CARLSON, Judge.
Jay H. Wedgewood appeals from an order of the district court for Washington County, in which order the court granted summary judgment in favor of U.S. Filter/Whittier, Inc. (U.S. Filter). Based on the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Wedgewood was injured on January 14, 2001, when hot lactic acid escaped from a "fines filter" manufactured by U.S. Filter. At the time of the incident, Wedgewood was an employee of Cargill, Inc., and Cargill was participating in a joint venture doing business as PGLA-1 (PGLA). PGLA purchased the fines filter from U.S. Filter in 1999. At the time of purchase, PGLA already had a similar, but smaller, fines filter which had been manufactured and sold to PGLA by U.S Filter. PGLA purchased the fines filter at issue for use in its production of lactic acid. The purpose of the fines filter was to remove small particles, or "fines," from the lactic acid solution.
A fines filter is a large metal cylinder, or tank, that contains a series of rotating filter screens, or "leaves," inside the tank. Fluid, in this case lactic acid, flows through the rotating filter leaves, and small particles, or fines, accumulate on the filter leaves. The fines filter has an automated cleaning process, which washes and removes the accumulated matter from the leaves, which is then drained into a separate tank. The fines filter holds 500 gallons of fluid when fully operational.
The interior of the fines filter is accessed through a 6-foot-in-diameter swing door located on one end of the filter and secured shut by 24 bolts. When the fines filter was operating as it should, it was expected that it would only be necessary to access the interior of the tank on an occasional basis for routine maintenance.
The fines filter was implemented into the rest of PGLA's production system, which was not manufactured or designed by U.S. Filter. U.S. Filter manufactured the fines filter according to the specifications provided by PGLA. U.S. Filter was aware that the operating temperature specification for lactic acid passing through the fines filter was 150 degrees Fahrenheit. Lactic acid is not dangerous at temperatures below 130 degrees Fahrenheit. PGLA ordered a "bare" tank, one without any gauges or monitoring devices. As such, there was no device on the fines filter itself that allowed someone looking at the fines filter to detect the presence of fluid in the filter. Specifically, there was no viewing window for looking into the tank to determine the amount of any product in the tank, there was no gauge on the tank to indicate the amount of any product in the tank, and there was no temperature gauge on the fines filter. U.S Filter does not provide gauges or monitoring devices for bare tanks, unless requested by the customer, in this case PGLA. Further, if U.S. Filter was involved in the design of PGLA's entire system into which the fines filter was to be incorporated, rather than just manufacturing a bare vessel to be used as part of PGLA's system, U.S. Filter would have added gauges or monitoring devices.
U.S. Filter typically installs an autolock door on the fines filter, which door cannot be opened if the filter is full of product. The fines filter at issue did not have an autolock door because PGLA chose not to have this type of door.
After the fines filter was added to PGLA's system, gypsum was introduced to the lactic acid production process. Thereafter, problems began to occur due to excessive gypsum accumulating on the leaves of the fines filter. Sometime after July 2000, due to the amount and character of the gypsum, the automated cleaning process was not cleaning adequately and an accumulation of excess gypsum would cause the filtering leaves to become caked and clogged, necessitating opening the fines filter more frequently than was expected to manually remove the accumulated gypsum. Prior to Wedgewood's accident, it became necessary to open the fines filter to remove excess gypsum more and more frequently, as often as three to four times per day.
Before opening the fines filter for routine maintenance or to remove accumulated gypsum, the system operators were required to complete a "Line Break Permit." Both Wedgewood and his coworker, Mark Gusse, had been trained in the procedures for the Line Break Permit, and both had initiated such permits prior to the incident. Wedgewood had been involved in accessing the interior of the fines filter because of accumulated gypsum more than 10 times in the 2 weeks prior to the incident.
On the day Wedgewood was injured, Wedgewood and Gusse determined that they needed to open and clean out the fines filter. Gusse initiated the Line Break Permit and was the "Permit Work Coordinator." Gusse was responsible for ensuring that the requirements listed on the permit were performed, which included draining the lactic acid out of the filter, specifically, "ensuring drains had proved cleared." Draining the filter is an automated process that simply required Gusse to use a computer mouse to click on the drain command in the control room, which then opens the drain valve on the fines filter. The Line Break Permit also required Gusse to verify that the temperature of the lactic acid was less than 130 degrees Fahrenheit, which could be done by touching the fines filter. Gusse placed his initials next to each requirement on the Line Break Permit and obtained approval of the permit from Scott McElmury, the operations team leader, and from Michael Hackbarth, the production team leader. However, despite indicating on the permit that all the requirements had been performed, Gusse admitted that he failed to drain the lactic acid out of the filter. Gusse also admitted that he failed to verify the temperature was less than 130 degrees. Because the fines filter had not been drained, a large amount of lactic acid remained in the fines filter.
