ORDER

RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, District Judge:

The Court is in receipt of the attached joint letter, dated July 17, 2013, from Plaintiff, Defendant Midland Funding, LLC ("Midland"); Defendants Peter T. Roach & Associates, P.C., Peter T. Roach, and Timothy J. Murtha (the "Roach Defendants"); and non-party Eltman, Eltman & Cooper, P.C. ("EEC"), regarding EElC's claim of privilege over (1) its collection agreement with Midland and (2) a document it identifies as the "MCM Firm Manual." Plaintiff argues that those documents are relevant to the Roach Defendants' bona fide error defense. The Roach Defendants do not dispute Plaintiffs assertion — indeed, they appear to concede that the sought after documents are relevant to its defense — but counter that the attorney-client privilege between Midland and EEC shields the documents from discovery.

It is well-established that "[t]he burden is on the party claiming the protection of a privilege to establish those facts that are essential to the elements of the privileged relationship." von Bulow by Auersperg v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 144 (2d Cir.1987) (internal quotation marks omitted). To carry its burden, a party must "show by affidavit or other competent evidence sufficient facts to bring the disputed documents within the confines of the privilege." United States v. Davis, 131 F.R.D. 391, 402 (S.D.N.Y.1990). "[M]ere conclusory or ipse dixit assertions," therefore;, are insufficient. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Jan. 4, 1984, 750 F.2d 223, 225 (2d Cir.1984) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, neither the Defendants nor EEC establishes that any privilege applies to the collection agreement or firm manual. EEC's privilege log asserts the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine only in conclusory terms, and the mere fact that in-house counsel may have drafted the manual does not establish that it is indeed privileged work product. Cf. Davis, 131 F.R.D. at 402 ("[I]n-house counsel's law degree and office are not to be used to create a privileged sanctuary for corporate records." (internal quotation marks omitted)). The more fundamental point, though, is that the documents Plaintiff seeks are not privileged. "[A] long and unbroken line of cases in this Circuit have established that `in the absence of special circumstances client identity and fee arrangements do not fall within the attorneyclient privilege because they are not the kinds of disclosures that would not have been made absent the privilege and their disclosure does not incapacitate the attorney from rendering legal advice.'" Torres v. Toback, Bernstein & Reiss, LLP, 278 F.R.D. 321, 322 (E.D.N.Y.2012) (quoting Vingelli v. United States, 992 F.2d 449, 452 (2d Cir.1993)). Similarly, numerous cases under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act have required disclosure of manuals regarding collection practices and procedures. See, e.g., Pullen v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, No. 02 Civ. 647(DJS), 2002 WL 32864712, at *4-5 (D.Conn. Oct. 17, 2002); Kimbro v. I.C. Sys., Inc., No. 01 Civ. 1676(DJS), 2002 WL 1816820, at *3 (D.Conn. July 22, 2002); Yancey v. Hooten, 180 F.R.D. 203, 213 (D.Conn.1998).

Because neither Defendants nor EEC has established that the documents Plaintiff seeks are privileged, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT EEC shall produce those documents to Plaintiff by July 29, 2013.

SO ORDERED.

The undersigned represents Plaintiff in this Fair Debt Collection Practices Act case.

Plaintiffs View:

Plaintiff seeks to enforce its June 4, 2013 subpoena to against Eltman, Eltman, & Cooper ("EEC"), the law firm that the Midland Defendants 1 forwarded the vacated judgment against Ms. Khan for execution. EEC in turn forwarded the account to the Roach Defendants2 for execution. Attached as Exhibit A is the list of documents that were subpoenaed. On June 25, 2013, EEC served a letter seeking a promotion conference to file a motion to quash the subpoena. EEC moved to quash the subpoena because EEC argued the documents were (1) protected by the attorney client and workproduct privileges, (2) not relevant given Plaintiffs settlement with Midland, (3) would disclose "proprietary information in Eltman's possession from Midland", and (4) were "unnecessarily broad and completely irrelevant to the issues herein." On June 27, 2013, Your Honor issued an order [DE 34] stating:

On July 1, 2013, EEC served the privilege log attached as Exhibit B. The documents at issue are the (1) collection agreement between Midland and EEC and (2) a document EEC identifies as the "MCM Firm Manual." EEC objects to producing these documents because it contains "proprietary information." In response to this letter, both Midland and EEC contend the documents are not relevant. However, EEC already argued in its June 27, 2013 letter that the arguments that the documents are proprietary or irrelevant, but EEC lost that argument when the court ordered EEC to produce "any non-privileged documents" responsive to the subpoena. That position should not be allowed to be re-litigated.

EEC makes blanket objections to "attorney client communication" and "workprodu3t," but does not provide a privilege log with enough specificity to address the objections. Plaintiff does not know what is meant by the "MCM Firm Manual," and the privilege log does not provide enough specific information to allow Plaintiff to understand much less challenge the designation. However, courts in FDCPA actions routinely order the production of various collection manuals.3

As to the issue of the collection agreement between Midland and EEC, courts routinely order the production of collection agreements with debt collection law firms.4 Even if the contract between Midland and EEC were more along the lines of a retainer agreement than a collection agreement, retainer agreements are not privileged.5 The collection agreements are relevant, if for no other reason, than to delineate the responsibilities of the parties in exchanging information, the information required to be shared, and whether a party explicitly disclaims reliance upon the information provided by another party. A standard provision of a collection agreement is a "representation and warranties" section that either expressly makes, is silent upon, or affirmatively disclaims representations as to the accuracy of the information. If the collection agreement between Midland and EEC disclaims warranties and representations, then the Roach Defendants — who apparently were the agents of both Midland and EEC — would lose any claim to a bona fide error defense that they had no reason to know that the judgment they were executing upon was vacated.6 Apparently the MCM Firm Manual is responsive to subpoena item # 1 (the contracts governing the collection of the subject debt). In that case, the Manual is directly relevant for the same reasons the collection agreement is.

