AND MEMORANDUM & ORDER

MARGO K. BRODIE, District Judge.

Plaintiffs Edwin L. Christian, Chris Confrey, John Cronin, Don Denardo, Kenneth Klemens, John F. O'Haire, Denise M. Richardson and Ernesto Tersigni are trustees of the Annuity, Pension, Welfare and Training Funds of the International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 14-14B, AFL-CIO (collectively, the "Local 14 Trust Funds") who commenced this action on February 4, 2015, against construction company Superior Site Work, Inc. under sections 502 and 515 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(3) & 1145 ("ERISA"), and section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185 ("LMRA"). (Compl. ¶¶ 1-2, Docket Entry No. 1.) Plaintiffs seek to recover fringe benefit contributions owed to employee trust funds and statutory damages for an alleged breach of a collective bargaining agreement. (Id.) Based on additional information received during discovery, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint on May 26, 2015 requesting additional contributions. (Am. Compl., Docket Entry No. 12.)

On April 5, 2016, Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment seeking a judgment in the amount of $177,636.80, consisting of a principal deficiency of $153,587.90, interest of $7760.15, and attorneys' fees and costs of $15,793.75 and $495.00, respectively, plus additional interest and statutory damages in amounts to be determined. (Pls. Mot. for Summ. J. ("Pls. Mot."), Docket Entry No. 25; Statement of Damages at 1, annexed to Pls. Mot. as Ex. 1.) Despite conferring with Plaintiffs on a briefing schedule and taking part in settlement negotiations as late as February of 2016, Defendant has not opposed Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and appears to have stopped defending this action. (See Joint Mot. for Extension of Time, Docket Entry No. 24.) For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.1

I. Background

The Local 14 Trust Funds are multi-employer benefit plans and third-party beneficiaries to a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") between Defendant and Local 14-14B International Union of Operating Engineers ("Local 14").2 (Pls. Statement of Undisputed Facts Pursuant to Local R. 56.1 ("Pls. 56.1") ¶¶ 3, 5, Docket Entry No. 26.) The CBA was signed on September 13, 2006, has no expiration date and has not been voided by the parties. (Id. ¶ 5; CBA, annexed to Affidavit of James M. Steinberg in Supp. of Pls. Mot. ("Steinberg Aff.") as Ex. A, Docket Entry No. 27.) The CBA provides the terms and conditions of employment for Defendant's employees, who perform "heavy construction work" within the jurisdiction of Local 14. (Pls. 56.1 ¶ 7; CBA ¶¶ 1, 6.) By its terms, the CBA also incorporates certain other agreements that Local 14 negotiated with employers' associations, including an agreement between Local 14 and the General Contractors Association of New York (the "GCA") that defines the obligations of heavy construction employers. (Pls. 56.1 ¶ 9; 2010-2014 GCA Contract, annexed to Steinberg Aff. as Ex. B; 2014-2018 GCA Contract, annexed to Steinberg Aff. as Ex. C.) Because Defendant performs heavy construction work, it is bound by the terms of Local 14's contracts with the GCA governing heavy construction employers' obligations (the "GCA Contracts"). (Pls. 56.1 ¶ 10; 2010-2014 GCA Contract at 4; 2014-2014 GCA Contract at 5.) The GCA Contracts provide that employers like Defendant must make contributions to the Local 14 Trust Funds on behalf of their employees who perform work covered by the GCA Contracts. (CBA ¶ 5; 2010-2014 GCA Contract at 71-76; 2014-2018 GCA Contract at 108-14.) In order to make contributions to the Local 14 Trust Funds, employers like Defendant are required to purchase and distribute "fringe benefit stamps"3 to their employees from the Local 14 Trust Funds in proportion to the number of eligible hours their employees work. (Pls. 56.1 ¶ 12; CBA ¶ 5; Affidavit of Marlene Monterroso in Supp. of Pls. Mot. ("Monterroso Aff.") ¶ 2, Docket Entry No. 29.) Defendant is also required to make its books and records available to the Local 14 Trust Funds for audit of those contributions. (CBA ¶ 4.)

