhabitable due to damage caused by Hurricane Sandy. The O'K. family then briefly stayed with the mother's sister in Paramus for about a week, and then for several months lived on an interim basis with the paternal grandmother in New York State. In May 2013, the family returned to live with the maternal grandmother in Little Ferry.
As of the time of the briefs on appeal, the family was living in a two-bedroom apartment in Little Ferry leased by the older son, who is now emancipated. The family was also continuing to seek permanent housing in Cresskill.
In September 2013, the family filed a petition with the Commissioner of Education, contending that they were homeless and sought to have their children continue with their education in Cresskill. Earlier that year, the Interim Executive County Superintendent of Bergen County had determined that the children were homeless and allowed them to remain enrolled in the Cresskill schools. Six months later, it was administratively determined that the children were no longer homeless and were domiciled in Little Ferry and, therefore, Little Ferry was responsible for their education.
The petition was initially heard by an administrative law judge ("ALJ") on a motion for summary decision. The ALJ found that the family was initially homeless, but then became domiciled in Little Ferry for the school year at issue.
On review of the ALJ's decision, the Commissioner agreed that summary disposition was procedurally appropriate in lieu of a full-blown hearing. The Commissioner, however, rejected the ALJ's legal conclusion that the family was no longer homeless. Instead, the Commissioner determined that under the applicable regulatory criteria, the family was still homeless, that the children should continue their schooling in Cresskill, and that Little Ferry was responsible for the cost of the children's education in that district for the operative school year.
On appeal, Little Ferry essentially makes two arguments: (1) the Commissioner erred in granting the motion for a summary decision without a plenary hearing; and (2) even if the children were homeless, there were genuine issues of material fact concerning whether it was in the best interest of the children to remain in the Cresskill school district. We reject both of these arguments.
Our scope of review of the Commissioner's final agency decision is limited. In general, we "defer to the specialized or technical expertise of the agency charged with administration of a regulatory system." In re Application of Virtua-West Jersey Hosp. Voorhees, 194 N.J. 413, 422 (2008). As the Supreme Court has recognized in the context of upholding an administrative agency decision by the Commissioner of Education, appellate courts ordinarily should not disturb an agency decision unless it is proven to be "arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable." In re Proposed Quest Acad. Charter Sch. of Montclair Founders Grp., 216 N.J. 370, 385 (2013). If the agency's decision involves pure issues of law, we review such legal questions de novo, although we nonetheless accord considerable deference to the agency's interpretation of the statutes and regulations it is entrusted to enforce. Wnuck v. N.J. Div. of Motor Vehicles, 337 N.J.Super. 52, 56 (App. Div. 2001).
Here, we review the Commissioner's decision applying standards within his agency's realm of expertise involving the responsibilities of public school districts to ensure that homeless children in New Jersey are provided with a thorough and efficient education. See generally N.J.S.A. 18A:7B-12.1; N.J.A.C. 6A:17-1.1 to-1.2. The Department of Education's regulations addressing these local obligations incorporate the requirements of the federal McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 11431-11435, which is part of the No Child
Left Behind Act of 2001.
The federal statute defines "homeless children and youths" to refer to "individuals who lack a fixed regular and adequate nighttime residence," and includes "children and youths who are sharing the housing of other persons due to loss of housing, economic hardship, or a similar reason[.]" 42 U.S.C.A. § 11434a(2). Similarly, our State's regulations define a homeless child as a child "who lacks a fixed, regular and adequate residence, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:7B-12 and N.J.A.C. 6A:17-2.3." N.J.A.C. 6A:17-2.2.4 Among other things, homelessness is present under N.J.A.C. 6A:17-2.3 when a child resides in "[t]he residence of relatives or friends with whom the homeless child is temporarily residing out of necessity because the family lacks a regular or permanent residence of its own[.]" N.J.A.C. 6A:17-2.3(a)(3) (emphasis added).5
The Commissioner correctly applied these standards in determining that petitioner's family was "homeless" for purposes of educational funding obligations during the 2013-14 school year. The family was indisputably displaced from a "fixed, regular and adequate residence," first as the result of foreclosure and then as a consequence of Hurricane Sandy. These precipitous events caused the family to live in temporary quarters with other relatives in New Jersey and New York, and then in the two-bedroom apartment of the oldest son in Little Ferry while they continued to seek permanent housing. This relevant chronology was essentially uncontested. Hence, there were no genuine issues of disputed material fact that required an evidentiary hearing before the ALJ. See N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(b) (authorizing summary decisions in administrative cases where there are no genuine issues of fact that can only be determined in an evidentiary proceeding).
We further concur with the Commissioner that it was in the best interest of the children to remain enrolled in the Cresskill school district. The rationale for that determination is particularly supported by the fact that the O'K. children have special needs and had been receiving special educational programs in Cresskill for many years until they were temporarily displaced by Hurricane Sandy. In addition, the Commissioner did not act arbitrarily or contrary to law by directing that Little Ferry, where the children were temporarily housed during the 2013-14 school year, was financially responsible for the children's education during that timeframe.
Under the applicable statutes, if a child becomes homeless, the "district of residence" is responsible for providing the child's education. N.J.S.A. 18A:7B-12(c). If homeless children reside in another district for more than one year, financial responsibility for the children's education shifts to that school district. N.J.S.A. 18A:38-1(d). Here, the responsible "district of residence" was Little Ferry, where the children had been living from the time of the October 2011 foreclosure of the Cresskill residence, except for the interim shelter they received with relatives in Paramus and New York from October 2012 to May 2013 before they returned back to Little Ferry.
The remaining arguments raised on appeal lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D) and (E).
Affirmed.
