DAVID N. HURD, District Judge.
Plaintiff Anthony Fudge ("Fudge" or "plaintiff"), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this action against thirteen defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging civil rights violations stemming from his arrest on July 3, 2008, when he was apprehended after leading law enforcement officers of the City of Syracuse Police Department and Onondaga County Sheriff's Office on a dangerous high-speed car chase. Plaintiff contends that he was subjected to excessive force during his inevitable arrest, that law enforcement officers failed to intervene on his behalf, and that the actions of all of the named defendants resulted in the denial of his right to equal protection of the laws.
The complaint included Onondaga County, Onondaga County District Attorney William Fitzpatrick, and Onondaga County Assistant District Attorney Lauren Lapaglia as defendants, but these parties were dismissed from the action on January 10, 2012, leaving six Onondaga County Sheriff's Deputies, one Onondaga County Sheriff's Sergeant, and three City of Syracuse Police Officers remaining.
Following the expiration of the discovery period, both the County of Onondaga Defendants and the City of Syracuse Defendants (collectively "defendants") moved for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 56 on all of Fudge's remaining claims.
On July 3, 2008, members of the Onondaga County Sheriff's Office, in conjunction with the City of Syracuse Police Department, were patrolling high-crime areas in the City of Syracuse as part of a multi-jurisdictional task force known as Operation Impact, a New York State Division of Criminal Justice initiative intended to combat "gun crime and gang violence." County Defs.' Statement of Material Facts, ECF No. 57-17, ¶ 7 ("County Rule 7.1 Stat."); City Defs.' Statement of Material Facts, ECF No. 66-7, ¶ 5 ("City Rule 7.1 Stat.").
At approximately 9:25 p.m. that evening, Deputy Shields conducted a traffic stop of a 2006 Pontica Montana because it had "dark tinted windows." County Rule 7.1 Stat. ¶ 8; City Rule 7.1 Stat. ¶¶ 9-10. Although the vehicle, bearing New York license plate number "EGY — 5641," initially pulled to the side of the road, the vehicle sped away when Deputy Shields exited his patrol car to approach the driver's door. County Rule 7.1 Stat. ¶¶ 10-11; City Rule 7.1 Stat. ¶ 10. Deputy Shields quickly returned to his patrol car, activated his sirens and lights, advised dispatch of the situation, and pursued the vehicle as it traveled at high rates of speed through stop signs, red traffic signals, onto and over sidewalks, the wrong way down one-way streets, and eventually into a fenced lot. County Rule 7.1 Stat. ¶¶ 13-17; City Rule 7.1 Stat. ¶¶ 17-20.
A number of other law enforcement officers had joined in the pursuit and soon attempted to corner the vehicle in this fenced lot, but the driver avoided these additional units, accelerated through the chain link fence surrounding the lot, traveled over a sidewalk, struck a "no parking" sign post, and rammed the patrol car driven by Deputy Cox and Deputy Mendolia.
Two occupants then exited the vehicle—the driver, later identified as Fudge, and a passenger, later identified as "Keith Lee"—and fled on foot.
The taser deployment caused Fudge to fall to the concrete sidewalk, where he was incapacitated for the duration of the taser's five-second cycle. County Rule 7.1 Stat. ¶ 32. However, plaintiff began actively resisting the efforts of "several Syracuse police officers" to arrest him.
Fudge sustained minor injuries as a result of the incident, including puncture marks from the taser probes, a contusion on the right side of his head, and an abrasion on his elbow, but refused medical treatment and was held at the Onondaga County Justice Center pending arraignment on the various criminal charges against him.
Fudge's complaint alleges that after Deputy June tasered him, rendering him "disabled and unable to resist," he was "badly beaten, kicked in the head, face, neck, back and other body parts which caused [him] great pain." Compl. 5. Plaintiff alleges that he suffered "[a] swollen head and face, blackened eyes, [a] concussion to [his] head and other bruises and injuries."
The entry of summary judgment is warranted when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
When summary judgment is sought, the moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of material fact to be decided with respect to any essential element of the claim.