On or about November 18, 2014, Plaintiffs and their certified public accounting firm conducted an audit of Defendant's books and records. (Affidavit of Lisa Madeiras in Supp. of Pls. Mot. ("Madeiras Aff.") ¶ 3, Docket Entry No. 30.) The audit covered Defendant's payroll records from July 1, 2011 through December 7, 2014. (Id.) The initial audit report identified a deficiency of $162,750.17 in the amount due and owing to Local 14 Trust Funds.4 (Id. ¶ 4; Pls. 56.1 ¶ 21.) Based on the initial report, Plaintiffs filed the instant suit. (Madeiras Aff. ¶ 4; Pls. 56.1 ¶¶ 16, 17.) On February 13, 2015, one of Defendant's employees contacted the auditor with two objections to the initial report. First, the employee objected to the deficiency calculated on behalf of employee Perry Notarnicola as understating the amount owed because Defendant had provided Notarnicola with "straight" stamps, reflecting regular hours worked, instead of the stamps for benefits, and the Local 14 Trust Funds track the stamps that are purchased and redeemed via a serial number on each stamp. See generally id. "double" stamps reflecting the overtime hours Notarnicola actually worked. (Madeiras Aff. ¶ 4; Email from Susan Caruso dated Feb. 13, 2015 ("Caruso Email"), annexed to Steinberg Aff. as Ex. J.) Second, Defendant's employee objected to the deficiency calculated on behalf of employee Joaquim Batista, a member of the affiliated Local 138 in Long Island, which should not have been included because Batista had not operated heavy construction equipment during the audit period. (Id.)

The Local 14 Trust Funds requested that Defendant produce a contribution history report from the Local 138 Trust Funds, Batista's home funds, or other independent documentation to support Defendant's position that Batista had not operated heavy construction equipment despite having received and redeemed stamps from Defendant during that period.5 (Pls. 56.1 ¶ 33; Caruso Email; see Steinberg Aff. ¶ 4.) Defendant did not respond or provide any further information, and the audit report was revised to reflect only Notarnicola's additional hours. (Pls. 56.1 ¶ 34; Madeiras Aff. ¶ 4; Revised Audit Report dated Apr. 16, 2015 ("Revised Report"), annexed to Steinberg Aff. as Ex. L.) The Revised Report identified a deficiency of $164,202.46, the amount included in the Amended Complaint. (Revised Report; see also Am. Compl. ¶ 26.)

On June 2, 2015, Plaintiffs served their initial disclosures on Defendant. (Pls. Initial Disclosures, annexed to Steinberg Aff. as Ex. O.) At a conference held before Magistrate Judge Viktor Pohorelsky on June 17, 2015, Defendant was ordered to "provide initial disclosures within 7 days." (Minute Entry dated June 17, 2015, Docket Entry No. 15.) Defendant never served its initial disclosures. (Steinberg Aff. ¶ 6.) Plaintiffs attempted, but were unable, to informally gather additional information from Defendant to support the alleged discrepancy regarding Batista's hours. (Id. ¶ 7.) Accordingly, Plaintiffs served their first set of discovery requests on August 10, 2015. (Pls. Interrogs., annexed to Steinberg Aff. as Ex. Q; Pls. Req. for Prod., annexed to Steinberg Aff. as Ex. R.) The requests included a demand for further information to support Defendant's objection to the audit results as to Batista's hours. (Id.; Steinberg Aff. ¶ 7.) At a status conference held on September 9, 2015, Judge Pohorelsky ordered Defendant to respond to Plaintiffs' discovery requests by September 30, 2015. (Order dated Sept. 9, 2015, Docket Entry No. 17.) Judge Pohorelsky advised Defendant that if it failed to respond by the deadline, Plaintiffs would be entitled to "move for such relief as they deem appropriate including the preclusion of evidence." (Id.) Defendant did not respond to Plaintiffs' discovery requests. (Pls. 56.1 ¶ 40; Ltr. from Pl. dated Oct. 5, 2015, annexed to Steinberg Aff. as Ex. T.)

