FREDERICK J. SCULLIN, Jr., Senior District Judge.
Plaintiff Edward Cochran brought this action pursuant to the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) ("Act"), seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the "Commissioner"), denying his application for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI"). See generally Dkt. Nos. 1, 19. Currently before the Court are the parties' cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Dkt. Nos. 19, 20.
Plaintiff filed an application for SSI on December 18, 2008, alleging disability beginning on December 10, 1991. See Administrative Record ("AR") at 191.
On remand, Plaintiff had a second hearing before the ALJ on March 5, 2010, at which attorney Peter Gorton represented him. See AR at 46. The ALJ then issued a second unfavorable decision on April 3, 2012, in which she made the following findings "[a]fter careful consideration of all the evidence. . . ."
See AR at 16-27 (citations omitted).
The ALJ's decision became the Commissioner's final decision on May 8, 2013, when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review. See AR at 1-6. Plaintiff then commenced this action on May 23, 2013, filing a supporting brief on January 17, 2014. See Dkt Nos. 1, 19.
In support of his motion, Plaintiff argues that there is not substantial evidence to support the ALJ's findings with respect to 1) the severity of certain of his impairments, 2) his residual functional capacity, and 3) whether other work suitable to Plaintiff exists in significant numbers in the national economy. See generally Dkt. No. 19, Pl.'s Br.
Absent legal error, a court will uphold the Commissioner's final determination if there is substantial evidence to support it. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Supreme Court has defined substantial evidence to mean "`more than a mere scintilla'" of evidence and "`such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quotation omitted). To be eligible for SSI, a claimant must show that he suffers from a disability within the meaning of the Act. The Act defines "disability" as an inability to engage in substantial gainful activity ("SGA") by reason of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment that can be expected to cause death or last for twelve consecutive months. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). To determine if a claimant has sustained a disability within the meaning of the Act, the ALJ follows a five-step process:
For this test, the burden of proof is on the claimant for the first four steps and on the Commissioner for the fifth step, if the analysis proceeds that far. See Balsamo v. Chater, 142 F.3d 75, 80 (2d Cir. 1998) (quotation omitted).
At step two of the disability analysis, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). In order to be severe, an impairment or combination of impairments must "significantly limit[] your physical or mental ability to do basic work activities." Id. An impairment or combination of impairments fails to meet this standard when the evidence "establishes only a slight abnormality or a combination of slight abnormalities which would have no more than a minimal effect on an individual's ability to work. . . ." Social Security Ruling ("SSR") 85-28, 1985 WL 56856, *3 (1985). "[E]vidence about the functionally limiting effects of an individual's impairment(s) must be evaluated" and "symptom-related limitations and restrictions must be considered at this step of the sequential evaluation process. . . ." SSR 96-3p, 1996 WL 374181, *2 (July 2, 1996).
In this case, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erroneously declined to find that his obesity, plantar fasciitis, and sleep apnea amounted to severe impairments. See Dkt. No. 19, Pl.'s Br., at 15. With respect to obesity, he argues that consulting orthopedist Dr. Weisner specifically noted that Plaintiff's obesity exacerbates his ankle condition. See id. at 16 (citing AR at 573). With respect to sleep apnea, Plaintiff argues that treating physician Dr. Shah diagnosed him with "severe" sleep apnea. See id. at 16 (citation omitted). Finally, with respect to plantar fasciitis, Plaintiff points out that treating physician, Dr. Brosnan, noted "tenderness primarily over the plantar fascia" which, Plaintiff argues, "clearly affects the ability to stand and walk. See id. at 16-17 (citing AR at 550).
