SANDRA J. FEUERSTEIN, District Judge.
Pending before the Court are the letter motions of pro se plaintiff Bryan Henry ("plaintiff"), dated March 28, 2016 and April 9, 2016, respectively, (1) seeking, inter alia, to re-open discovery to compel defendants to provide proper and complete responses to his discovery demands and to reconsider an order, entered March 10, 2016, extending the deadline for filing dispositive motions in this case to May 9, 2016; and, (2) in essence, objecting to an order of the Honorable Arlene R. Lindsay, United States Magistrate Judge, dated March 30, 2016, denying as moot his motion to compel defendants to respond to his discovery requests.
On December 30, 2013, plaintiff filed, inter alia, a civil rights complaint in this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983") against the County of Nassau ("the County") and thirteen (13) "John Doe" defendants, subsequently identified as Michael J. Sposato, Sheriff for the Nassau County Correctional Center ("NCCC"); Corporal Gulliksen ("Cpl. Gulliksen"), corporal for Dorm E2C of the NCCC on December 27, 2010; Correction Officer Collins ("C.O. Collins"), Shield No. 2265, correction officer for Dorm E2C of the NCCC on December 27, 2010; Corporal Marciano ("Cpl. Marciano"), corporal for the Satellite Building Dorm EIF of the NCCC on October 2, 2011; Correction Officer Grier, Shield No. 2226; Correction Officer McGuinness, Shield No. 121; Sergeant Drake, Shield No. 100; Correction Officer Teves, Shield No. 2460; Correction Officer Ley, Shield No. 2421; Captain Dennis Hesse, s/h/a the Deputy Sheriff of Security for the NCCC; Correction Officer Shearin ("C.O. Shearin"), Shield No. 2997, correction officer for the Satellite Building Dorm EIF of the NCCC; James Ford, Commissioner of the NCCC; Correction Officer Peletier, Shield No. 2513; Sergeant Krueger ("Sgt. Krueger"); Sergeant Tobin ("Sgt. Tobin"); Correction Officer Terry-Clarke ("C.O. Terry-Clarke"); and Correction Officer Camidge ("C.O. Camidge"), Shield No. 2394, all in their individual and official capacities (collectively, "defendants").
By Order dated May 13, 2015, defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's Section 1983 claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was granted to the extent that plaintiff's Section 1983 claims against Cpl. Gulliksen, C.O. Collins, Cpl. Marciano and C.O. Shearin were dismissed in their entirety with prejudice for failure to state a claim for relief, and plaintiff's Section 1983 claim seeking punitive damages against the County was dismissed in its entirety with prejudice for failure to state a claim for relief, and the motion was otherwise denied.
During a conference before me on July 8, 2015, I, inter alia, referred all outstanding discovery to Magistrate Judge Lindsay
On that same date, Magistrate Judge Lindsay entered a scheduling order providing, in relevant part,
(DE 43) (emphasis omitted). In addition, the scheduling order, inter alia, directed that dispositive motions "be served and filed in accordance with the District Judge's rules on or before March 9, 2016," (id.) (emphasis omitted); and indicated that the dates set forth therein "will not be adjourned absent approval from the District Court Judge, who has scheduled a Pretrial Conference for May 11, 2016." (Id.)
By letter dated December 16, 2015, more than five (5) months after Magistrate Judge Lindsay issued the scheduling order requiring the parties to serve their interrogatories and/or document demands "immediately," plaintiff (a) indicated, inter alia, that he had served a Request for Interrogatories and the Production of Documents upon defendants on December 9, 2015 and that he intended to serve a Request for Admissions upon defendants no later than December 23, 2015; and (b) requested a forty-five (45) day extension of the discovery deadline. (DE 53). Plaintiff did not provide any explanation for his delay in serving his discovery requests upon defendants until twenty-seven (27) days before the discovery deadline.
By Order dated December 28, 2015, plaintiff's application for an extension of the discovery deadline was denied. Thereafter, plaintiff filed a motion, dated January 15, 2015, i.e., ten (10) days after the expiration of the deadline for the completion of all discovery, seeking to compel defendants to respond to his Request for Interrogatories and the Production of Documents. (DE 54).
Notwithstanding the close of discovery, by letter dated February 1, 2016, defendants requested a thirty (30)-day extension of time to respond to plaintiff's discovery demands and motion to compel on the basis, inter alia, that they had not received plaintiff's Request for Interrogatories and the Production of Documents until December 11, 2015, less than thirty (30) days prior to the close of discovery, and that "[p]laintiff's discovery request contain[ed] one hundred sixty eight [sic] (168) demands" and was voluminous. (DE 55). By Order dated February 9, 2016, inter alia, defendants' application was granted.