In support of their motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs have submitted a final audit report identifying a deficiency of $161,348.05, which reflects specific amounts owed for ERISA and non-ERISA contributions. (Affidavit of Edwin L. Christian in Supp. of Pls. Mot. ("Christian Aff.") ¶ 9, Docket Entry No. 28; Final Audit Report dated Dec. 9, 2015 ("Final Report"), annexed to Steinberg Aff. as Ex. V.) The Final Report reflects an amount that includes sixpercent interest on the ERISA funds for welfare, pension, annuity and training;6 and no interest on the non-ERISA funds for voluntary annuity (including political action contributions), dues assessment and legal defense.7 (Final Report; see Madeiras Aff. ¶¶ 2, 10-13 (explaining minor differences between Revised Report and Final Report); Pls. 56.1 ¶¶ 30-32.) Defendant has not paid any part of the deficiency. (Pls. 56.1 ¶ 29; Monterroso Aff. ¶ 11.)

II. Discussion

a. Standard of review

Summary judgment is proper only when, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Davis v. Shah, 821 F.3d 231, 243 (2d Cir. 2016); see also Cortes v. MTA NYC Transit, 802 F.3d 226, 230 (2d Cir. 2015); Tolbert v. Smith, 790 F.3d 427, 434 (2d Cir. 2015); Zann Kwan v. Andalex Grp. LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 843 (2d Cir. 2013). The role of the court "is not to resolve disputed questions of fact but only to determine whether, as to any material issue, a genuine factual dispute exists." Rogoz v. City of Hartford, 796 F.3d 236, 245 (2d Cir. 2015) (first quoting Kaytor v. Elec. Boat Corp., 609 F.3d 537, 545 (2d Cir. 2010); and then citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986)). A genuine issue of fact exists when there is sufficient "evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. The "mere existence of a scintilla of evidence" is not sufficient to defeat summary judgment. Id. The court's function is to decide "whether, after resolving all ambiguities and drawing all inferences in favor of the non-moving party, a rational juror could find in favor of that party." Pinto v. Allstate Ins. Co., 221 F.3d 394, 398 (2d Cir. 2000).

Where, as here, a motion for summary judgment is unopposed, "the district court may not grant the motion without first examining the moving party's submission to determine if it has met its burden of demonstrating that no material issue of fact remains for trial." Amaker v. Foley, 274 F.3d 677, 681 (2d Cir. 2001). "Before summary judgment may be entered, the district court must ensure that each statement of material fact is supported by record evidence sufficient to satisfy the movant's burden of production even if the statement is unopposed." Jackson v. Fed. Exp., 766 F.3d 189, 194 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing Vt. Teddy Bear Co., Inc. v. 1-800 Beargram Co., 373 F.3d 241, 244 (2d Cir. 2004)). "In doing so, the court may rely on other evidence in the record even if uncited." Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3)).

b. Liability under ERISA and the LMRA

Section 515 of ERISA provides:

29 U.S.C. § 1145. Similarly, the LMRA authorizes federal "[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees." Id. § 185(a); see also Brown v. C. Volante Corp., 194 F.3d 351, 354 (2d Cir. 1999) (explaining lawsuit for failure to abide by a collective bargaining agreement is governed by 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)).