When deciding a summary judgment motion, a court must resolve any ambiguities and draw all inferences from the facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.
Fudge identifies "William Jones" as a Deputy Sheriff employed by the Onondaga County Sheriff's Office.
The defendants contend that Fudge's equal protection claim must fail because plaintiff has not identified any similarly situated persons who were treated differently. County Defs.' Mem. 12; City Defs.'s Mem. 14.
"The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the government to treat all similarly situated individuals alike."
Here, Fudge alleges that "the named defendants are all white police officers who were in part motivated by racial invidious discriminatory motives to deny [him], a black male citizen, equal protection of the laws when they used force sadistically and excessively to inflict severe physical injuries on [him]." Compl. 7. Plaintiff further alleges that various law enforcement officers subjected him to unspecified verbal abuse, and indicated that he "was a dumb negro, going to die tonight, and that the job would be finished at the Justice Center." Pl.'s Opp'n 13.
These two allegations, standing alone, are insufficient to maintain an equal protection claim. Fudge neither identifies any similarly situated individual nor attempts to explain how he was treated differently from anyone else. "In order to state an equal protection violation under § 1983, `it is axiomatic that plaintiff must allege that similarly situated persons were treated differently.'"
The County of Onondaga Defendants next contend that Deputies Himes, Mendolia, McLaughlin, Shields, and Cox lack the "personal involvement" required to impose § 1983 liability and summary judgment must be entered in their favor. County Defs.' Mem. 4-5. Likewise, the City of Syracuse Defendants contend that Officers Brown and Cordone were not personally involved in plaintiff's arrest and are entitled to summary judgment. City Defs.' Mem. 6.
"Personal involvement of defendants in alleged unconstitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983."
Here, the record reflects that: (1) the patrol car driven by Deputy Mendolia and Deputy Cox was disabled during the chase; (2) Deputy Shields initially executed the vehicle traffic stop but did not participate in the later foot chase after Fudge exited his vehicle; (3) Deputy Himes and Deputy McLaughlin, evidence technicians, only took photographs to document the incident following plaintiff's arrest; (4) Officer Brown was not present for the foot chase with plaintiff; and (5) Officer Cordone arrived at the scene of the incident after plaintiff had already been handcuffed.
Fudge correctly identifies Deputy June as the individual who tasered him, but despite his allegations of being punched and kicked, he only states that he "recalls seeing between 6 to 8 officers at the scene, and `several' officers standing around not saying or doing anything to stop the assault." Pl.'s Opp'n 11. "Assertions of personal involvement that are merely speculative are insufficient to establish a triable issue of fact."
Nothing in the record places any of the above-named defendants at the scene of the struggle during the relevant time period. Because there is no indication that these individuals directly participated in the alleged assault or were present and possessed a realistic opportunity to intervene, they were not "personally involved" as required to sustain a § 1983 claim. Accordingly, plaintiff's claims against these seven defendants fail as a matter of law.
This leaves Fudge's claims against Deputy June, Sergeant McCarron, and Officer Metz. The County of Onondaga Defendants contend that Deputy June's use of force was objectively reasonable under the circumstances and that Sergeant McCarron was not involved in plaintiff's arrest—and could not intervene on plaintiff's behalf—because he was occupied with a simultaneous foot pursuit of Mr. Lee. County Defs.' Mem. at 5-7. The City of Syracuse Defendants contend that Officer Metz was also occupied with Mr. Lee's arrest. City Defs.' Mem. 12.
A claim of excessive force "requires a careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake."
Here, Fudge led law enforcement officers on a high-speed vehicle pursuit through the City of Syracuse, violating traffic laws, damaging property, and endangering public safety before exiting the vehicle and fleeing on foot. Deputy June gave chase before ordering plaintiff to stop running, ultimately deploying his taser and causing plaintiff to fall to the concrete sidewalk. Given the circumstances, Deputy June's initial decision to deploy the taser was undoubtedly reasonable.
However, Fudge alleges that he was then "punched and kicked in the head" while rendered helpless by this taser deployment and in the period before he was finally handcuffed. Even assuming that he made some effort to resist the officers' attempts to place him in handcuffs, the mere fact that plaintiff resisted arrest "does not give [defendants] license to use force without limit."
