MARGO K. BRODIE, District Judge.
Plaintiff Stephanie Holloman, proceeding pro se, commenced the above-captioned action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the "Commissioner") denying her claim for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits under the Social Security Act (the "SSA"). (Compl., Docket Entry No. 1.) The Commissioner moves for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that Administrative Law Judge Ifeoma Iwumandi (the "ALJ") correctly found that Plaintiff was not disabled. (Comm'r Mot. for J. on the Pleadings ("Comm'r Mot."), Docket Entry No. 17; Comm'r Mem. of Law in Supp. of Comm'r Mot. ("Comm'r Mem."), Docket Entry No. 18.) Plaintiff opposes the Commissioner's motion. (Pl. Letter in Opp. ("Pl. Opp'n"), Docket Entry No. 16.) For the reasons discussed below, the Court denies the Commissioner's motion for judgment on the pleadings and remands the case for further proceedings consistent with this Memorandum and Order.
Plaintiff was born in 1968. (Certified Admin. Record ("R.") 30, Docket Entry No. 8.) From 2002 through 2004, Plaintiff worked at BJ's Wholesale Club, Target, and Trader's Joes. (R. 46-47.) Plaintiff subsequently worked as a security guard at Building Star and then as a custodian at Amityville Union Free School. (R. 47.)
In 2010, Plaintiff relocated to South Carolina after her father's death to help her mother. (R. 48.) While cleaning her mother's home, Plaintiff began having back pain and complained to her mother about the pain. (R. 48.) Plaintiff had difficulty moving. (R. 48.) Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff was unable to work because of her back pain. (R. 49.)
In 2014, Plaintiff's son passed away. (R. 49.) Plaintiff attended weekly therapy sessions to cope with her son's death. (R. 49.) She also took medication to help her cope with depression. (R. 49.) Her son's death was another reason Plaintiff was unable to work. (R. 49.)
On July 9, 2013, Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits and social security income, asserting that she had been disabled since June 1, 2011, due to back problems, asthma, hypertension, heart problems, and anxiety. (R. 385-97, 422, 426.) On October 2, 2013, Plaintiff's application was denied. (R. 222.) Upon reconsideration, Plaintiff's denial was pheld. (R. 227.) Plaintiff requested a hearing before an administrative law judge. (R. 231-33.) She appeared with counsel at the administrative hearing, which began on March 5, 2015, and continued on February 12, 2016 and August 18, 2016. (R. 40-156.) After the hearing, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled. (R. 10-39.) On July 15, 2017, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review, making the ALJ's decision the Commissioner's final decision. (R. 1-6.) Plaintiff filed a timely appeal with the Court.
Plaintiff testified that she cannot walk more than one and a half blocks in distance or more than a half hour at a time because of her back pain. (R. 53.) She is limited to standing and sitting for about half an hour each. (R. 53, 88, 90-91.) Plaintiff can lift a purse, but not a gallon of water or a bag of potatoes. (R. 54, 91.) She cannot reach overhead, but can reach in other directions, and she does not have difficulty grasping objects. (R. 54-55.) Plaintiff can drive, but only drives to her medical appointments. (R. 58.)
Plaintiff testified that she feels back pain "all the time." (R. 50-51.) She receives physical therapy, but it does not help. (R. 51.) Plaintiff was receiving injections to relieve the pain, but stopped receiving them because she is asthmatic. (R. 51.)
On February 12, 2016, Dr. John Schosheim, a psychiatrist, testified as a medical expert at Plaintiff's hearing. (R. 144-47, 987.) Dr. Schosheim reviewed the record and opined that Plaintiff has no impairments in performing activities of daily living or in social functioning, and only a mild to moderate impairment in maintaining concentration, persistence, and pace. (R. 145.)
On August 18, 2016, Dale Pasculli, a certified rehabilitation counselor, testified as a vocational expert ("VE"). (R. 64-67, 539-40.) The ALJ asked the VE the following question:
(R. 65-66.) The VE identified two jobs that this hypothetical individual could perform, each existing in significant numbers in the national economy: (1) "addresser" and (2) "polisher, eye glass frames." (R. 66-67.)
