OPINION

JOY FLOWERS CONTI, Chief District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendants the Board of Education of the School District of Pittsburgh, the City of Pittsburgh Public School District (the "School District"), Dale Frederick, and Ronald Zangaro ("Zangaro") (collectively, the "City defendants") filed a motion to dismiss the second amended complaint of plaintiff Shawn Logan ("plaintiff") pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF Nos. 44, 45.) Having been fully briefed and argued, the motion is ripe for disposition.

For the reasons set forth in this opinion, the court will grant the City defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss without prejudice. If plaintiff seeks to amend the complaint, he must file a motion to amend his complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 16(b)(4) and 15(a)(2). See Graham v. Progressive Direct Ins. Co., 271 F.R.D. 112, 118 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (holding that a motion to amend the complaint after the deadline established by the pretrial scheduling order is analyzed first under Rule 16(b)(4), then Rule 15(a)(2)).

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Because the parties are familiar with this case's factual context and procedural history, the court sets forth only the background information necessary to its analysis.1

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("§ 1983"), plaintiff alleges: (1) former School District police officer Robert Lellock ("Lellock")2 sexually assaulted him while he was a public school student at Arthur J. Rooney Middle School (the "Middle School"), in violation of his due process right to bodily integrity; and (2) the City defendants failed to prevent Lellock's misconduct, in violation of plaintiff's right to bodily integrity.

In his first amended complaint, plaintiff alleged § 1983 supervisory liability, municipal liability, failure to act, and failure to train claims against the City defendants. The court granted the City defendants' first Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss all plaintiff's § 1983 claims against them, giving plaintiff leave to amend only his § 1983 "single-incident" — based failure to train claim. (Text Minute Entry, 10/7/2015; ECF Nos. 40, 41.) Specifically, the court stated:

(ECF No. 40 at 37.)

On November 6, 2015, plaintiff filed a second amended complaint setting forth additional factual allegations in support of his "single-incident"-based § 1983 failure to train claim against the City defendants. (ECF No. 42.) In particular, plaintiff alleges:

On November 20, 2015, the City defendants filed this Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss plaintiff's amended "single-incident"-based § 1983 failure to train claim, i.e., the only claim remaining against the City defendants in this action. (ECF Nos. 44, 45.) On December 11, 2015, plaintiff filed a brief in opposition to the City defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 47.)

On January 19, 2016, the court held a hearing at which the parties argued the City defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See (Text Minute Entry, 1/19/2016.) The court took the matter under advisement.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently reiterated the standards the court must apply when deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss:

Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., No. 14-3792, ___ F.3d ___, 2016 WL 106159, at *3-4 (3d Cir. Jan. 11, 2016).

At the final step of the analysis, the court is to assume the truth of all well-pleaded allegations of "historical fact," construe those allegations in the light most favorable to plaintiff, draw all reasonable inferences from the facts in favor of plaintiff, and ask whether those facts "raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence" to support the legal claim being asserted. Id. at *7. Allegations of historical fact are assumed true even if "unrealistic or nonsensical," "chimerical," or "extravagantly fanciful." Id. at *6 (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681). "Put another way, Twombly and Iqbal expressly declined to exclude even outlandish allegations from a presumption of truth except to the extent they resembled a `formulaic recitation of the elements of a . . . claim' or other legal conclusion." Id.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. The elements of plaintiff's claims

The court must "`tak[e] note of the elements'" plaintiff must plead to state a § 1983 failure to train claim. Connelly, ___ F.3d at ___, 2016 WL 106159, at *3-4 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675).

As the court explained in its prior Rule 12(b)(6) opinion in this case, a municipality may be liable for the failure to train its employees "only where that failure amounts to `deliberate indifference to the [constitutional] rights of persons with whom the [employees] come in contact.'" Doe v. Luzerne Cnty., 660 F.3d 169, 179 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)) (emphasis added). To show the "deliberate indifference" required to state a § 1983 failure to train claim, a claimant may proceed under either a "pattern"- or "single-incident"-based theory of liability.

