PATRICK J. HANNA, Magistrate Judge.
Pending before this Court is the motion for summary judgment, which was filed by the defendants, Iberia Parish Sheriff Louis M. Ackal and Sheriff's Deputy Lucas Plauche (Rec. Doc. 23). The motion is opposed. The motion was referred to the undersigned for review, report, and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 and the standing orders of this Court. For the following reasons, it is recommended that the motion be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
This lawsuit arose out of an incident in which a dog was killed by an Iberia Parish sheriff's deputy. In their complaint, the plaintiffs, Teddy Sonnier and his son Brance Sonnier, alleged that a neighbor called 911 on the morning of August 28, 2015 to report a loose dog at the plaintiffs' residence. Corporal Lucas Plauche, a deputy with the Iberia Parish Sheriff's Office, was dispatched to the scene. When he arrived at the plaintiffs' address, nobody was home and the plaintiffs' dog, Tank, was in the plaintiffs' yard. Tank was a two-and-a-half-year-old registered Presa Canario. The plaintiffs alleged that, in addition to being a family pet, Tank was also the product of champion bloodlines and used for breeding.
The plaintiffs alleged that, after arriving at the scene, Corporal Plauche called Deputy Chris Richard, Sergeant Gregory Pete, and Corporal Brad LeBlanc for assistance, all of whom also arrived on the scene. Animal Warden Wesley Lanceslin also arrived on the scene, equipped with a catch pole. Video from Corporal Plauche's body camera shows Corporal Plauche talking with another deputy, and it shows Tank running about and barking, all while remaining in the plaintiffs' yard. On the video, Tank never growls, snarls, or makes any aggressive movements toward the officers. After approximately twenty minutes, the video was shut off. It is undisputed that, after he had been on the scene for approximately an hour, and after the body camera was turned off, Corporal Plauche discharged his service weapon and shot Tank in the left eye, killing him.
The plaintiffs sued Iberia Parish Sheriff Louis M. Ackal, the Iberia Parish Sheriff's Office,
In their motion for summary judgment, the defendants argued that there are two reasons why the plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed in their entirety. First, they argued that the plaintiffs were not Tank's owners and, consequently, cannot assert a Fourth Amendment claim for wrongful seizure of their property. Second, they argued that the plaintiffs' claims are procedural due process claims that cannot be remedied through the operation of Section 1983 because Louisiana provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy for a loss of property through governmental action. Additionally, the defendants argued that, because the plaintiffs were not Tank's owners, they cannot validly assert a Louisiana state-law conversion claim. Finally, the defendants argued that, once the plaintiffs' federal-law claims are dismissed, the court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' remaining state-law claims. The defendants' motion for summary judgment does not address the issue of qualified immunity.
In response, the plaintiffs argued that they were Tank's owners at all material times and therefore validly asserted a Fourth Amendment claim and a Louisiana state-law conversion claim. The plaintiffs responded to the defendants' due process argument with only a single sentence, maintaining that their due process claims have merit. The plaintiffs then argued that there is a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether the shooting of Tank was unreasonable and, for that reason, violated their Fourth Amendment protection against unlawful seizure and precludes the court from finding that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A fact is material if proof of its existence or nonexistence might affect the outcome of the lawsuit under the applicable governing law.
The party seeking summary judgment has the initial responsibility for informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those parts of the record that demonstrate the absence of genuine issues of material fact.
If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden by pointing out that there is insufficient proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim.
The complaint states that the plaintiff's claims are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as well as under Louisiana law. Section 1983 provides a cause of action against anyone who "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State" violates another person's Constitutional rights. Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights; it merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere.
"The Fourth Amendment, which applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, bars unreasonable governmental searches and seizures."
