NOT FOR PUBLICATION

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff appeals from a September 23, 2011 order denying its motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of damages; certain aspects of a November 4, 2011 order granting summary judgment to defendants Uncle Jack's of Bayside, Inc. (UJB); Uncle Jack's Steakhouse, Inc. (UJI); Uncle Jack's Steakhouse Midtown, Inc. (UJM); and William J. Degel (Degel); and a January 9, 2012 order denying plaintiff's motion for reconsideration. We affirm the unchallenged grant of summary judgment to UJM and UJB, but remand on all remaining issues and direct the judge to conduct a hearing and make findings of fact and conclusions of law.

In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we apply the same standard under Rule 4:46-2(c) that governs the trial court. Wilson ex rel. Manzano v. City of Jersey City, 209 N.J. 558, 564 (2012). We must "consider whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party." Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995).

Plaintiff is an architectural firm based in Atlantic City. Degel is listed in the New York Division of Corporations registry as Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of UJI, UJB, and UJM. The principal executive office for all three entities is 3940 Bell Boulevard, Bayside, NY 11361. Degel sought to construct a restaurant next to Caesars Casino in Atlantic City and retained plaintiff to provide professional architectural services. The parties dispute which defendant is obligated to compensate plaintiff for services rendered, and the amount due. UJI, a fourth entity entitled Uncle Jack's Steakhouse of Atlantic City, Inc. (UJAC),1 and Degel himself, are intermittingly referred to by the parties in the contract documents and pretrial discovery.

In May 2009, plaintiff entered into a contract with "William J. Degel[,] Uncle Jack's Steakhouse[,] 3940 Bell Boulevard, Bayside, NY 11361-2061."2 Pursuant to this contract, plaintiff agreed to provide design and construction phase architectural services for $198,300. The contract refers to the project as "Uncle Jack's Steakhouse[,] Caesars Pier[,] Atlantic City, NJ 08401."

Degel signed the contract indicating that he was the president, on behalf of the "owner." The "owner" is referred to in the May 2009 contract as "William J. Degel[,] Uncle Jack's Steakhouse[,] 3940 Bell Boulevard, Bayside, NY 11361-2061." That contract stated that plaintiff was to provide its services in accordance with "Exhibit `A' — Proposal" dated February 12, 2009 and revised on April 22, 2009. This proposal, therefore, was made a part of the contract, and the proposal was entered into between plaintiff and "William J. Degel[,] hereinafter referred to as `Owner.'" Degel, however, signed the proposal as "CEO, Uncle Jack's Steakhouse."

In May 2009, plaintiff forwarded a retainer invoice, in the amount of $19,830, to "Mr. William Degel[,] Uncle Jack's Steakhouse, 3940 Bell Boulevard, Bayside, NY 11361-2061." In July 2009, Degel paid plaintiff the retainer using a bank account from UJAC. In September 2009, Degel used the same bank account and paid plaintiff an additional $20,000.

In October 2009, defendants fell behind on payments to plaintiff. Plaintiff's Chief Financial Officer emailed Degel to follow up on the outstanding invoice and Degel responded by sending another $20,000 check from the same UJAC bank account. Between November 2009 and May 2010, plaintiff communicated with Degel on numerous occasions, forwarded several additional invoices for services rendered,3 and continued to receive promises from Degel that plaintiff would get paid. Defendants, however, failed to make another payment.

In June 2010, plaintiff filed its complaint against UJB, UJI, UJM, Degel, and UJAC. The complaint contains seven counts against all defendants.4 The discovery end date (DED) expired in May 2011.

In June 2011, all defendants except UJAC moved for summary judgment arguing that they were not parties to the May 2009 contract. Plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment against Degel, UJI, and UJAC seeking judgment in the amount of $105,586.97 for services rendered.

On September 23, 2011, after the expiration of the DED, the judge issued a written decision and stated that "a jury could conclude that the Uncle Jack's restaurants are all linked [together]." As a result, he denied summary judgment to those defendants that sought dispositive relief. He dismissed the case without prejudice, however, against Degel, indicating that "[t]his relief will enable [p]laintiff to resume the case against Mr. Degel should any relevant information be discovered either before or during trial." The judge denied plaintiff's cross-motion for partial summary judgment, finding that genuine issues of material fact existed.