1. "Pattern"-based § 1983 failure to train claim

"A pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is `ordinarily necessary' to demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of [a] failure to train" claim under § 1983. Connick v. Thompson, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 1360 (2011) (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409 (1997)). Policymakers' "`continued adherence to an approach that they know or should know has failed to prevent tortious conduct by employees may establish the conscious disregard for the consequences of their action—the `deliberate indifference'—necessary to trigger municipal liability.'" Id. (quoting Brown, 520 U.S. at 407). "Without notice that a course of training is deficient in a particular respect, decisionmakers can hardly be said to have deliberately chosen a training program that will cause violations of constitutional rights." Id.

2. "Single-incident"-based § 1983 failure to train claim

A pattern of constitutional violations is not always necessary to prove a § 1983 failure to train claim. In Harris, 489 U.S. at 390, the United States Supreme Court posited that even without a pattern of constitutional violations

Id. There, the Court set forth the following paradigmatic hypothetical of a "single-incident" claim:

Id. at 390 n.10 (internal citation omitted).

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has observed that "[l]iability in single-incident cases depends upon `[t]he likelihood that the situation will recur and the predictability that an [employee] lacking specific tools to handle that situation will violate citizens' rights.'" Thomas v. Cumberland Cnty., 749 F.3d 217, 223-24 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Brown, 520 U.S. at 409). "To find deliberate indifference from a single-incident violation, the risk of [the] injury [alleged] must be a `highly predictable consequence' of the [municipality's] failure to provide . . . training." Id. at 225 (quoting Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1361).

3. Causation

To state either a "pattern"- or "single-incident"-based § 1983 failure to train claim, the plaintiff must "`prove that the deficiency in training actually caused [the constitutional violation at issue].'" Doe, 660 F.3d at 170 (quoting Harris, 489 U.S. at 391). "In analyzing causation, `the focus must be on adequacy of the training program in relation to the tasks the particular officers must perform.'" Thomas, 749 F.3d at 226 (quoting Harris, 489 U.S. at 390). "[T]he causation inquiry focuses on whether `the injury [could] have been avoided had the employee been trained under a program that was not deficient in the identified respect.'" Id. (quoting Harris, 489 U.S. at 391).

B. Whether plaintiff states plausible § 1983 failure to train claims

As explained, the court must "identify allegations" related to plaintiff's § 1983 failure to train claims "`that, `because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.'" Connelly, ___ F.3d at ___, 2016 WL 106159, at *3-4 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675). Finally, "[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations," the court "assume[s] their veracity" and "determine[s] whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Id. (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

1. "Pattern"-based § 1983 failure to train claim

At the October 7, 2015 hearing and in plaintiff's response to this Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, plaintiff acknowledged he cannot state a "pattern"-based § 1983 failure to train claim against the City defendants, as he "does not possess sufficient information to plead" that the City defendants "had knowledge of" Lellock's misconduct "until after [plaintiff's] injury." (ECF No. 47 at 9 (emphasis added).) On these grounds, the court dismissed plaintiff's "pattern"-based § 1983 failure to train claim with prejudice at the October 7, 2015 hearing. See Logan, 2015 WL 5971198, at *15-16.

For the remainder of this opinion, therefore, the court addresses only whether plaintiff's second amended complaint states a "single-incident"-based § 1983 failure to train claim against the City defendants.

2. "Single-incident"-based § 1983 failure to train claim

In support of his "single-incident"-based failure to train claim, plaintiff alleges the City defendants were deliberately indifferent to the need to train staff: (a) to stop unauthorized personnel (i.e., Lellock) from removing students from Middle School classrooms; and (b) to detect and report signs of sexual abuse of students by Lellock, a School District police officer. The court addresses the plausibility of each of plaintiff's allegations—and (c) the issue of causation—in turn.

a. Removal of students from classrooms

In his second amended complaint, plaintiff alleges the City defendants were deliberately indifferent to the need to train staff to identify and stop unauthorized personnel (i.e., Lellock) from removing students (i.e., plaintiff) from Middle School classrooms. In support, plaintiff alleges: (1) Lellock "was not even assigned specifically to [the Middle School]"; and (2) then-Middle School principal Zangaro "testified at [Lellock's] criminal trial that [Lellock] was not even authorized to remove a child from the classroom," yet Lellock did so repeatedly with impunity. (ECF No. 42 ¶¶ 22-23.)

