SUMMARY ORDER

Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and this court's Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a document filed with this court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an electronic database (with the notation "summary order"). A party citing a summary order must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel.

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED. The plaintiffs-appellants appeal from the district court's March 31, 2014 judgment, which dismissed their complaint. Plaintiffs, the parents of school-aged children with disabilities, allege that the defendants improperly billed Medicaid for case management services provided to disabled children. Plaintiffs assert relator claims under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733, challenging those allegedly fraudulent billing practices. We assume the parties' familiarity with the relevant facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues presented for review.

Plaintiffs' sole argument on appeal is that the district court misread their allegation that the defendant school districts "failed to hold an [individualized education program ("IEP")] meeting thirty days prior to billing Medicaid." J.A. 32-33 ¶ 63. The district court rejected this allegation because no statute or regulation required defendants to submit bills within thirty days of an IEP meeting. Plaintiffs now contend that the allegation was intended to assert that no IEP meeting was ever held, because if it had been, the districts would have billed Medicaid within thirty days of an IEP meeting.

Plaintiffs failed to advance this interpretation of their complaint before the district court, despite the fact that the defendants explicitly argued in their motion to dismiss that there was no requirement that schools bill for IEP meetings within thirty days. Plaintiffs never clarified that they were not alleging a violation of a timing requirement, but instead alleging that no IEP meetings had taken place at all. Nor did plaintiffs move for reconsideration based on the district court's supposed misreading of their complaint or amend their complaint to clarify their allegations, even though the district court dismissed their claims without prejudice.

"[I]t is a well-established general rule that an appellate court will not consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal." Greene v. United States, 13 F.3d 577, 586 (2d Cir. 1994) (per curiam). Accordingly, we decline to consider plaintiffs' contention that the district court misread their complaint. The judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.