The Court has reviewed the non-medical and medical evidence contained in the record, and provides a brief summary of the medical evidence relevant to this Memorandum and Order.
On September 23, 2013, Plaintiff met with Dr. Sanjay Kumar, M.D., an internist at Carolina Medical Center, for a vocational rehabilitation examination. (R. 736-37.) Plaintiff complained of asthma, anxiety, hypertension, diabetes, and intermittent back pain. (R. 736-37.) Dr. Kumar assessed that Plaintiff could do basic work related activities with no limitations in sitting, standing, walking, lifting, carrying, or handling objects. (R. 737.)
On January 9, 2014, Dr. Jean Smolka, M.D., a state agency medical consultant, reviewed Plaintiff's medical record and concluded that Plaintiff could occasionally lift and carry fifty pounds and frequently lift and carry twenty-five pounds. (R. 198.) Dr. Smolka further stated that Plaintiff could occasionally climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds, kneel and craw, and could frequently climb ramps and stairs, stoop, and crouch. (R. 198-99.)
On October 14, 2014, Plaintiff visited Saint John's Episcopal Hospital ("St. John's") outpatient clinic complaining of back pain. (R. 905.) Plaintiff had been experiencing an increase in back pain as she walked, and felt numbness and tingling when sitting for long periods of time. (R. 905.) An examination of Plaintiff's back revealed a decreased range of motion and pain on palpation. (R. 905.) X-rays of Plaintiff's lumbar and thoracic spine, taken the same day, were unremarkable. (R. 911-12.)
On November 11, 2014, Plaintiff again went to St. John's complaining of back pain. (R. 906-07.) Plaintiff reported that her back pain had gotten worse since her car accident in 1995. (R. 906.) On a scale of one to ten, Plaintiff rated her back pain level as fifteen. (R. 906.) The attending doctor ordered an MRI of Plaintiff's lumbar spine. (R. 906.)
A progress note dated December 2, 2014 states that the MRI indicated degenerative changes at L5-S1, with a post-annular tear, a disc bulge without mass effect on the existing nerve roots, and no significant stenosis. (R. 907.) The MRI also showed a disc bulge at L4-L5 touching the existing L4 nerve root, as well as facet arthropathy with mild narrowing of the canal. (R. 907.) On January 14, 2015, an electromyogram and nerve conduction (EMG/NCS) study revealed L3-L4, L4-L5, and S1 radiculopathy. (R. 800-03, 998-1000.)
On February 24, 2015, Plaintiff returned to St. John's Orthopedics Department to follow up on the results of her MRI and EMG/NCS. (R. 908-09.) An examination revealed that Plaintiff had lower back pain on palpation and with extension, flexion, and rotation. (R. 908.) The pain also radiated to Plaintiff's legs. (R. 908-09.) Plaintiff was instructed to continue physical therapy. (R. 909.) A diagnosis of fibromyalgia was ruled out. (R. 909.)
On March 6, 2015, Dr. Robert Limani noted that x-rays of Plaintiff's thoracic spine indicated multiple small disc bulges, but no evidence of significant spinal stenosis. (R. 901.)
On December 1, 2015, at a follow-up visit at St. John's, progress notes indicate lumbar tenderness and range of motion limited by pain. (R. 986.) The doctor assessed fibromyalgia and recommended Plaintiff for pain management. (R. 986.)
On February 3, 2016, Maria Rodriguez, M.D., an internist at the Addabbo Family Health Center, completed forms on behalf of Plaintiff for the New York City Human Resources Administration and indicated that Plaintiff would be unable to work for at least twelve months. (R. 990-92.) Dr. Rodriguez diagnosed Plaintiff with thoraco-lumbar neuritis, hypertension, and asthma. (R. 991.) Dr. Rodriguez reviewed Plaintiff's MRI and found degeneration of L5-S1, with post-annular tear; disc bulge without mass effect on existing nerve root; no significant stenosis; and L4-L5 degenerative bulge with mild narrowing of canal. (R. 991.)