At the January 19, 2016 hearing, plaintiff suggested:

Critically, however, plaintiff's second amended complaint does not include specific allegations of a student-removal policy applicable to the Middle School and promulgated by the City defendants.

For the reasons that follow, the allegations in plaintiff's second amended complaint fail to raise the plausible inference that "in light of the duties assigned to specific . . . [Middle School] employees," the "need for more or different training" to identify and stop unauthorized personnel, i.e., Lellock, from removing students from class "[was] so obvious," and the "inadequacy so likely to result in" the sexual assault of plaintiff and other students, that the City defendants can "reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need" for such training. Harris, 489 U.S. at 390.

The court finds L.R. v. School District of Philadelphia, 60 F.Supp.3d 584 (E.D. Pa. 2014), persuasive on this point. There, the district court found allegations of a "single-incident"-based failure to train claim plausible where a public school teacher released a kindergarten student from class to a woman without verifying the woman's identity or authority to remove the child. Id. at 586. Tragically, the woman abducted and sexually assaulted the child. Id. at 586-87. The child's parent filed suit against the school district alleging a "single-incident"-based § 1983 failure to train claim. Id. at 586, 599-601. In her complaint, the plaintiff in L.R. alleged the school district had a policy providing that

Id. at 587 (quoting the plaintiff's complaint). The plaintiff in L.R. alleged that by enacting such a policy, the school district conveyed its awareness of the likely risk of "`pupil abduction by unidentified individuals'" yet failed to train its employees on that policy, causing the child's constitutional injury. Id.

In ruling on the school district's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint, the district court in L.R. concluded that the plaintiff stated a plausible "single-incident"-based failure to train claim against the school district. Id. at 599-601. In so holding, the district court agreed with the plaintiff that by enacting the student-removal policy, the school district conveyed its awareness of the likely risk of abduction in releasing students to unidentified, unauthorized individuals, yet failed to train its staff on that policy, plausibly showing deliberate indifference to the child's rights:

Id. at 600-01.

In summary, the district court in L.R. found it plausible to infer that the school district knew students likely would be abducted if it failed to train staff about when, where, why, and to whom students could be released. The district court in L.R. reached this conclusion because the plaintiff alleged the school district enacted a student-removal policy specifically to prevent abduction. In light of the policy's specificity in substance and purpose—and allegations in the plaintiff's complaint that the school district failed to train its staff on that policy— the district court in L.R. found it plausible to infer deliberate indifference to the child's constitutional rights.

Unlike L.R., this court cannot plausibly infer that the City defendants knew students likely would be sexually assaulted by a school police officer (i.e., Lellock) if the City defendants failed to train Middle School staff about when, where, why, and to which School-District personnel students could be released from class. While plaintiff's allegations are arguably sufficient to imply negligence, they fail to show the requisite knowledge for this court to plausibly infer deliberate indifference on the part of the City defendants. The court cannot plausibly infer deliberate indifference because plaintiff fails to set forth factual allegations sufficient for this court to infer knowledge; for example, allegations that the City defendants had enacted a student-removal policy to prevent the sexual assault of students by School District personnel, including police officers like Lellock. Cf. L.R., 60 F. Supp. 3d at 600-01.

In L.R., the complaint alleged a specific school-district policy to prevent the abduction of students. As detailed above, although plaintiff argued that a student-removal policy existed in this case, plaintiff did not set forth factual allegations in his second amended complaint to that effect. Instead, plaintiff made only two vague allegations concerning the removal of students from Middle School classrooms by School District personnel, including police officers like Lellock. For related reasons, both of these allegations are insufficient to state a "single-incident" failure to train claim.

First, plaintiff alleges Lellock "was not even assigned specifically to [the Middle School]," yet he removed students from class with impunity. (ECF No. 42 ¶ 22.) Without supporting factual allegations, however, the court cannot plausibly infer that the City defendants knew that a policy was needed to stop School District police officers from sexually abusing students. Without factual allegations sufficient to imply knowledge, the court cannot plausibly infer that the City defendants knew students could be sexually assaulted if the City defendants failed to train staff to identify and stop School District personnel, including police officers like Lellock, who were not assigned to the Middle School, from removing students from class. While negligence may be inferable, plaintiff's allegation is insufficient for the court to plausibly infer deliberate indifference.