The ALJ, in her written decision, found that Plaintiff "has been medically managed" for, among other things, obesity, sleep apnea, and plantar fasciitis in the left foot. See AR at 17. She further found that "there is not enough documentation to show that these conditions rise to the level of a severe impairment." See id. With respect to obesity, the ALJ discussed Dr. Weisner's opinion. See AR at 18. In particular, she noted that, although Dr. Weisner found that Plaintiff's obesity contributes to his ankle pain, he also observed that Plaintiff "uses no assistive devices" and that he "ambulated well without limp." See id. (quoting AR at 574). The ALJ also discussed the opinion of consulting physician Dr. Magurno, who noted the extent of Plaintiff's activities and that he did not use any assistive devices. See id. at 17. Accordingly, the Court finds that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ's finding that obesity had "no more than a minimal effect" on Plaintiff's ability to work. SSR 85-28, 1985 WL 56856, at *3.
With respect to plantar fasciitis, the ALJ discussed Dr. Brosnan's opinion. See AR at 17. She found that, although Dr. Brosnan diagnosed plantar fasciitis of the left foot, he noted that Plaintiff suffered from "occasional discomfort [but] he did get significant relief with the cortisone shot. . . ." See id. (quoting AR at 548). Further review of Dr. Brosnan's notes shows that, although he noted "[t]enderness over the plantar fascia," see id. at 549, X-rays of Plaintiff's left foot yielded "no significant abnormalities," see id. at 550. Accordingly, the Court finds that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ's finding that plantar fasciitis had "no more than a minimal effect" on Plaintiff's ability to work. SSR 85-28, 1985 WL 56856, at *3.
Finally, with respect to sleep apnea, the ALJ noted Dr. Shah's observation that Plaintiff was being treated for sleep apnea. See AR at 17. However, the ALJ also noted that Dr. Shah found that Plaintiff had "normal" pulmonary function studies. See id. Thus, although Dr. Shah diagnosed Plaintiff with "severe" sleep apnea, see id. at 383, the record is generally devoid of evidence tending to show that this impairment "significantly limits" his ability to do basic work activities. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). In other words, no treating or examining physician identified any functional limitations arising out of Plaintiff's sleep apnea. For this reason, the Court finds that the ALJ was justified in "relying on what the record does not say" in this instance. Dumas v. Schweiker, 712 F.2d 1545, 1553 (2d Cir. 1983) (citations omitted). Accordingly, the Court finds that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ's finding that sleep apnea had "no more than a minimal effect" on Plaintiff's ability to work. SSR 85-28, 1985 WL 56856, at *3.
In summary, for the above-stated reasons, the Court finds that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff's obesity, sleep apnea, and plantar fasciitis did not amount to severe impairments, or a combination thereof, as defined in the regulations. See Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401.
Between steps three and four of the disability analysis, the ALJ must determine the claimant's residual functioning capacity ("RFC"), which is defined as "the most you can still do [in a work setting] despite your limitations." 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e). The RFC analysis considers "all of your medically determinable impairments of which we are aware," even if they are not severe. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(2). The ALJ is to consider "all of the relevant medical and other evidence" in assessing RFC. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(3).
In this case, Plaintiff advances the following arguments with respect to the ALJ's RFC analysis. First, Plaintiff argues that there was no substantial evidence supporting the conclusion that he can frequently respond appropriately to supervision, co-workers, and situations, and frequently deal with changes in a routine work setting. See Dkt. No. 19 at 17. Second, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not consider the full extent of his physical limitations. See id. at 21. In particular, Plaintiff argues that the "combination of his arthritic ankle, bursitis of the hip, knee injury, and obesity cause significant limitations on his ability to walk and stand. . . ." See id.