On March 7, 2016, Dr. Chaim Shtock conducted a consultative neurological examination of Plaintiff. (R. 1010-21.) Plaintiff complained of lower back pain that radiated upward, with an episodic tingling sensation in her left leg. (R. 1010.) She needed no help changing for the examination or getting on and off the examining table, and, with some difficulty, was able to rise from a chair. (R. 1010.) Dr. Shtock also reviewed X-rays of Plaintiff's lumbar spine, taken March 9, 2016, and prior diagnostic studies, including Plaintiff's MRI and EMG/NCS reports. (R. 1013-15.) Dr. Shtock opined that Plaintiff had moderate limitations with heavy lifting, kneeling, crouching, and frequent bending. (R. 1013.) She had moderate-to-marked limitations for squatting, and mild-to-moderate limitations with frequent stair climbing, walking long distances, standing for long periods, and sitting for long periods. (R. 1013.) He also concluded that Plaintiff had mild limitations performing overhead activities and fine and gross manual activities (with both arms and hands). (R. 1013.)
Dr. Shtock completed a questionnaire in which he stated that Plaintiff could frequently lift and carry up to ten pounds. (R. 1016.) In an eight-hour workday, Plaintiff could sit for four hours, stand for two hours, and walk for two hours. (R. 1017.) Dr. Shtock also stated that Plaintiff could frequently use her arms and hands for reaching, handling, fingering, feeling, pushing, and pulling. (R. 1018.) Dr. Shtock noted that Plaintiff could occasionally climb ladders and scaffolds, and could frequently climb stairs and ramps, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. (R. 1019.)
On March 15, 2016, Plaintiff met with Hiroyuki Yoshihara, M.D., at SUNY Downstate Medical Center, complaining of back pain. (R. 1031, 1033.) Plaintiff reported that injections and physical therapy did not help with her pain. (R. 1031.) Dr. Yoshihara observed mild tenderness to palpation of Plaintiff's lumbar spine and left sacroiliac joint. (R. 1031.) Dr. Yoshihara ordered an MRI of Plaintiff's lumbar spine. (R. 1033.)
On June 23, 2016, an MRI of Plaintiff's cervical spine revealed disc herniations at C3-C4 and C5-C6, deformation of the thecal sac, with C5-C6 abutment; disc bulges at C2-C3 and C6-C7; cervical spine straightening; and sinus mucosal thickening. (R. 1027-28.) A June 26, 2016 lumbar MRI revealed disc bulges at L4-L5 and L5-S1, and a disc herniation at T8-T9, possibly deforming the thecal sac and abutting the thoracic spinal cord. (R. 1025-26.)
On July 5, 2016, Plaintiff returned to Dr. Yoshihara and the doctor noted tenderness to palpation over the musculature throughout Plaintiff's spine. (R. 1032.) Dr. Yoshihara reviewed Plaintiff's MRI results and described them as showing mild degenerative disc disease. (R. 1032.) He advised Plaintiff to continue physical therapy and pain management, and to lose weight. (R. 1032.)
On July 27, 2012, Plaintiff went to the Hope Clinic complaining of "anxiety type symptoms." (R. 609-10.) Plaintiff was prescribed Atarax (hydroxyzine). (R. 609-10.) On October 15, 2012, Temisa L. Etikenrentse, M.D., completed a questionnaire regarding Plaintiff's mental condition. (R. 632.) According to the questionnaire, Plaintiff displayed a worried and anxious mood/affect. (R. 632.) Despite this, Plaintiff was fully oriented, her thought process was intact, and her thought content was appropriate. (R. 632.) Plaintiff's attention, concentration, and memory were also good. (R. 632.) Dr. Etikenrentse opined that Plaintiff exhibited slight work-related limitations and her anxiety could be exacerbated by a stressful work environment. (R. 632.) Dr. Etikenrentse did not recommend psychiatric treatment. (R. 632.)