Second, plaintiff alleges then-Middle School principal Zangaro "testified at [Lellock's] criminal trial that [Lellock] was not even authorized to remove a child from the classroom," yet he did so with impunity. (Id. ¶ 23.) Again, absent supporting factual allegations, the court cannot plausibly infer that the City defendants knew that sexual abuse of students was likely if School District police officers were permitted to remove students from Middle School classrooms. Without allegations of such knowledge—like, for example, allegations of a policy like the one discussed in L.R.—the court cannot plausibly infer that the City defendants knew students likely would be sexually assaulted if the City defendants failed to train Middle School staff to identify unauthorized police officers and stop them from removing students from class. As the court stated in a similar case:

Jankowski v. Lellock, No. 13-194, 2013 WL 5945782, at *9 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 6, 2013) (quoting Douglas v. Brookville Area Sch. Dist., 836 F.Supp.2d 329, 362 (W.D. Pa. 2011)). This allegation, therefore, also fails to raise the plausible inference of deliberate indifference to plaintiff's rights.

For these reasons, plaintiff fails to plausibly allege "single-incident" liability premised upon the need to train staff to identify and stop unauthorized personnel, like Lellock, from removing students from Middle School classrooms.

b. Detecting and reporting signs of abuse

Plaintiff alleges the need for the City defendants to train Middle School staff to detect and report signs of sexual abuse of students by School District personnel was so obvious, and the lack of such training so likely to result in sexual abuse, that the City defendants' failure to provide this training was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff's rights. As detailed previously, plaintiff alleges:

Plaintiff's vague allegations fail to raise the plausible inference that the risk of sexual abuse of Middle School students by School District personnel, like Lellock, was "so obvious" to the City defendants in the late-1990s that their failure to provide training to detect and report such abuse was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff's rights. While negligence may be inferable, the court cannot plausibly infer from plaintiff's allegations that the City defendants knew sexual abuse of students by School District personnel, like Lellock, was likely. Plaintiff's second amended complaint lacks plausible allegations of knowledge, such as some official or unofficial policy or action by the City defendants through which they conveyed their awareness of the risk of sexual abuse of Middle School students by School District personnel during the time frame relevant to this case. Cf. L.R., 60 F. Supp. 3d at 600-01 (finding that a school district was deliberately indifferent to the risk of abduction where it conveyed its awareness of that specific risk by enacting a policy protecting against abduction). In the absence of plausible factual allegations that the City defendants "knew to a moral certainty," Harris, 489 U.S. at 390 n.10, that sexual abuse of students by School District personnel was a "`highly predictable consequence'" of their failure to train staff to detect and report such abuse, the court can infer only that the City defendants were negligent—not "deliberately indifferent" to plaintiff's rights—in failing to provide such training. Thomas, 749 F.3d at 225 (quoting Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1361).

Specifically, plaintiff alleges that "[i]n the [1990s], it was . . . widely known that school children were at risk of being sexually abused by school personnel." (ECF No. 42 ¶ 34.) Without supporting facts, this generalized allegation fails to provide information from which the court can infer matters such as if, how, and why sexual assault of students by school staff was a "widely[-]known" risk specifically to the City defendants during the time frame relevant to this case. This generalized allegation may support an inference of negligence on the part of the City defendants—but it does not plausibly support an inference of "deliberate indifference" to plaintiff's rights in failing to train staff to detect and report signs of sexual abuse.

Plaintiff alleges "the United States Department of Education issued guidelines [that] required all school boards and administrators to adopt appropriate policies, procedures, and training regimens to prevent child abuse and sexual misconduct in schools." (ECF No. 42 ¶ 34.) Plaintiff, however, fails to set forth allegations identifying or explaining the "guidelines" to which he refers. Consequently, the court must speculate whether these guidelines applied during the late-1990s to the City defendants, the Middle School, and the alleged misconduct at issue in this case, and whether the City defendants knew about the guidelines yet failed to act. Without supporting factual allegations, the court cannot plausibly infer that the risk of sexual abuse of Middle School students by School District personnel, like Lellock, was "so obvious" to the City defendants so as to rise to the level of "deliberate indifference" to plaintiff's rights merely because sexual-abuse guidelines were promulgated. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (observing that factual allegations must "permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct"). This allegation plausibly supports an inference of negligence; it does not, however, plausibly support an inference of deliberate indifference to plaintiff's rights, as required. Doe, 660 F.3d at 179 (quoting Harris, 489 U.S. at 388).