After the Line Break Permit was filled out and believing that all the requirements had been performed, Wedgewood began removing the bolts on the swing door. When Wedgewood had only a couple of bolts left to remove, some lactic acid escaped from the swing door's seal in a small stream. When the flow stopped, Wedgewood continued to remove the remaining bolts, at which time the door quickly swung open and hot lactic acid poured out on Wedgewood. The force of the flow knocked Wedgewood backward, causing him to fall, resulting in injuries to his left knee, left shoulder, and cervical spine. He also suffered burns to 40 percent of his body surface area. He was subsequently diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder as a result of the incident.
Wedgewood filed a second amended complaint against U.S. Filter, alleging that the fines filter had defects in its design and in its warnings, making it unreasonably dangerous, and was also defective in that it was not accompanied by adequate instructions for use, and that these defects were the proximate cause of Wedgewood's injuries and damages. The second amended complaint further alleged that as a direct proximate result of the defects in the fines filter, U.S. Filter is strictly liable to Wedgewood for his damages.
U.S. Filter filed a motion for summary judgment requesting that the trial court dismiss Wedgewood's case against it because there are no genuine issues of material fact and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A hearing was held on the motion for summary judgment, and both parties offered evidence in support of their positions.
On August 11, 2009, the trial court entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of U.S. Filter on seven grounds and dismissing Wedgewood's second amended complaint with prejudice. The seven grounds on which the trial court found summary judgment should be granted are as follows: (1) Gusse's failure to drain the fines filter was an intervening sole proximate cause, (2) Wedgewood's misuse of the fines filter was an intervening sole proximate cause, (3) U.S. Filter had no duty to warn a sophisticated user of the fines filter, (4) any defect was readily recognizable by Wedgewood, (5) any defect did not make the fines filter unreasonably dangerous, (6) Wedgewood was guilty of assumption of the risk, and (7) U.S. Filter was not liable when it manufactured the fines filter to PGLA's specifications. Wedgewood appeals.
Wedgewood assigns that the trial court erred in (1) determining as a matter of law that Gusse's failure to drain the fines filter constituted an efficient intervening cause; (2) determining as a matter of law that Wedgewood's misuse of the fines filter constituted an efficient intervening cause; (3) granting summary judgment on the basis of a "sophisticated user" concept; (4) determining as a matter of law that the fines filter was not defective due to inadequate warnings because the risk of harm was "readily recognizable"; (5) determining as a matter of law that the fines filter was not unreasonably dangerous; (6) determining as a matter of law that Wedgewood voluntarily assumed the risk of harm posed by the fines filter; (7) determining that U.S. Filter manufactured the fines filter according to PGLA's specifications and therefore was not liable; (8) finding that PGLA, rather than U.S. Filter, was responsible for specifying appropriate safety devices for the fines filter; (9) receiving the affidavit of H. Bruce Sigel into evidence; (10) determining that Wedgewood's motion to strike U.S. Filter's affirmative defense of contributory negligence was rendered moot; and (11) overruling Wedgewood's objections to U.S. Filter's proposed summary judgment order.
Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings and evidence admitted at the hearing disclose no genuine issue as to any material fact or as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from those facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Wilken v. City of Lexington, 16 Neb.App. 817, 754 N.W.2d 616 (2008). In reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the judgment is granted and gives such party the benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible from the evidence. Id.
In a products liability cause of action based on strict liability in tort, the quality of the product is at issue, that is, whether the product was unreasonably dangerous. Id. "Unreasonably dangerous" means that a product has the propensity for causing physical harm beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary user or consumer who purchases it, with ordinary knowledge common to the foreseeable class of users as to its characteristics. Freeman v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 260 Neb. 552, 618 N.W.2d 827 (2000).