On August 29, 2012, Plaintiff visited Walterboro Adult & Pediatric Medicine ("Waterboro") and met with Dr. Stania DeJesus. (R. 625.) Dr. DeJesus prescribed Klonopin for Plaintiff's anxiety and determined that Plaintiff's hypertension had improved. (R. 625.) On September 3, 2013, Dr. DeJesus completed a questionnaire concerning Plaintiff's mental condition. (R. 729, 734.) Dr. DeJesus opined that Plaintiff did not exhibit any work-related functional limitations due to her mental condition. (R. 729.) Plaintiff appeared fully oriented with an intact thought process, appropriate thought content, normal mood and affect, and good attention, concentration, and memory. (R. 729.) Dr. DeJesus did not recommend psychiatric treatment. (R. 729.)
On October 22, 2014, Plaintiff visited Catholic Charities because of her depressed and angry mood following the death of her son one month earlier. (R. 846.) On October 31, 2014, Plaintiff attended a psychosocial intake assessment conducted by Angel Collazo, a social worker at Catholic Charities. (R. 816-27, 847, 995-96.) The social worker assessed Plaintiff's mood as euthymic or non-depressed. (R. 816.) Activities of daily living skills were intact, Plaintiff's insight and judgment were good, and she denied any suicidal tendencies. (R. 816, 823, 995.) Plaintiff was scheduled for short-term treatment to help her grieving process. (R. 843-45.) Plaintiff attended these treatment sessions from November of 2014 through February of 2015. (R. 850-79.) During the sessions, Plaintiff's mood was generally stable; she discussed the death of her son, coping skills, and interaction with family. (R. 850-79.)
The ALJ conducted the five-step sequential analysis as required by the Social Security Administration under the authority of the SSA. First, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since June 1, 2011, the alleged onset date of her disability. (R. 15.) Second, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: obesity, asthma, hypertension, lumbar radiculopathy, and disorders of the thoracic and lumbar spine. (R. 16.) Third, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or was equal to the severity of one of the impairments listed in Appendix 1 of the Commissioner's Regulations. (R. 16.) The ALJ also found that Plaintiff's other impairments did not meet any of the Listing criteria in Appendix 1. (R. 16.) Next, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work, except that Plaintiff "can occasionally reach overhead, climb ramps and stairs, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. Additionally, [Plaintiff] cannot have concentrated exposure to dust, odors, fumes, and pulmonary irritants" and Plaintiff "can perform simple work related decisions." (R. 20.) In making this RFC finding, the ALJ stated that the RFC "is supported by the opinion of the Dr. John P Schosheim, the impartial medical expert, the opinions of the state agency consultative examiners and medical consultants, and the opinions of the [Plaintiff's] treating doctor, Dr. Stania DeJesus." (R. 29.) The ALJ assigned "little weight" to one of Plaintiff's treating doctor Dr. Rodriguez. (R. 27.)
"In reviewing a final decision of the Commissioner, a district court must determine whether the correct legal standards were applied and whether substantial evidence supports the decision." Butts v. Barnhart, 388 F.3d 377, 384 (2d Cir. 2004), as amended on reh'g in part, 416 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 2005); see also Selian v. Astrue, 708 F.3d 409, 417 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam). "Substantial evidence is `more than a mere scintilla' and `means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Lesterhuis v. Colvin, 805 F.3d 83, 87 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)); see also McIntyre v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 146, 149 (2d Cir. 2014) (same). Once an ALJ finds facts, the court "can reject those facts only if a reasonable factfinder would have to conclude otherwise." Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 683 F.3d 443, 448 (2d Cir. 2012) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted omitted). In deciding whether substantial evidence exists, the court "defer[s] to the Commissioner's resolution of conflicting evidence." Cage v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 692 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2012); McIntyre, 758 F.3d at 149 ("If evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the Commissioner's conclusion must be upheld."). The Commissioner's factual findings "must be given conclusive effect so long as they are supported by substantial evidence." Genier v. Astrue, 606 F.3d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 2010) (citation and internal quotations omitted). If, however, the Commissioner's decision is not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error, a court may set aside the decision of the Commissioner. Box v. Colvin, 3 F.Supp.3d 27, 41 (E.D.N.Y. 2014); see also Balsamo v. Chater, 142 F.3d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1998). "In making such determinations, courts should be mindful that `[t]he Social Security Act is a remedial statute which must be `liberally applied'; its intent is inclusion rather than exclusion.'" McCall v. Astrue, No. 05-CV-2042, 2008 WL 5378121, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2008) (alteration in original) (quoting Rivera v. Schweiker, 717 F.2d 719, 723 (2d Cir. 1983)).
