MEMORANDUM & ORDER

CAROL BAGLEY AMON, Chief District Judge.

On October 13, 2009, John Crawford filed a petition for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which this Court denied in a February 25, 2013 memorandum and order. Crawford thereafter sought and was granted a thirty day extension to file a notice of appeal. On April 22, 2013, Crawford filed both a notice of appeal and a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). The Court denied the motion for reconsideration on July 3, 2013, finding it untimely pursuant to Rule 59(e) and beyond the scope of Rule 60(b). Crawford subsequently appealed that order as well. The Second Circuit denied Crawford's application for a Certificate of Appealability with regard to the denial of his habeas petition on July 23, 2013, and issued a mandate to that effect on August 27, 2013. Similarly, the Second Circuit denied a Certificate of Appealability with regard to the denial of his Rule 59(e) motion on March 13, 2014, and issued its mandate on April 17, 2014.1

On January 10, 2014, Crawford filed this motion to vacate the judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) & (d). In this motion, Crawford raises three arguments. First, he argues that the government committed fraud on the court by misrepresenting the circumstances surrounding his waiver of his Miranda rights and his subsequent confession. Specifically, he argues that logbooks from Rikers Island show that he was transported to meet with the investigator who interrogated him at 5:54 PM, undermining the investigator's testimony that he gave Crawford the Miranda warnings at 5:00 PM. Second, he argues that the Supreme Court's decision in Howes v. Fields, 132 S.Ct. 1181 (2012) — which held that there is no categorical rule that a prisoner who "is isolated from the general prison population and questioned about conduct outside the prison" is in custody for purposes of Miranda, see Howes, 132 S. Ct. at 1188-89 — rendered his confession inadmissible. Finally, he argues that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective in failing to appreciate that Crawford had dyslexia and for failing to argue for the suppression of his confession due to the circumstances surrounding it.

Under Rule 60(b), a district court may relieve a party from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). "Since 60(b) allows extraordinary judicial relief, it is invoked only upon a showing of exceptional circumstances." Nemaizer v. Baker, 793 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1986). As this Court noted in its order denying Crawford's prior motion for reconsideration, a Rule 60(b) motion brought in a habeas case sometimes may be considered a second or successive habeas petition. Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 531-32 (2005). Such a motion will be treated as a successive habeas petition if it asserts a "federal basis for relief from a state court's judgment of conviction." Id. at 530. This includes where the motion "seeks to add a new ground for relief ... [or] attacks the federal court's previous resolution of a claim on the merits." Id. at 532 (emphasis in original). On the other hand, a Rule 60(b) motion that attacks "some defect in the integrity of the federal habeas proceedings" may proceed as denominated. Id.

Each of three bases for relief that Crawford raises in his Rule 60 motion is an entirely new federal challenge to the state court's judgment of conviction. He seeks to vacate the judgment based on newly discovered evidence that he believes demonstrates inconsistencies in the testimony of a key witness, based on an alleged change in the law that he believes renders his confession inadmissible, and based on his trial counsel's alleged ineffectiveness. Not one of those bases relates to a "defect in the integrity of the federal habeas proceeding[]," Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 532; rather, his motion is an attempt to add three entirely new federal claims to his habeas petition. Crawford's Rule 60 motion is therefore a second or successive habeas petition2

Crawford attempts to avoid this conclusion with regard to his first claim — regarding the allegedly newly discovered evidence of Rikers Island logbooks — by describing it in terms of "fraud" on the court. Although a claim of fraudulent conduct before a federal habeas court brought in a Rule 60 motion would not be deemed a second or successive habeas petition, Crawford's claim of"fraud" is based on the government's alleged suppression of the logbooks during the state court proceedings, not during this federal habeas proceeding.3 Thus, the assertion of fraud is unrelated to the integrity of the federal habeas proceeding, and does not render his claim proper for a Rule 60(b) motion.4

As this Court noted in its order denying Crawford's first motion for relief from the judgment, although second or successive petitions for habeas corpus relief should typically be transferred to the Court of Appeals when incorrectly filed in a district court, the Second Circuit has also cautioned district courts against recharacterizing Rule 60(b) motions as new collateral attacks and transferring them to the Second Circuit without informing the prisoner of the district court's intent to do so, see Gitten v. United States, 311 F.3d 529, 533-34 (2d Cir. 2002). That rule exists to avoid potential unfairness to a petitioner, as a motion converted to an application to file a second or successive petition will be "tested against the strict gate-keeping standards [of 28 U.S.C. § 2244] before [the prisoner] has framed his allegedly new challenges in a way that presents his best chance of meeting those standards" and may be subject to denial on the ground of "abuse of the writ." Id. at 533. Instead, in such circumstances, a district court may simply deny the motion as "beyond the scope of Rule 60(b)," id. at 534, as this Court did with Crawford's first such motion.

Although this Court previously warned Crawford that it would treat any future motions seeking to add ineffective assistance of counsel claims as second or successive petitions and transfer them to the Second Circuit, it will instead deny this motion as beyond the scope of Rule 60(b). Crawford explicitly requested that the motion not be construed as a second or successive petition, apparently under the belief that his initial habeas petition was not yet final. Because it is conceivable that, if Crawford were to deliberately seek leave to file a second or successive petition, he might frame his challenges differently, denying the motion as beyond the scope of Rule 60(b) will avoid any potential unfairness. The Court puts Crawford on notice, however, that any subsequent motion attempting to bring new federal challenges to his state conviction will be treated as a second or successive petition and transferred to the Court of Appeals.

Accordingly, Crawford's motion is denied as beyond the scope of Rule 60(b). Since Crawford has failed to make a "substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right," a Certificate of Appealability shall not issue. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c).

SO ORDERED.