Plaintiff alleges that "[i]n most states, school personnel are mandatory reporters" with an "affirmative obligation to report suspicions of [child] abuse." (ECF No. 42 ¶ 34 (emphasis added).) Plaintiff, however, fails to allege that these "affirmative obligation[s]" applied to the City defendants and Middle School staff in Pennsylvania during the time frame relevant to this case. Without allegations of this nature, the court cannot plausibly infer that the risk of sexual abuse of Middle School students by School District personnel, like Lellock, was "so obvious" to the City defendants in the late-1990s so as to rise to the level of "deliberate indifference" to plaintiff's rights merely because "most states" enforce, or enforced, mandatory child-abuse reporting laws. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (observing that the plausibility standard "asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully"). This allegation plausibly supports an inference of negligence, not deliberate indifference to plaintiff's rights, as required. Doe, 660 F.3d at 179 (quoting Harris, 489 U.S. at 388).

Plaintiff alleges that "[g]iven what happened to [him], and numerous other students,3 it is clear that [the City defendants] failed to enact appropriate policies, procedures, and training regimens to address the known risk of sexual abuse faced by school children in their district." (ECF No. 42 at ¶ 36.) Plaintiff also alleges "schools across the country promulgated policies and procedures, and implemented training regimens, that assisted school personnel in identifying children who were exhibiting the signs and symptoms of abuse." (ECF No. 42 ¶ 35.) Plaintiff, however, fails to allege that the City defendants knew about these policies, procedures, and training regimens during the late-1990s, yet failed to take action to implement similar measures under circumstances demonstrating deliberate indifference to plaintiff's rights. In the absence of such allegations, the court cannot plausibly infer that the risk of sexual abuse of Middle School students by school staff, like Lellock, was "so obvious" to the City defendants merely because "schools across the country" implemented certain policies, procedures, and training regimens. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (observing that the plausibility standard "asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully"). Again, this allegation may show negligence, but it does not plausibly show "deliberate indifference" to plaintiff's rights, as required. Doe, 660 F.3d at 179 (quoting Harris, 489 U.S. at 388).

For the reasons discussed above, plaintiff fails to plausibly allege a "single-incident"-based failure to train claim premised upon the need to train staff to detect and report signs of sexual abuse of plaintiff by Lellock.

c. Causation

As stated previously, the plaintiff must allege facts from which the court can plausibly infer that the "`deficiency in training actually caused'" the constitutional violation at issue. Doe, 660 F.3d at 170 (quoting Harris, 489 U.S. at 391) (emphasis added).

While not dispositive to this Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, plaintiff's amended "single-incident"-based § 1983 failure to train claim suffers from the same causation deficiency the court identified in its prior Rule 12(b)(6) opinion— i.e., plaintiff alleges official misconduct two causal steps removed from the constitutional injury in issue. The court explains this issue in greater detail.

In its prior Rule 12(b)(6) opinion, this court observed that

Logan, 2015 WL 5971198, at *15 (emphasis added). The court recognized, however, that the typical § 1983 failure to train claim (including a "single-incident"-based claim) raises "`difficult problems of proof'" because it alleges official misconduct "`[one causal] step removed from the constitutional violation resulting from that failure [to train].'" Id. at *14 (quoting Brown, 520 U.S. at 406; Douglas, 836 F. Supp. 2d at 364). The following comparison between a general § 1983 Monell4 claim and a failure to train claim illustrates the difficulty of proving that a policymaker's failure to train caused a constitutional violation.

In the archetypal § 1983 Monell claim, government policymakers affirmatively implement policies or tacitly acquiesce to customs that directly cause the claimant's constitutional deprivation. In hypothetical terms, policymaker-"X" directly deprives citizen-"C" of her constitutional rights via a government policy or custom. In the archetypal Monell claim, therefore, there are no additional causal links between the policymaker's misconduct and the constitutional injury alleged; the policymaker directly causes the injury.