Here, the facts establish that Defendant failed to make required contributions pursuant to the CBA, violating ERISA. Local 14 and Defendant are parties to a CBA for the period covered by the auditor's report. Pursuant to that CBA and the GCA Contracts, Defendant purchased stamps for work performed by its employees between July 1, 2011 and December 7, 2014. The auditor reviewed Defendant's books and records and discovered that Defendant had failed to purchase the required number of stamps for all hours worked by employees covered under the CBA and GCA Contracts.8 Plaintiffs, as plan fiduciaries, may bring a civil action to enforce the provisions of the CBA. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B)(ii) (empowering a fiduciary to enjoin any act or practice in violation of ERISA or to enforce any provisions of the employee plan); see also Finkel v. Ommega Commc'n Servs., Inc., 543 F.Supp.2d 156, 160 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (applying same provision). Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have met their burden of proving that Defendant violated section 515 of ERISA, as well as the terms of the CBA for which Plaintiffs may seek enforcement under the LMRA. Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to summary judgment.

c. Damages

Plaintiffs request that the Court accept their damages calculations and award damages as listed in their Statement of Damages. (Pls. Mem. 17.) Ordinarily, claims for damages must be established in an evidentiary proceeding at which a defendant is afforded an opportunity to contest the amount claimed. See Fustok v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 873 F.2d 38, 40 (2d Cir. 1989). However, a court may make this determination based upon evidence presented at a hearing or upon a review of detailed affidavits and documentary evidence submitted by the plaintiffs. See Action S.A. v. March Rich & Co., Inc., 951 F.2d 504, 508 (2d Cir. 1991); Fustok, 873 F.2d at 40. Here, Defendant has been on notice of the damages Plaintiffs sought since the filing of the Complaint, (Compl. ¶ 25), and it has not disputed Plaintiffs' documentary evidence. The Court will therefore determine damages based on the documentary record before it.

Section 502(g) of ERISA provides that upon finding a violation of section 515, "the court shall award the plan" the following:

Id. § 1132(g). In other words, the "special remedy against employers who are delinquent in meeting their contractual obligations that is created by § 502(g)(2) includes a mandatory award of prejudgment interest plus liquidated damages in an amount at least equal to that interest, as well as attorney's fees and costs." Int'l Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators v. CAC of N.Y., Inc., No. 13-CV-39, 2015 WL 691192, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2015) (quoting Laborers Health & Welfare Tr. Fund v. Adv. Lightweight Concrete Co., Inc., 484 U.S. 539, 547 (1988)).

i. Unpaid ERISA and non-ERISA contributions

Plaintiffs seek $120,897.55 in delinquent ERISA contributions and $32,690.35 in delinquent non-ERISA contributions. (Statement of Damages at 1.) As explained above, the auditors arrived at these sums by taking the number of regular and overtime hours worked by covered employees during each of the relevant time periods and multiplying those categories of hours by their respective fringe benefit contribution rates. (See Wage Scales, annexed to Steinberg Aff. as Ex. H; Final Report at Summary; see also Monterroso Aff. ¶¶ 7-9.) The Court is satisfied that the evidence substantiates the amount of unpaid principal reflected in the auditor's Final Report and in Plaintiffs' Statement of Damages.

ii. Interest on ERISA deficiency

Plaintiffs also seek interest on unpaid contributions to the ERISA plans. (Statement of Damages at 1.) ERISA provides that interest will be calculated using the rate in the relevant benefit plan, or if the plan sets no such rate, a prescribed statutory rate. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2); 26 U.S.C. § 6621. Under the Trust Agreements establishing the Local 14 Trust Funds, a sixpercent (6%) interest rate applies to late and unpaid ERISA plan contributions.9 (See Madeiras Aff. ¶¶ 9, 12; Pls. 56.1 ¶ 41 (citing Trust Agreements at 10-12).) Applying that rate as of the last date of each contribution period10 and through December 15, 2014, the date of the initial audit report, Plaintiffs seek $7760.15 in prejudgment interest on the delinquent ERISA contributions. (Statement of Damages at 1.) Plaintiffs seek an additional amount in prejudgment interest calculated at a rate of six percent from December 16, 2014 through the date of final judgment. (Id.) The Court grants Plaintiffs' request for prejudgment interest on delinquent ERISA contributions at a rate of six percent per year from December 16, 2014 through the date of this Memorandum and Order, amounting to an additional $15,759.45.11 In sum, Plaintiffs are entitled to $23,519.60 in interest on the delinquent ERISA contributions.