The defendants contend that a threshold question must be resolved before the issue of qualified immunity or the merits of the plaintiffs' claims can be addressed. They argued that, in order to assert a claim for the unconstitutional seizure of his property, a person must first establish that the property was, in fact, his. They further argued that the plaintiffs are not entitled to assert the claims set forth in their complaint because neither Teddy Sonnier nor Brance Sonnier owned Tank. The defendants premised this argument on the contention that Tank's pedigree and registration were in the name of Chase Sonnier (Teddy's son and Brance's brother) and not in either Teddy Sonnier's or Brance Sonnier's name.
The defendants did not submit any documentary evidence in support of their argument that Tank was owned by Chase Sonnier rather than by Teddy or Brance Sonnier, nor did they cite any statutory or jurisprudential authority for the proposition that the registration of a dog with a club or organization establishes the dog's ownership. This Court is unaware of any governmental agency that registers the owners of dogs or other domestic animals. The plaintiffs submitted a "Permanent Registration Certificate" issued by the United Kennel Club Registering Office, which states that the "sole signatory" and "registrant on record" for the dog known as Kingdom Kennels Tank was Chase Sonnier. (Rec. Doc. 25-9 at 1-3). This document was not accompanied by an affidavit and there is no basis on which to conclude that it constitutes valid summary-judgment-style evidence. Still, perhaps this is the documentation that the defendants were referring to when they argued that Tank was registered in Chase Sonnier's name. But that document does not indicate that Chase Sonnier was the dog's owner.
Furthermore, Teddy Sonnier testified at his deposition that, because his work schedule requires him to be out of the country for long periods of time, it is not unusual for his sons Chase and Brance to sign registration papers for dogs that he owns. (Rec. Doc. 23-3 at 2). He admitted that Chase signed the registration papers for Tank (Rec. Doc. 23-3 at 3) but stated that he, Teddy, was Tank's owner (Rec. Doc. 23-3 at 3). More particularly, he explained that he acquired ownership of Tank after breeding Tank's father and obtaining the right to receive the first male pick of the litter. (Rec. Doc. 25-3 at 4-5). He also stated that he paid for everything for Tank and his other dogs and that the kennel belongs to him; however, he also stated that his sons take care of his dogs for him. (Rec. Doc. 25-3 at 8). Teddy Sonnier further testified that his son Brance was also an owner of Tank because Brance "raised Tank from a baby. . . in Brance's home." (Rec. Doc. 23-3 at 3-4). Brance Sonnier confirmed this testimony, stating that he considered Tank to be a family dog because he "had him since he was born," "raised him in the house with my kids," and "raised him in my house." (Rec. Doc. 25-4 at 10).
Under Louisiana law, a dog is a corporeal movable.
In this case, the evidence establishes that Teddy Sonnier acquired the ownership of Tank when he picked him from a litter sired by Tank's father in lieu of the breeding fee. (Rec. Doc. 32 at 3-4). The evidence further establishes that, due to his work taking him out of the country (Rec. Doc. 32 at 1-2), Teddy Sonnier voluntarily relinquished temporary possession of Tank to his son Brance, and Tank lived with Brance Sonnier and his family (Rec. Doc. 25-4 at 10; Rec. Doc. 32 at 7). Louisiana law permits two or more persons to share ownership of the same thing.
This Court finds that the defendants failed to prove that Chase Sonnier was Tank's owner. To the contrary, this Court finds that Tank was owned by both Teddy Sonnier and Brance Sonnier. Accordingly, they are entitled to bring the claims asserted in this lawsuit. To the extent the defendants argued that they were entitled to summary judgment in their favor because the plaintiffs lacked standing to assert their claims, it is recommended that the motion be denied.