With respect to Plaintiff's mental limitations, the ALJ noted Plaintiff's self-reports of "leaving challenging situations," such as a number of his past jobs and his first hearing before the ALJ, which Plaintiff attributed to his mental impairments. See AR at 22. However, the ALJ engaged in an appropriate credibility analysis and found that Plaintiff's statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his mental impairments were only partially credible. See id.; SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, *2 (July 2, 1996). In particular, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff was "a very different claimant" at his second disability hearing: he was "more relaxed, able to talk and answer questions, and appeared to be overall much better" than at his first hearing. See AR at 21. Additionally, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff was not fired from his job at either K-Mart or Catholic Charities. See AR at 22. With respect to Plaintiff's job at K-Mart, the ALJ found Plaintiff's testimony to "indicate[] a dislike of change and nothing more" because Plaintiff was not fired. See id. With respect to the Catholic Charities job, the ALJ noted that "this job did not end due to a physical or mental impairment; the employer was satisfied enough with [Plaintiff] to offer him another job." See id. Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's "weak attachment to the workforce . . . detracts from his credibility regarding motivation to work." See id.
The ALJ also thoroughly considered the various medical evidence supporting the alleged limiting effects of Plaintiff's mental impairments. In particular, the ALJ considered Dr. Rahman's opinion that Plaintiff's temper "appear[ed] to be a little short" and that he got irritable when asked probing questions. See AR at 22. However, the ALJ also noted Dr. Rahman's observation that Plaintiff's speech was normal, that there was no evidence of perceptual or psychomotor disturbances, that his intelligence appeared to be average, that his memory function was intact, and that he denied having suicidal thoughts. See id. at 22-23. The ALJ also considered the opinion of consulting psychiatric examiner Dr. Moore, who noted that Plaintiff "can follow and understand simple directions and instructions, perform simple rote tasks under supervision, and consistently perform simple tasks." See id. at 23. Dr. Moore also noted that Plaintiff had intact attention and concentration and that he had the ability to learn simplistic and complex tasks. See id.
With respect to Plaintiff's physical limitations, the ALJ considered the opinion of consultative examiner, Dr. Magurno, who found that Plaintiff had "moderate limitations for squatting" and "mild limitations for walking, standing, and other weight bearing activities." See AR at 23. Similarly, she noted Dr. Weisner's opinion that Plaintiff was moderately restricted for prolonged standing and lifting heavy objects. See id. The ALJ further concluded that she properly considered Plaintiff's obesity because, by weighing the opinions of the examining physicians, all of whom noted Plaintiff's weight, she "necessarily considered [Plaintiff's] obesity." See AR at 25. The ALJ also discussed the opinions of Drs. Morog and Galu, as well as NP Lee. See AR at 24.
In sum, to the extent that Plaintiff points to evidence in the Administrative Record that reasonably might support a different conclusion in his favor, "whether there is substantial evidence supporting the appellant's view is not the question" on appeal. Bonet ex rel. T.B. v. Colvin, 523 F. App'x 58, 59 (2d Cir. 2013) (instructing that ALJ need not discuss every piece of evidence submitted). Moreover, the Court finds that the ALJ properly weighed the various medical opinions in her analysis.
At step five of the disability analysis, the Commissioner has the burden of "providing evidence that demonstrates that other work exists in significant numbers in the national economy that you can do, given your residual functional capacity" and "the vocational factors of age, education, and work experience, as appropriate in your case." 20 C.F.R. § 416.960(c)(2); see also 20 C.F.R. § 419.920(a)(4)(v), (g). At this stage, the ALJ may properly rely upon the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, Bureau of Labor statistics, and the testimony of vocational experts. See Pitcher, 2008 WL 619175, at *7 (citations omitted). In this case, Plaintiff argues that he is precluded from performing two of the three jobs the vocational expert identified in her testimony. See Dkt. No. 19 at 12-13. In particular, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's finding limiting him to simple instructions and directions is incompatible with the surveillance system monitor and order clerk — food and beverage jobs because they have a reasoning level of 3 out of 6. See id.; see also AR at 76. However, "a limitation to simple work does not preclude a job that has a reasoning development level of 2 or 3. . . ." Reynolds v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 11-CV-00778, 2012 WL 2050410, *6 (N.D.N.Y. June 6, 2012). Accordingly, the Court finds that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ's step-five finding. See Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401.
Having reviewed the entire record in this matter, the parties' submissions, and the applicable law, and for the above-stated reasons, the Court hereby