Deputy June's affidavit states only that Fudge "became combative," that "several police officers arrived to assist," and that he subjected plaintiff to a second taser deployment for his "noncomplian[ce]" before "about four or five Syracuse police officers subdued him." June Aff., ECF No. 57-12, ¶¶ 11-13. Deputy June's "narrative report," completed shortly after the incident, indicates that he "was then assisted by Officer Metz" in this use of force to subdue plaintiff.
However, these reports completely lack any specific details regarding the actions taken by those who participated in Fudge's arrest. Various statements in these reports are also in direct conflict with affidavits submitted by both sets of defendants in support of their respective motions for summary judgment. For instance, Sergeant McCarron's affidavit indicates that his earlier narrative report is simply incorrect, that he was occupied with Mr. Lee's arrest during the relevant time period, and that he has a "distinct recollection of assisting . . . Officer Metz" in handcuffing Mr. Lee.
As the City of Syracuse Defendants correctly note in a reply memorandum, "[i]t is a physical impossibility for Officer Metz to have been in two places at once." City Defs.' Reply Mem. 9. However, Officer Metz's and Sergeant McCarron's affidavits—contrasted with the earlier narrative reports—do not, as the City of Syracuse Defendants believe, "provide[ ] a basis . . . to conclude that Officer Metz would not be a rational candidate to participate or intervene in the use of force."
The parties do not dispute that Deputy June was present for, and involved in, the use of force against Fudge. Evidence in the record also suggests that both Officer Metz and Sergeant McCarron were present for, and even involved in, that altercation. The presence or absence of both officers during the period of time between Deputy June's initial taser deployment and plaintiff's successful arrest, as well as the actions taken (if any) by all three law enforcement officers to "subdue" plaintiff, are material facts suitable for determination by a jury.
It is of no moment that Fudge's injuries appear to be minimal.
Finally, the three remaining defendants contend they are nevertheless entitled to qualified immunity.
Where, as here, the rights at issue in circumstances confronting police officers were clearly established, "the officers will nonetheless be entitled to qualified immunity if it was objectively reasonable for them to believe their acts did not violate those rights."
Here, the parties plainly dispute what force was used to "subdue" Fudge following the initial taser deployment as well as what degree of resistance plaintiff offered during his arrest, since it would not have been objectively reasonable for the officers to believe that kicking and punching plaintiff in the head while he was rendered helpless by the taser deployment was permissible. Indeed, such conduct would clearly fall on the wrong side of the "sometimes hazy border between excessive and acceptable force."
"Summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds is not appropriate when there are facts in dispute that are material to a determination of reasonableness."
The record establishes that Deputies Himes, Mendolia, McLaughlin, Shields, and Cox as well as Officers Brown and Cordone were not personally involved in any of the alleged constitutional violations and therefore all of Fudge's claims against these seven defendants fail as matter of law. However, Deputy June was indisputably involved in the force used against plaintiff during his arrest, and evidence in the record places both Officer Metz and Sergeant McCarron at the scene during the relevant time period. Whether Sergeant McCarron and Officer Metz were present during the arrest, and whether the actions or omissions of all three individuals were reasonable under the circumstances, requires a resolution of the disputed factual issues surrounding the incident.
Therefore, it is
ORDERED that
1. The County of Onondaga Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part;
2. The City of Syracuse Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part;
3. Plaintiff's claims against "William Jones, Deputy Sheriff, Onondaga County" are DISMISSED;
4. Plaintiff's equal protection claims are DISMISSED;
5. Plaintiff's claims against Onondaga County Sheriff's Office Deputies Himes, Mendolia, McLaughlin, Shields, and Cox are DISMISSED;
6. Plaintiff's claims against City of Syracuse Officers Brown and Cordone are DISMISSED;
7. Plaintiff's excessive force/failure to intervene claims against Onondaga County Sheriff's Deputy June, Onondaga County Sheriff's Sergeant McCarron, and City of Syracuse Officer Metz remain for trial.
IT IS SO ORDERED.