iii. Statutory damages

Plaintiffs request an additional sum equal to the amount of prejudgment interest on the delinquent ERISA contributions. (Pls. Mem. 19.) Under section 502(g)(2) of ERISA, Plaintiffs are entitled to interest on the delinquent contributions and are also entitled to statutory damages at "an amount equal to the greater of interest on the unpaid contributions, or liquidated damages provided for under the plan." See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2). The Trust Agreements do not provide for liquidated damages, therefore Plaintiffs are entitled to statutory damages in an amount equal to that of the interest calculated in the section above.

iv. Attorneys' fees and costs

Plaintiffs also seek to recover attorneys' fees in the amount of $15,793.75 and costs in the amount of $495.00. (Statement of Damages at 1.) A district court must award attorneys' fees and costs in a successful ERISA action that results in judgment in favor of the plan. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2)(D); Labarbera v. Clestra Hauserman, Inc., 369 F.3d 225, 226 (2d Cir. 2004) ("In that case, the statute renders fees and costs mandatory: `the court shall award the plan' reasonable fees and costs." (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2))).

In deciding what fees are due to a plaintiff's attorneys, the Court must consider "what a reasonable client would be willing to pay to determine the `presumptively reasonable fee.'" Trs. of Local 813 Ins. Trust Fund v. Bradley Funeral Serv., Inc., No. 11-CV-2885, 2012 WL 3871759, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 3871755 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2012); see also Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass'n v. Cty. of Albany, 522 F.3d 182, 183-84 (2d Cir. 2007). To calculate the amount of a "presumptively reasonable fee," the court multiplies a reasonable hourly rate by the number of hours reasonably expended on the matter. Simmons v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 575 F.3d 170, 174 (2d Cir. 2009) (explaining the "substance of" the traditional lodestar approach and a twelvefactor "reasonableness" approach to determining fees informed the "presumptively reasonable fee" test). When determining whether the presumptively reasonable fee is ultimately reasonable, a court must "bear in mind all of the case-specific variables that we and other courts have identified as relevant to the reasonableness of attorneys' fees . . . ."12 Simmons, 575 F.3d at 174 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In what has become known as the "forum rule," courts assess the reasonableness of hourly rates by comparing the rates requested with the prevailing rates charged by attorneys practicing in the district where the court sits. See id. at 174-76 (discussing forum rule); see also Bergerson v. N.Y. State Office of Mental Health, Cent. N.Y. Psychiatric Ctr., 652 F.3d 277, 290 (2d Cir. 2011).

In reviewing a fee application, courts may review the expenditure of hours submitted by counsel, and adjust to a reasonable amount, as determined in light of the particulars of the case. Gayle v. Harry's Nurses Registry, Inc., No. 07-CV-4672, 2013 WL 5502951, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2013) report and recommendation adopted, No. 07-CV-4672, 2013 WL 5502950 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2013). To obtain an award of attorneys' fees, a plaintiff must provide contemporaneous time records which support the date work was performed, the nature of the hours expended, and the work done. See Scott v. City of New York, 643 F.3d 56, 58-59 (2d. Cir. 2011); Pilitz v. Inc. Vill. of Freeport, No. 07-CV-4078, 2011 WL 5825138, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2011) ("The burden is on the party seeking attorney's fees to submit sufficient evidence to support the hours worked and the rates claimed . . . . Accordingly, the party seeking an award of attorney's fees must support its application by providing contemporaneous time records that detail `for each attorney, the date, the hours expended, and the nature of the work done.'" (first citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 453 (1983) and then citing Cho v. Koam Med. Servs. P.C., 524 F.Supp.2d 202, 209 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); quoting N.Y. Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136, 48 (2d Cir. 1983))).