The defendants argued that the plaintiffs' complaint should be dismissed because the claims that the plaintiffs asserted are due process claims, and such claims are not cognizable when state law provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy. They then suggested that Louisiana tort law recognizes a claim for conversion,
This Court finds, as a preliminary matter, that the plaintiffs did not assert due process claims in their complaint. The plaintiffs' complaint alleged that "[t]his is an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to redress the deprivation under color of law of Plaintiffs' Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights as secured by the United States Constitution. . . ." (Rec. Doc. 1 at 3). It also alleged that Tank's death violated the plaintiffs' "rights guaranteed by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. . . ." (Rec. Doc. 1 at 8). However, the words "due process" are not in the complaint. Accordingly, this Court interprets the references to the Fourteenth Amendment set forth in the complaint as merely referencing the fact that the Fourth Amendment's protections against wrongful search and seizure were made applicable to the actions of state actors through the operation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and this Court concludes that the plaintiffs did not assert due process claims in their complaint.
But the plaintiffs included a sentence in their opposition memorandum stating that their due process claims have merit. (Rec. Doc. 25-1 at 21). Therefore, to the extent that the plaintiffs might contend that they did assert due process claims, the merits of the defendants' argument — which was not opposed by the plaintiffs — will be addressed.
Due process may be substantive or procedural. When a constitutional amendment provides an explicit textual source of protection against certain government misconduct, that amendment is the guide for analysis of the claim rather than the generalized notion of substantive due process.
The argument posited by the defendants concerning the adequacy of state-law post-deprivation remedies applies only to procedural due process claims. Ordinarily, under the due process clause, the state may not take property from an individual without providing pre-deprivation notice and a hearing.
In this case, however, the plaintiffs did not allege that Corporal Plauche's actions were "random and unauthorized." Instead, they alleged that his actions were the result of policies, practices, or customs and usages implemented by Iberia Parish Sheriff Louis M. Ackal and the sheriff's "custom of tolerating employee-responders unreasonably using deadly force against loose dogs and failure to train and/or equip CORPORAL PLAUCHE to properly handle dog/animal encounters without the use of lethal force." (Rec. Doc. 1 at 7). The Fifth Circuit has explained that the Parratt/Hudson doctrine does not apply when a law enforcement office is operating pursuant to a local custom or procedure.
Although further proceedings may show that the Corporal Plauche's acts were "random and unauthorized," the plaintiffs' allegations must be accepted as true at this stage of the litigation, and those allegations preclude the application of the Parratt/Hudson doctrine to any procedural due process claim that the plaintiffs might have. Accordingly, the defendants' motion for summary judgement with regard to the plaintiffs' procedural due process claim, if any, should be denied.
Although the plaintiffs went to great lengths to argue in their opposition memorandum that it was not reasonable for Corporal Plauche to shoot and kill Tank, neither the issue of whether Corporal Plauche is entitled to qualified immunity nor the ultimate issue of whether Corporal Plauche's actions violated the Fourth Amendment were raised in the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the reasonableness of his actions is not an issue before the court at this time and must be reserved for another day.
The defendants argued that the plaintiffs have no conversion claim under Louisiana state law because they were not Tank's owners. This Court's finding that Teddy and Brance Sonnier were Tank's owners renders the defendants' argument concerning the plaintiffs' conversion claim without merit.
The defendants argued that the plaintiffs' state-law claims should be dismissed upon the dismissal of their federal-law claims. But this Court's finding that the defendant's motion for summary judgment should be granted only with regard to the plaintiff's substantive due process claim renders the defendant's argument concerning the remainder of the plaintiff's state-law claims without merit.
Accordingly, this Court finds that there is no basis for granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment as it concerns the plaintiffs' state-law claims.
For the foregoing reasons, this Court recommends that the defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted with regard to the plaintiffs' substantive due process claim (if any) and denied in all other respects.
Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), parties aggrieved by this recommendation have fourteen days from service of this report and recommendation to file specific, written objections with the Clerk of Court. A party may respond to another party's objections within fourteen days after being served with of a copy of any objections or responses to the district judge at the time of filing.
Failure to file written objections to the proposed factual findings and/or the proposed legal conclusions reflected in the report and recommendation within fourteen days following the date of its service, or within the time frame authorized by Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b), shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking either the factual findings or the legal conclusions accepted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services Automobile Association, 79 F.3d 1415 (5