In a products liability action on a claim of strict liability based on defect, a plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the defendant placed the product on the market for use and knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, that the product would be used without inspection for defects; (2) the product was in a defective condition when it was placed on the market and left the defendant's possession; (3) the defect is the proximate or a proximately contributing cause of plaintiffs injury sustained while the product was being used in the way and for the general purpose for which it was designed and intended; (4) the defect, if existent, rendered the product unreasonably dangerous and unsafe for its intended use; and (5) plaintiffs damages were a direct and proximate result of the alleged defect. Jay v. Moog Automotive, 264 Neb. 875, 652 N.W.2d 872 (2002).
"The proximate cause of an injury is `that cause which, in a natural and continuous sequence, without any efficient, intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the injury would not have occurred.'" Stahlecker v. Ford Motor Co., 266 Neb. 601, 609, 667 N.W.2d 244, 253-54 (2003), quoting Haselhorst v. State, 240 Neb. 891, 485 N.W.2d 180 (1992).
One of the grounds on which the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of U.S. Filter was that Gusse's failure to drain the fines filter was not foreseeable by U.S. Filter and presented an efficient intervening cause. As a result, the trial court concluded that Gusse's actions, rather than U.S. Filter's, were the sole proximate cause of Wedgewood's injuries. Wedgewood assigns that the trial court erred in determining that Gusse's actions constituted an efficient intervening cause.
An efficient intervening cause is new and independent conduct of a third person, which itself is a proximate cause of the injury in question and breaks the causal connection between the original conduct and the injury. Willet v. County of Lancaster, 271 Neb. 570, 713 N.W.2d 483 (2006). The causal connection is broken if between the defendant's act and the plaintiffs injury there has intervened the negligence of a third person who had full control of the situation and whose negligence was such as the defendant was not bound to anticipate and could not be said to have contemplated, which later negligence resulted directly in the injury to the plaintiff. See Willet v. County of Lancaster, supra. In other words, an intervening act cuts off a tort-feasor's liability only when the intervening cause is not foreseeable. Id.
Wedgewood argues that the trial court erred in finding that Gusse's actions were an efficient intervening cause as a matter of law because there are genuine issues of material fact in regard to whether Gusse had full control over the situation at the time Wedgewood was injured and whether Gusse's failure to drain the fines filter was foreseeable by U.S. Filter.
We first address Wedgewood's argument that there is a genuine issue of material fact in regard to whether Gusse was in full control of the situation. Wedgewood asserts that there is evidence that the filter had not been drained at the time Wedgewood opened it because the drain was clogged or plugged with accumulated gypsum, rather than because Gusse failed to activate the drain sequence. Wedgewood contends, therefore, that it cannot be concluded Gusse was in control of the situation, because even if he had activated the drain sequence, the incident would still have occurred.
Hackbarth, the production team leader at the time of the incident, testified it was "conceivable" a "valve" was plugged. However, the evidence shows that when the fines filter was inspected after the accident, there was no accumulation of any product inside the filter. Therefore, what Hackbarth testified to as "conceivable" was not the case in reality. Hackbarth also testified that had the Line Break Permit procedures been followed, there would not have been any product in the fines filter when Wedgewood opened it. McElmury, the operations team leader at the time of the incident, also testified that in PGLA's investigation, no cause, other than that the drain was closed, was established as to why the lactic acid remained in the fines filter. Wedgewood's engineering expert, Bruce W. Main, conceded that there was no evidence that the drain was clogged. PGLA's investigation report listed various "Immediate Causes" and various "Basic Causes," including that the system was not completely drained, that communication was poor, and that Line Break Permit steps were not fully communicated or followed.
Further, there is no evidence that the drain had been plugged with gypsum on any occasion prior to the incident. McElmury testified that he did not know of any time when the drain had ever been clogged. There was evidence of accumulation of gypsum on the leaves within the filter on prior occasions, but that is not tantamount to a plugged drain.
After reviewing the evidence, there is no issue of material fact as to why the fines filter was full of lactic acid when Wedgewood opened the swing door. Gusse admitted that he failed to activate the drain sequence necessary to drain the lactic acid out of the fines filter due to inadvertence or unexplained reason. Gusse admitted that he was the person responsible for performing the drain function required by the Line Break Permit and that he failed to perform that function. Not only did Gusse fail to initiate draining the fines filter, but he failed to verify that the filter had been drained before allowing Wedgewood to open the filter. When the filter is drained, the product drains into a "sour water" tank. There is a level indicator for the sour water tank in the control room, which indicator changes when the level of product in the sour water tank increases or decreases. Gusse could have checked if the fines filter had been drained by looking at the level indicator for the sour water tank.