Here, although Plaintiffs do not support their fee request with contemporaneous time records, Plaintiffs' counsel has submitted a summary of his time records.13 Those records reflect 43.25 hours of work at an hourly rate of $350.00 per hour and 3.75 hours of travel at a reduced hourly rate of $175.00 per hour. (Hours Expended by Counsel, annexed to Steinberg Aff. as Ex. W.) The time expenditure for the case appears reasonable in view of the documentation Plaintiffs have provided to support their motion for summary judgment and the time spent making discovery requests and attending conferences while Defendant was active in the litigation. The hourly rate is also reasonable, although on the higher end of the prevailing rate within this district. See Trustees of Empire State Carpenters Annuity, Apprenticeship, Labor-Mgmt. Coop., Pension & Welfare Funds v. Sanders Constr., Inc., No. 13-5102, 2015 WL 1608039, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2015) (describing $200 to $400 range for partners); Trustees of the Local 813 I.B.T. Ins. Trust Fund v. Amanda Carting Corp., No. 07-CV-656, 2007 WL 4324019, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2007) (finding that the prevailing rates in the Eastern District range from $200-$375 per hour for partners and $200-250 per hour for senior associates). Plaintiffs' counsel is a partner at his law firm and has been practicing labor law since 1995. His prior rates, between $285 and $325, have been approved within this district for similar work, and counsel asserts that his rates have increased to $350 per hour since January 1, 2015. (Pls. Mem. 21); see Annuity, Pension, Welfare & Training Funds of the Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs Local 14-14B, AFL-CIO v. Lori Contracting, Inc., No. 14-CV-2467, 2015 WL 1321672, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2015) (awarding same attorney $325 per hour); Annuity, Pension, Welfare & Training Funds of the Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs Local 14-14B, AFL-CIO v. Rice Mohawk (E.D.N.Y. 1991); see also Cruz v. Local Union No. 3 of Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 34 F.3d 1148, 1160 (2d Cir. 1994) (typed summaries of hours drawn from contemporaneous time records, without submission of actual time records, was sufficient to support attorney's fees application). Structural Steel Corp., No. 12-CV-902, 2013 WL 1342267, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2013) (awarding same attorney $317 per hour); Annuity, Pension, Welfare & Training Funds of the Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs Local 14-14B, AFL-CIO v. Marbro Realty Co., No. 11-CV-5722, 2012 WL 3536499, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. July 16, 2012) (awarding same attorney $317.24 per hour); Annuity, Pension, Welfare & Training Funds of the Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs Local 14-14B, AFL-CIO v. Star Structural, Inc., No. 07-CV-876, 2008 WL 817915, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2008) (awarding same attorney $285 per hour).

Plaintiffs' costs — $400.00 for filing fees and $95.00 for service of process — are also reasonable. (See Statement of Damages at 1; Pls. Mem. 22.) Accordingly, Plaintiffs will be awarded the requested $15,793.75 in attorneys' fees and $495.00 in costs.

v. Interest on non-ERISA deficiency

Finally, Plaintiffs seek prejudgment interest on the delinquent non-ERISA contributions. (Statement of Damages at 1.) Plaintiffs request that the Court apply a nine-percent annual interest rate derived from New York C.P.L.R. section 5004 to an intermediate date between July 1, 2011 and December 15, 2014. (Pls. Mem. 24.)

The Second Circuit permits an award of prejudgment interest for LMRA claims at the Court's discretion and at a rate within the Court's discretion. See Finkel, 543 F. Supp. 2d at 162 (citing Lodges 743 & 1746, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v. United Aircraft Corp., 534 F.2d 422, 446-47 (2d Cir. 1975)); see also Taaffe v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 769 F.Supp.2d 530, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) ("Choosing an interest rate, as noted above is a matter `confided to the district court's broad discretion.'" (quoting Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1476 (2d Cir. 1996))).