If there is any concern about confidentiality, EEC could designate the documents as confidential under the stipulated protective order. EEC has already agreed to produce its collection agreement with the Roach Defendants under the terms of the protective order.

Defendant Midland's View:

Midland has a retainer agreement that it uses when it retains counsel. The retainer agreement is confidential and Midland takes the position that the content of the retainer agreement is privileged. More significantly, the production of this document is entirely irrelevant to the allegations in the Complaint. Significantly, Midland has settled with the Plaintiff and is no longer a party to this action. The purpose of the settlement was to bring this litigation to an end with respect to Midland.

There is no colorable reason for why Midland should be compelled to produce its retainer agreement with Eltman in a suit between Roach (with whom Midland has no contractual relationship) and Plaintiff.

As to Midland's training and compliance manuals provided to Eltman, Midland asserts that these manuals are proprietary and privileged. The manuals are prepared and approved by legal counsel at Midland and consist of work product. The manuals are the property of Midland, the client, and were provided to Eltman, Midland's attorneys. Midland is not inclined to waive its protections.

Again, Midland provided no manuals to Defendant Roach. Midland is not a party to this action and the manuals are utterly irrelevant to the claims asserted by Plaintiff against Roach. Therefore, Midland does not waive attorney-client privilege and is not amenable to production of such documents through a protective order as Midland is not a party to this action and these documents are entirely irrelevant to the present claims in this litigation.

Defendant Roach's View:

We represent Defendants Peter T. Roach & Associates, P.C. Peter T. Roach, Esq. and Timothy J. Murtha, Esq. (collectively, the "Roach Defendants") and nonparty Eltman, Eltman & Cooper, P.C. ("EEC") in this action. On June 27, 2013, the Court ordered EEC to disclose responsive documents to the Subpoena served upon it by Plaintiff and to produce a privilege log with respect to documents it deemed privilege. EEC produced such documents on July 1, 2013 and a privilege log. A copy of the privilege log is enclosed herewith.

Notwithstanding the privilege log, EEC has agreed to disclose the Service Provider Master Agreement between EEC and the Roach Defendants pursuant to an executed stipulation and protective order. However, with respect to the Defendant Midland Credit Management, Inc.'s ("Midland Credit") contract with EEC and its firm manual, neither EEC nor Roach can produce such documents because Midland Credit has asserted the attorney-client privilege as well as work product and proprietary information doctrines. Given this assertion, EEC and the Roach Defendants must preserve client confidentiality. Midland Credit retained EEC as its attorney with respect to the collection of its accounts and, thus, EEC cannot disclose these documents given Midland Credit's assertion of privilege. In addition, the contract between Midland Credit and EEC contains confidentiality provisions that preclude EEC from disclosure to any other individual or entity.

As stated in our letter to the Court, dated June 25, 2013, EEC's duties included but were not limited to, handling and resolving debtor disputes as well as prosecuting and/or defending actions, suits or proceedings before any court, arbitrator, or governmental agency. Therefore, communications between Midland and EEC are protected by the attorney-client privilege and EEC's handling of Plaintiffs account also implicates the work-product doctrine. Communications between Midland and any of EEC's agents or subcontractors, including the Roach Defendants, are also protected because the attorneyclient privilege "extends to communications of `one serving as an agent of either attorney or client.'" Hudson Ins. Co. v. Oppenheim, 72 A.D.3d 489, 490, 899 N.Y.S.2d 29 (1st Dept.2010) (quoting Robert V. Straus Prods, v. Pollard 289 A.D.2d 130, 131, 734 N.Y.S.2d 170 (2001)). Plaintiff attempts to hinge the Roach Defendants' defenses to the contract between EEC and Midland. This is a red herring; even to the extent that the Roach Defendants' defenses are predicated upon such contract, the law recognizes that as an agent of EEC, the Roach Defendants are bound by assertions of privilege and/or confidentiality by Midland.

Finally, we note that in light of the settlement between Plaintiff and the Midland Defendants, there is simply no basis for the production of the contract between EE1C and Midland. The issue in this case is simple: whether EEC and the Roach Defendants knew that the 2006 Judgment against Plaintiff had been vacated when they proceeded to file the Income Execution. That issue can be established without the need for contracts, agreements or other private, confidential or proprietary information that do not relate to Plaintiffs account.

CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE

I certify that I attempted to resolve the matters raised by way of this letter without the necessity of court involvement, but those attempts failed.

Exhibit A

            AKJTAR KHAN v. MIDLAND FUNDING, LLR, et al. (12-CV-08462-RJS)

                Non-party Eltman, Eltman & Cooper, P.C. privilege log

 Batestamped Range             Document                        Privilege Reason

EEC 00001-EEC 0010      EEC Account information           Redacted for privacy reasons
                                                          information belongs to other
                                                          debtors

EEC 00020-EEC 00031     Agreement between Eltman,         Attorney Client
                        Eltman & Cooper, P.C and          Communication; Confidentiality
                        Peter T. Roach & Associates,      provision in agreement
                        P.C. dated March 30, 2011

EEC 00032-EEC 00054     Agreement between Midland         Attorney Client Communication;
                        and Eltman, Eltman & Cooper,      Confidentiality provision
                        P.C. dated September 17. 2010     in agreement; contains
                                                          proprietary information

EEC 00055-EEC 00248     CM Firm Manual dated April        Attorney Client Communication/Work
                        22, 2013                          Product; contains
                                                          propriety information