Defendants moved for reconsideration, which resulted in the orders under review. On November 4, 2011, without conducting oral argument and without any additional pertinent information, the judge changed his mind and dismissed the case with prejudice against Degel, UJB, UJI, and UJM.5 The judge did not issue a written or oral decision, but prepared the November 4, 2011 order, which stated that

On April 20, 2012, plaintiff and UJAC, represented in the briefs to be a defunct company, entered into a consent order entering judgment solely against that defendant in the amount of $50,000. This appeal followed.

On appeal, plaintiff argues that the judge erred by (1) misinterpreting who the contracting parties were; (2) finding that fact issues defeated plaintiff's partial summary judgment motion on the issue of damages; (3) granting summary judgment to Degel; (4) dismissing its claims against UJI; and (5) denying its reconsideration motion.

Under the facts of this case, it was inappropriate to grant summary judgment to UJI and Degel without first conducting a plenary hearing. On this record, we are unable to determine the amount owed and which defendant received plaintiff's services. In his September 2011 written decision, issued after discovery had expired, the judge found correctly that "a jury could conclude that the Uncle Jack's restaurants are all linked [together]." The judge reconsidered and granted summary judgment to UJB, UJI, UJM, and Degel, but he did not resolve that factual dispute. We direct the judge to conduct a hearing, make the requisite findings of fact to determine who the contracting parties are and which defendant received the benefit of plaintiff's services, and then make conclusions of law on the dispositive motions. We briefly highlight the disputed facts regarding the corporate entities, Degel, and issues relating to damages.

Regarding the corporate entities, Thomas J. Sykes, a principal owner of plaintiff, testified in his deposition that plaintiff "always understood [Degel] was [the] principal" of "Uncle Jack's Steakhouse" and acknowledged that he understood "Degel was signing as president of Uncle Jack's." Plaintiff asserts that it provided services to UJI. Even though the May 2009 contract refers in part to "Uncle Jack's Steakhouse" as the "owner," Degel certified that plaintiff did not provide services to "Uncle Jack's Steakhouse."

Defendants contend that UJI is not bound by the contract because "Inc." does not follow reference to Uncle Jack's Steakhouse. They argue, therefore, that only UJAC, a defunct company, is bound by the contract. Plaintiff alleged, though, that when it entered into the May 2009 contract it had no knowledge that UJAC existed. In fact, the May 2009 contract does not list UJAC as an owner; it describes the project as "Uncle Jack's Steakhouse[,] Caesars Pier[,] Atlantic City." Nevertheless, Degel paid plaintiff roughly $60,000 using a bank account from UJAC. The judge did not appropriately resolve these disputed facts regarding for which party plaintiff provided services. In the context of determining the proper contracting parties at a plenary hearing on remand, the judge can then make conclusions of law regarding whether to dismiss certain counts in the complaint, and if so, on what legal basis.

Regarding Degel individually, plaintiff also maintains that Degel is a party to the contract. The May 2009 contract indicates that the "Owner" will compensate plaintiff for the services rendered. That contract states that "[t]he Owner and Architect agree as follows. See Exhibit `A' — Proposal, attached." The proposal was entered into between plaintiff and "William J. Degel[,] hereinafter referred to as `Owner.'" Thus, plaintiff alleged that Degel, as owner, is responsible for the outstanding balance for services rendered. The judge must analyze these contract documents, discern the intent of the parties, and then determine whether Degel is considered a party to the agreement. Thereafter, the judge can make the appropriate conclusions of law.7

Regarding the denial of plaintiff's cross-motion for partial summary judgment, we conclude that factual issues likewise preclude dispositive relief as to the issue of damages. Degel emailed plaintiff expressing dissatisfaction with the services provided, the outstanding balance, and whether plaintiff finished its work. He stated that "I will send you some money ... the work was half done we didn't even build a thing so relax[;] as for [plaintiff's subcontractor JEM Associates,] I did all the main work for them as well ... they just like to make it harder on me to build up the bill!" In addition, Degel wrote that "[the l]ast invoice said [$]85,000 balance[, but] we never even built the store[;] we need to come to an arrangement for all involved to get much less payment for work done." Thus, defendants dispute the quality and quantity of the services that plaintiff rendered.

Affirmed in part and remanded in part. We do not retain jurisdiction.