New York C.P.L.R. section 5004 applies a nine-percent annual interest rate for judgments arising under New York law. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5004 (applying a nine-percent annual rate "except where otherwise provided by statute"). Because Plaintiffs seek to recover the delinquent non-ERISA contributions under the LMRA, which allows them to sue in federal court for breaches of state-law labor contracts, the rate under section 5004 is appropriate here.14 See 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (authorizing federal "[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees"); see also Brown, 194 F.3d at 354 (explaining that a lawsuit for failure to abide by a collective bargaining agreement is governed by 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)); Lanzafame v. Dana Restoration, Inc., No. 09-CV-873, 2011 WL 1100111, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2011) ("In awarding interest, a court may look to state law to determine an appropriate rate.").

Moreover, courts in this district regularly apply the section 5004 rate to non-ERISA delinquencies. See Bricklayers Ins. & Welfare Fund v. J.K. Merillin Builders, Inc., No. 13-CV-1048, 2014 WL 6674404, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2014); Flanagan v. Marson Grp., Ltd., No. 11-CV-2896, 2014 WL 4426277, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2014); Trs. of Steamfitters' Local Union No. 638 v. Nexus Mech., Inc., No. 08-CV-3214, 2014 WL 1338377, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2014); Bricklayers Ins. & Welfare Fund v. Verse Inc., No. 12-CV-4271, 2013 WL 4883966, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2013); Taaffe, 769 F. Supp. 2d at 538-39; but see Omega Commc'n Servs, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 2d at 162 ("In the absence of an agreement between the parties [regarding the non-ERISA rate], I see no reason to award a higher interest rate to the Non-ERISA Plans than that allotted to the ERISA Plans . . . ."); Finkel v. Fervent Elec. Corp., No. 13-CV-3289, 2015 WL 1469650, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2015) (applying the same interest rate governing ERISA contributions to non-ERISA contributions under the parties' contract). Because Defendant has not disputed Plaintiffs' proposed interest rate and the Court finds it reasonable, the Court awards Plaintiffs nine-percent per year on the outstanding non-ERISA deficiency.

In the absence of a specific interest rate to apply, Plaintiffs' auditor did not calculate interest on the non-ERISA deficiencies. (See Final Report.) Because those amounts came due at different times, Plaintiffs encourage the Court to apply an intermediate date as the interest accrual date. (Pls. Mem. 24.) Under New York law, where damages "were incurred at various times, interest shall be computed upon each item from the date it was incurred or upon all of the damages from a single reasonable intermediate date." N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5001(b). Accordingly, courts in ERISA cases "routinely calculate prejudgment interest from a midpoint date in the delinquency period." Alston v. Northstar La Guardia LLC, No. 10-CV-3611, 2010 WL 3432307, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2010) (citing Finkel v. Triple A Grp. Inc., 708 F.Supp.2d 277, 287-88 (E.D.N.Y. 2010)); Tr. of the Plumbers Local Union No. 1 Welfare Fund v. Manhattan Plumbing Corp., 2009 WL 5821676, at *5 n.4 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 2009) ("New York law, which federal courts frequently apply in calculating interest in ERISA cases, provides that when damages are incurred over a period of time, prejudgment interest may be calculated from a `single reasonable intermediate date.'" (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5001(b))).

In this case, the delinquency period extended from July 1, 2011 until December 15, 2014. (See Pls. 56.1 ¶ 16.) The intermediate date of the delinquency period is March 23, 2013. Multiplying the amount Defendant owed in non-ERISA contributions ($32,690.35) by the annual interest rate of nine percent, and dividing that amount by 365, the daily interest rate on Defendant's non-ERISA delinquency is $8.06. Accordingly, Defendant owes Plaintiffs $11,501.62 in prejudgment interest from March 23, 2013 through the date of this Memorandum and Order.15

III. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the Court grants Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and directs the Clerk of Court to award judgment in the amount of $228,417.47 as detailed above and below, and as calculated through the date of this Memorandum and Order:

If judgment is entered after the date of this Memorandum and Order, the Clerk of Court should add to the ERISA and non-ERISA deficiencies additional per-day interest rates in the amounts identified above.

SO ORDERED.