By letter dated March 2, 2016, defendants opposed plaintiff's motion to compel on the grounds, inter alia, that the number of interrogatories posed by plaintiff were "far in excess of the amount permitted by statute (Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 33(a))[,]" and that, in any event, plaintiff's motion to compel was moot because they had nonetheless served him "with responses to all one hundred sixty eight [sic] (168) demands and additional documentation which is not privileged and responsive to said demands." (DE 57). Plaintiff did not serve or file a response to defendants' objections to his discovery requests, or otherwise object to defendants' discovery responses, within fifteen (15) days of receiving them,
On March 9, 2016, defendants requested a sixty (60)-day extension of time "to commence summary judgment" on the grounds, inter alia, that their counsel "requires sworn affidavits from Nassau County Sheriff's Department personnel with knowledge of particular and essential facts relevant to [their] motion" since plaintiff did take any depositions of defendants; and that "[d]ue to [their] counsel's work schedule[,] coordinating such a meeting has been difficult." (DE 59). By Order dated March 10, 2016, inter alia, defendants' application was granted to that extent that "any party may file a fully-briefed motion for summary judgment in accordance with my individual rules on or before May 9, 2016."
By letter motion dated March 28, 2016, and received by the Court on April 4, 2016, plaintiff requested, inter alia, (1) that discovery be re-opened "solely in respect the to [sic] demands filed prior to the Discovery deadline — as they are not moot;" and (2) that I reconsider the March 10, 2016 Order granting the parties an extension of time to file dispositive motions and proceed with a final pretrial conference "based on the defendants [sic] mischaracterization of fulfilling their Discovery obligations." (DE 66). Attached to plaintiff's letter motion are his objections to defendants' responses to his discovery demands. (Id.)
By Order dated March 30, 2016, i.e., twenty-eight (28) days after defendants served plaintiff with their discovery responses, Magistrate Judge Lindsay denied plaintiff's motion to compel as moot, finding that plaintiff "ha[d] not opposed" defendants' March 2, 2016 letter indicating that they had served him with responses to all discovery requests and requesting that his motion to compel be denied as moot. (DE 62).
By letter dated April 13, 2016, defendants opposed plaintiff's motion to re-open discovery on the grounds, inter alia, (1) that to the extent plaintiff's motion seeks to compel responses to his Requests for Admission, the motion "is untimely, commenced on the eve of dispositive motion practice, unduly burdensome, not likely to lead to admissible evidence, and was waived due to Plaintiff's failure to include [his Requests for Admission] . . . in [his] prior motion to compel[;]" (2) that, in any event, that branch of plaintiff's motion is moot because defendants have nonetheless served responses to plaintiff's Requests for Admission; (3) that in addition to responding to all of plaintiff's discovery demands, defendants, more than three and a half ( 3 ½) months ago, "turned over Plaintiff's inmate file prior to the close of discovery consisting of approximately four hundred eight [sic] five (485) pages of documents . . . [;]" and (4) that plaintiff's motion "is nothing more than an attempt to circumvent dispositive motion practice in order for [him] to proceed directly to trial." (DE 67).
By letter motion dated April 9, 2016, and received by the Court on April 18, 2016, plaintiff, in essence, objects to Magistrate Judge Lindsay's March 30, 2016 Order denying his motion to compel defendants to respond to his Request for Interrogatories and the Production of Documents as moot on the basis, inter alia, that "it appears to be absent any mention or consideration of [his] March 28
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) permits a district judge to "designate a magistrate judge to hear and determine any [nondispositive] pretrial matter," not otherwise expressly excluded therein. Any party may serve and file objections to a magistrate judge's order on a nondispositive pretrial matter within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). Upon consideration of any timely interposed objections and "reconsider[ation]" of the magistrate judge's order, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), the district judge must modify or set aside any part of the order that "is clearly erroneous or contrary to law." Id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). A party may not assign as error any defect in a magistrate judge's order to which he has not timely objected. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a).
Plaintiff has not demonstrated that any part of Magistrate Judge Lindsay's March 30, 2016 Order denying his motion to compel is clearly erroneous or contrary to law. Since plaintiff's March 28, 2016 letter motion was not received by the Court until April 4, 2016, four (4) days after Magistrate Judge Lindsay issued the Order, she did not err in failing to consider it. Moreover, Magistrate Judge Lindsay did not issue the March 30, 2016 Order until approximately nine (9) days after the expiration of the fifteen (15)-day period set in her scheduling order for opposing an adversary's responses to discovery demands.
In any event, upon review of plaintiff's discovery requests, defendants' responses thereto, plaintiff's objections to defendants' responses, and all motion papers, I find defendants' responses to plaintiff's discovery demands to be adequate and complete. Accordingly, (1) upon reconsideration of Magistrate Judge Lindsay's March 30, 2016 order, plaintiff's motion to compel is denied; and (2) plaintiff's motion seeking to re-open discovery and to reconsider the March 10, 2016 Order are denied.
For the reasons set forth herein, plaintiff's objections to Magistrate Judge Lindsay's March 30, 2016 Order, (DE 68), are overruled and plaintiff's motions, (DE 54 and 66), are denied in their entirety. In light of this determination, the telephone conference scheduled to be held before me on April 26, 2016 is canceled. Pursuant to Rule 77(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Clerk of the Court shall serve notice of entry of this order upon all parties as provided by Rule 5(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and record such service on the docket.
The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of any appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45, 82 S.Ct. 917, 8 L. Ed. 2d 21 (1962).
SO ORDERED.