Supplemental security income and disability insurance benefits are available to individuals who are "disabled" within the meaning of the SSA.
Kohler v. Astrue, 546 F.3d 260, 265 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Perez v. Chater, 77 F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 1996)); see also Lesterhuis, 805 F.3d at 86 n.2 (describing the "five-step sequential evaluation for adjudication of disability claims, set forth at 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520"); McIntyre, 758 F.3d at 150 (describing "the five-step, sequential evaluation process used to determine whether a claimant is disabled" (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v))).
The Commissioner contends that substantial evidence supports (1) the ALJ's RFC finding that Plaintiff can perform sedentary work, (R. 25), and (2) the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff does not have a severe mental impairment, (R. 20). The Commissioner further argues that the ALJ therefore properly found that Plaintiff is not disabled. (R. 30.)
The Court has conducted a thorough review of the record and in accordance with general principals regarding pro se parties, construed Plaintiff's filings "to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest." Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994). Based on this review, the Court concludes that the ALJ did not properly comply with the treating physician rule.
"[A] treating physician's statement that the claimant is disabled cannot itself be determinative." Micheli v. Astrue, 501 F. App'x 26, 28 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 133 (2d Cir. 1999)); Green-Younger v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2003) (same). But a treating physician's opinion as to the "nature and severity" of a plaintiff's impairments will be given "controlling weight" if the opinion is "well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the plaintiff's] case record."
If an ALJ declines to give a treating physician's opinion controlling weight, the ALJ must consider a number of factors to determine how much weight to assign to the treating physician's opinion, specifically: "(1) the frequen[cy], length, nature, and extent of treatment; (2) the amount of medical evidence supporting the opinion; (3) the consistency of the opinion with the remaining medical evidence; and (4) whether the physician is a specialist." Selian, 708 F.3d at 418 (citing Burgess v. Astrue, 537 F.3d 117, 129 (2d Cir. 2008)); see also Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 32 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)) (discussing the factors). The ALJ must set forth the reasons for the weight assigned to the treating physician's opinion. Halloran, 362 F.3d at 32. While the ALJ is not required to explicitly discuss the factors, it must be clear from the decision that the proper analysis was undertaken. See Petrie, 412 F. App'x at 406 ("[W]here `the evidence of record permits us to glean the rationale of an ALJ's decision, we do not require that he have mentioned every item of testimony presented to him or have explained why he considered particular evidence unpersuasive or insufficient to lead him to a conclusion of disability.'" (quoting Mongeur, 722 F.2d at 1040)). Failure "to provide good reasons for not crediting the opinion of a claimant's treating physician is a ground for remand." Sanders v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 506 F. App'x 74, 77 (2d Cir. 2012); see also Halloran, 362 F.3d at 32-33 ("We do not hesitate to remand when the Commissioner has not provided `good reasons' for the weight given to a treating physician[']s opinion. . . .").
In general, "ALJs should not rely heavily on the findings of consultative physicians after a single examination." Selian, 708 F.3d at 419. This is because "consultative exams are often brief, are generally performed without the benefit or review of [the] claimant's medical history and, at best, only give a glimpse of the claimant on a single day." Cruz v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 8, 13 (2d Cir. 1990); see also Hernandez v. Astrue, 814 F.Supp.2d 168, 182-83 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) ("[T]he opinion of a consultative physician, `who only examined a plaintiff once, should not be accorded the same weight as the opinion of [a] plaintiff's treating psychotherapist.'" (quoting Cruz, 912 F.2d at 13)).