The evidence shows that there was no accumulation or gypsum in or around the drain preventing the fines filter from draining if the drain had been opened. Gusse was in complete control of draining the fines filter; the lactic acid remained in the filter solely because Gusse did not open the drain as required by the Line Break Permit. If he had done so, the incident would not have occurred. The evidence supports only one reason why lactic acid was in the filter when Wedgewood opened it and that reason is Gusse's failure to drain the filter.
Wedgewood also argues that Gusse was not in complete control of the situation because other workers were involved in approving the Line Break Permit. Specifically, the Line Break Permit had to be authorized by McElmury, the operations team leader, and by Hackbarth, the production team leader. However, Gusse testified that for the particular Line Break Permit at issue, it was his responsibility to make sure the requirements of the permit were performed. No one other than Gusse actually performed the Line Break Permit requirements, and he was the person who signed off on each requirement, including the requirement of draining the fines filter. There is no issue of material fact as to whether Gusse was in complete control of the situation.
Wedgewood next argues that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Gusse's actions were foreseeable by U.S. Filter. In arguing that there is evidence to support the foreseeability of Gusse's actions, Wedgewood relies on the deposition testimony of Bruce L. Johnson, U.S. Filter's engineering expert, who made a general statement that "it's foreseeable that there's human error that can exist." Johnson does not testify that it was foreseeable to U.S. Filter that Gusse or any operator in control of a Line Break Permit would fail to activate the drain sequence and verify that the filter was drained before allowing someone to open it. Rather, Johnson testified about a "human factors concept" generally accepted in the engineering field, which provides that when an individual does the same task frequently, the individual may get careless or use less caution when performing the task. Wedgewood's engineering expert, Main, also indicated that human error is related to the frequency of the task to be performed, in this case the frequency of opening the fines filter. It must be remembered that the fines filter was manufactured by U.S. Filter with the intention that it would be opened only for routine maintenance. However, at the time of Wedgewood's accident, the fines filter was being opened as often as several times a day. There is no evidence that at the time the fines filter left U.S. Filter's manufacturing facility or that, at any time after, U.S. Filter had any information or knowledge that PGLA would be opening the fines filter more frequently than for routine maintenance—and clearly not as frequently as several times per day.
Further, there is no evidence that U.S. Filter knew of prior injuries resulting from opening swing doors on fines filters. Sigel, the sales engineer for U.S. Filter that helped design PGLA's fines filter, testified that he knew of prior injuries resulting from opening doors on other fines filters. However, the only specific incident that Sigel recalled involved a fines filter that did not have a swing door, like in the instant case, and the individual that was injured overrode a safety device on the door. When asked whether injuries had occurred in connection with a fines filter with a swing door, Sigel could not recall any.
Even if there had been prior injuries from opening the same type of swing door under like conditions, such evidence would not support Wedgewood's argument that U.S. Filter could have foreseen that Gusse would fail to drain the filter because U.S. Filter was unaware of the procedures or requirements established by PGLA for accessing the interior of the fines filter. The requirements of the Line Break Permit were implemented by PGLA without any input from U.S. Filter. Further, PGLA installed and implemented the fines filter into its production system using its own contractors. Therefore, U.S. Filter could not foresee that one of PGLA's employees would fail to follow the procedures that he was trained by PGLA to follow. There is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Gusse's actions were foreseeable by U.S. Filter.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Wedgewood and giving him the benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible from the evidence, as we must, we find no error in the district court's determination that the actions of Gusse were not foreseeable and were an efficient intervening cause, breaking the causal connection between the alleged design, warning, and instruction defects by U.S. Filter and the injuries for which damages are claimed by Wedgewood. Accordingly, we affirm the court's grant of summary judgment in U.S. Filter's favor.
Given our determination that summary judgment was properly granted on the basis of intervening cause, we need not address Wedgewood's other assignments of error that relate to the grounds on which summary judgment was granted. An appellate court is not obligated to engage in an analysis which is not needed to adjudicate the controversy before it. In re Interest of Josiah T., 17 Neb.App. 919, 773 N.W.2d 161 (2009).
Wedgewood also raises several other assignments of error that do not relate to the grounds on which summary judgment was granted. Having reviewed the record, we find no merit to any of these remaining assignments of error.
We conclude as a matter of law that Gusse's actions constituted an efficient intervening cause, breaking the causal connection between U.S. Filter's conduct and Wedgewood's injuries. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of U.S. Filter and dismissing Wedgewood's action.
AFFIRMED.
