Filed: Oct. 08, 2003
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: medical malpractice tribunal under Mass. Gen. L. c 231 § 60B.1, Contrary to the suggestions of the hospitals, this does not, appear to be a case in which the plaintiffs claim challenges a, medical decision but attempts to evade the statute by suing on, other than a malpractice theory.
Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
Citation Limited Pursuant to 1st Cir. Loc. R. 32.3
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 02-1918
STEPHEN P. KNIGHT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
BROCKTON HOSPITAL; THE ARBOUR HOSPITAL,
Defendants-Appellees,
CITY OF BROCKTON; CITY OF BOSTON, Police Department;
BROCKTON POLICE DEPARTMENT,
Defendants.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Edward F. Harrington, Senior U. S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Circuit Judge,
Stapleton,* Senior Circuit Judge,
and Howard, Circuit Judge.
Malcolm J. Barach, for appellant.
Daniel J. Buoniconti, for appellee, Brockton Hospital.
Janet J. Bobit, with whom Jeffrey W. Coleman was on the brief,
for appellee, The Arbour Hospital.
October 8, 2003
* Of the Third Circuit, sitting by designation.
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge. Appellant Stephen Knight asks
us to determine whether the claims he asserts were properly
referred to a medical malpractice tribunal under Massachusetts Law,
Chapter 231, § 60B. We hold that they were not and, therefore,
reverse and remand for further proceedings.
I.
The complaint alleges that the police entered Knight’s
home without a warrant, sprayed mace in his eyes, and took him to
Appellee Brockton Hospital. There, he was examined and transferred
to Appellee Arbour Hospital, where he was “confined for some 21
days without legal justification and without his consent.”
Based on these factual allegations, Knight asserts claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Massachusetts law against both
hospitals, the city of Brockton, and its police department. These
include an illegal search and seizure claim, an invasion of privacy
claim, a false imprisonment claim, an assault and battery claim,
and a claim based on Massachusetts’s involuntary civil commitment
statute, Mass. Gen. L. c 123.
The Appellee hospitals moved to have the case referred to
the Massachusetts Superior Court for the purpose of convening a
medical malpractice tribunal under Mass. Gen. L. c 231 § 60B. Over
Knight’s objection, this motion was granted and a tribunal was
convened. Knight declined to submit evidence to this tribunal,
however, and the Superior Court decided in favor of the hospitals
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for that reason and, pursuant to the statute, directed Knight to
post a $6,000 bond. Based on Knight’s failure to post a bond, the
district court entered judgment in favor of the hospitals under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). This appeal followed.
II.
Under Massachusetts law, “[e]very action for malpractice,
error or mistake against a provider of health care shall be heard
by a tribunal consisting of a single justice of the superior court,
a physician licensed to practice medicine in the commonwealth . .
. and an attorney authorized to practice law in the commonwealth.
. . .” Mass. Gen. L. ch. 231, § 60B. “The function of a medical
malpractice tribunal is to separate medical malpractice claims into
two groups: those appropriate for judicial evaluation, and those
involving merely an unfortunate medical error” Millian v. Deaconess
Waltham Hosp., 2001 Mass. Super LEXIS 450, *7 (Mass. Super. 2001).
“[A] tribunal . . . evaluate[s] only the medical aspects of a
malpractice claim for the purpose of distinguishing between” those
types of cases. Salem Orthopedic Surgeons., Inc. v. Quinn, 386
N.E.2d 1268, 1272 (Mass. 1979). “The tribunal procedure,
therefore, is appropriate only where there is an issue of medical
malpractice, error or mistake.” Leininger v. Franklin Medical
Center,
534 N.E.2d 1151, 1152 (Mass. 1989) (quotation omitted and
emphasis in original).
Knight insists that he is not complaining about “medical
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malpractice, error or mistake” and the hospitals are unable to
point to any allegation in the complaint that is contrary to this
assertion. Rather, they suggest that if Knight were required to be
more specific, it would be apparent that he is challenging a
medical decision. While that may turn out to be the case, the
hospitals did not move to dismiss for failure to state a claim or
for a more definite statement. A plaintiff is entitled to
determine what claims he wishes to have adjudicated and until it
affirmatively appears that a claim involves a challenge to a
medical decision or treatment, a medical malpractice tribunal
convened under the Massachusetts statute has no jurisdiction.
Leininger, 534 N.E.2d at 1152.1 Accordingly, this matter must be
remanded to the district court.
We do not, of course, suggest that a referral to a
medical malpractice tribunal will not be appropriate if it
subsequently appears that one of Knight’s state law claims presents
a medical issue. Feinstein v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 643
F.2d 880 (1st Cir. 1981) (when a federal district court is
exercising its diversity jurisdiction, the Rules of Decision Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1652, requires it to apply the Massachusetts medical
malpractice statute). To the extent the district court is
1
Contrary to the suggestions of the hospitals, this does not
appear to be a case in which the plaintiff’s claim challenges a
medical decision but attempts to evade the statute by suing on
other than a malpractice theory.
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confronted on remand with an argument that one of Knight’s claims
under § 1983 should be submitted to such a tribunal, we do suggest
that it determine whether the Massachusetts statute was intended to
apply to such claims and whether it would be constitutional if so
applied.
III.
The judgments of the district court are reversed, and
this matter is remanded to that court for proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
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