The ALJ summarized Dr. Rodriguez's opinion as finding that Plaintiff "cannot climb, bend, or walk for any prolonged period, without experiencing severe back pain," has "limitations with traveling," and "is unable to work for at least twelve months." (R. 27.) The ALJ concluded that Dr. Rodriguez's opinion was only entitled to "little weight" because it (1) was inconsistent with other opinions in the record, and (2) "with . . . [Plaintiff's] activities of daily living including being able to shop, do boot camp, cook, clean, go out with friends, drive to North Carolina." (R. 27.) Neither of the ALJ's reasons are sufficient for disregarding the treating physician rule and assigning little weight to Dr. Rodriguez's opinion.
The ALJ's first reason for discounting Dr. Rodriguez's medical opinion is without support in the record.
In addition, Dr. Schosheim's opinion at Plaintiff's hearing in 2016, also focused on Plaintiff's psychiatric condition. (R. 28 ("[Dr. Schoesheim, an impartial medical expert, testified that the record reveals little evidence of psychiatric care.").) Finally, Mr. Collazo's opinion as Plaintiff's social worker focused on her behavioral impairments, especially after the loss of her son. (R. 843.) None of this evidence undermines Dr. Rodriguez's medical opinion concerning Plaintiff's physical impairments.
Moreover, Dr. Rodriguez's medical opinion is consistent with evidence in the record and should have been assigned controlling weight absent "good reasons" for doing so. For example, Dr. Yoshihara, Plaintiff's treating orthopedist, opined that, although Plaintiff did not require orthopedic spinal surgery, she should continue physical therapy and pain management. (R. 24.)
The ALJ's first reason for discarding Dr. Rodriguez's medical opinion, based on a flawed comparison of two different types of medical evidence, does not justify departure from the treating physician rule.
The ALJ's second reason for declining to credit Dr. Rodriguez's assessments, purported inconsistencies with Plaintiff's daily activities, fares no better. The ALJ contends that Dr. Rodriguez's opinion is not consistent with Plaintiff's "activities of daily living including being able to shop, do boot camp, cook, clean, go out with friends, [and] drive to North Carolina." (R. 27.) As an initial matter, the Court has found no evidence in the record that Plaintiff "d[id] boot camp," and the ALJ provides no citation in support of this statement. (R. 27.) The closest thing to the ALJ's reference is a treatment note stating that Plaintiff "recently ordered a pilates video." (See R. 642, 760.) However, in clear contrast to "do[ing] boot camp," which information provides insight into a claimant's physical abilities, the mere ordering of a pilates video says nothing about what a claimant is capable of doing, and does not constitute substantial evidence sufficient to contradict Dr. Rodriguez's opinion as to Plaintiff's limitations. See Balsamo v. Chater, 142 F.3d 75, 81-82 (2d Cir. 1998) ("[W]hen a disabled person gamely chooses to endure pain in order to pursue important goals . . . it would be a shame to hold this endurance against him." (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, Plaintiff's daily activities including cooking, cleaning, and going out with friends also do not constitute substantial evidence sufficient to contradict Dr. Rodriguez's opinion. See Cabibi v. Colvin, 50 F.Supp.3d 213, 238 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) ("Indeed, it is well-settled that the performance of basic daily activities does not necessarily contradict allegations of disability, as people should not be penalized for enduring the pain of their disability in order to care for themselves." (first quoting Valet v. Astrue, No. 10-CV-3282, 2012 WL 194970, at *19 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2012); and then collecting cases)).
Accordingly, because the ALJ failed to properly apply the treating physician rule, remand is warranted.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, and remands the case for further proceedings consistent with this Memorandum and Order.
SO ORDERED.