In the archetypal § 1983 failure to train claim, on the other hand, policymakers fail to equip subordinate government actors with the training necessary to avoid specific constitutional deprivations, and those subordinates directly cause the citizen's constitutional injury. In hypothetical terms, policymaker-"X" fails to train subordinate-"Y" who directly injures citizen-"C" as a result of the policymaker's failure to train. Because the policymaker's failure to train the subordinate indirectly causes the citizen's constitutional deprivation at the hands of that subordinate, the archetypal § 1983 failure to train claim renders the policymaker liable for official misconduct "[one causal] step removed" from the claimant's constitutional injury. Douglas, 836 F. Supp. 2d at 364. Because of this additional causal step between the policymaker's misconduct (i.e., the failure to train) and the constitutional injury alleged, "difficult problems of pro[ving]" that the official misconduct actually caused the injury arise.5 Brown, 520 U.S. at 406. Because of this single causal step, the Court has repeatedly expressed that a local government's "culpability for a deprivation of [constitutional] rights is . . . at its most tenuous" where a § 1983 claim turns on a failure to train. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1359 (stating courts must apply a "stringent standard of fault" when assessing § 1983 failure to train claims, lest liability "collapse into respondeat superior") (emphasis added); Brown, 520 U.S. at 405 (observing that "rigorous standards of culpability and causation must be applied" where a plaintiff alleges a local government "has not directly inflicted an injury" but "caused an employee to do so" through its failure to train); Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 822 (plurality opinion) (observing that a "policy" of "inadequate training" is "far more nebulous, and a good deal further removed from the constitutional violation, than was the policy in Monell.").

Factually, a "single-incident"-based § 1983 failure to train claim falls within the "one-causal-step" failure to train archetype. As this court explained previously, the Court offered

Logan, 2015 WL 5971198, at *17. In Harris' hypothetical, the policymaker fails to train the armed police officer (i.e., the subordinate) in the use of deadly force, and the police officer directly deprives the fleeing felon (i.e., the citizen) of his or her constitutional right. A "single-incident" claim stemming from Harris' hypothetical, therefore, alleges government misconduct one causal step removed from the constitutional injury in issue. While the Court in Harris posited that it is "obvious" policymakers must train armed police officers in the use of deadly force, this expansive language must be read in context with the narrow facts of Harris' "single-incident" hypothetical.

In this case, plaintiff's allegations extend beyond the facts of Harris' "single-incident" hypothetical to allege official misconduct through a failure to train two causal steps removed from the constitutional violation in issue. Specifically, plaintiff alleges the City defendants failed to train their teachers to detect, report, and prevent Lellock from sexually abusing Middle School students, including plaintiff. In hypothetical terms, therefore, plaintiff alleges policymakers (i.e., the City defendants) failed to train subordinates (i.e., teachers) to prevent a third-party (i.e., Lellock) from directly injuring a citizen (i.e., plaintiff). Such a theory attenuates further the already-attenuated causal chain between the policymaker's misconduct and the injury at issue in a failure to train claim. Given the Court's stringent standards of culpability and causation for failure to train claims alleging official misconduct merely one causal step removed from the injury, this court expresses doubt whether "single-incident" liability may be extended to failure to train claims alleging official misconduct two causal steps removed from the injury. Cf. Fla. Audubon Soc'y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 670 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("The greater number of uncertain links in a causal chain, the less likely it is that the entire chain will hold true.").

This court could not locate, and plaintiff (again) failed to point to, any binding authority extending Harris' "single-incident" liability in the attenuated circumstances at issue in this case.6 Other decisions express similar skepticism whether such an attenuated failure to train claim is ever cognizable under § 1983.7 In light of the Court's stringent standard for determining liability in "one-causal-step" § 1983 failure to train claims, this court reiterates its doubt whether Harris' "single-incident" framework extends to failure to train claims alleging official misconduct two causal steps removed from the injury.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth in this opinion, the court will grant the City defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss plaintiff's § 1983 "single-incident"-based failure to train claim—i.e., the only claim remaining against the City defendants in plaintiff's second amended complaint—without prejudice.

If plaintiff seeks to amend the complaint, he must file a motion to do so. If plaintiff fails to file a motion to amend the complaint within ninety days from the issuance of this opinion and accompanying order, the court will dismiss plaintiff's "single-incident"-based § 1983 failure to train claim against the City defendants with prejudice.

An appropriate order follows.