Contrary to defendants' contention that an action to recover pursuant to Debtor and Creditor Law § 273-a may only be brought against the judgment debtor, both a transferee of a debtor's assets and beneficiary of the conveyance who participated in the fraudulent transfer may be found liable under Debtor and Creditor Law § 273-a (Constitution Realty v Oltarsh, 309 A.D.2d 714, 716 [1st Dept 2003]; Gruenebaum v Lissauer, 185 Misc. 718, 727-728 [Sup Ct, NY County 1945], affd 270 App Div 836 [1st Dept 1946]; Farm Stores v School Feeding Corp., 102 A.D.2d 249, 255 [2d Dept 1984], affd in part and appeal dismissed in part 64 N.Y.2d 1065 [1985]; Stochastic Decisions, Inc. v DiDomenico, 995 F.2d 1158, 1172 [2d Cir 1993], cert denied 510 U.S. 945 [1993]). Because defendants acknowledge for purposes of this appeal that the conveyance of the trademarks at issue here from defendant Boom Batta, Inc. to defendant Do the Hustle, LLC was constructively fraudulent, plaintiff is entitled to partial summary judgment on liability against defendant Watman on his cause of action pursuant to Debtor and Creditor Law § 273-a.

While "[a]s a general rule, the creditor's remedy in a fraudulent conveyance action is `limited to reaching the property which would have been available to satisfy the judgment had there been no conveyance'" (Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v Lauer's Furniture Acquisition, 226 A.D.2d 1056, 1057 [4th Dept 1996], lv dismissed 88 N.Y.2d 962 [1996]), a court of equity may award a personal judgment against a party in lieu of setting aside a transfer (Constitution Realty, 309 AD2d at 715). Setting aside the fraudulent conveyance of the trademarks here is not an adequate remedy, where the transferee and subsequent licensees exploited the use of the fraudulently conveyed property in an effort to reap profits and return of the trademarks would not avail plaintiff.

However, plaintiff fails to point to anything in the record to establish the value of the trademarks. Although he points to moneys defendant Watman received from the licensees, which operated bars and nightclubs, such evidence tends to show, at most, that Watman received such money from the operation of the clubs in which he was an investor. Plaintiff points to nothing in the record tending to establish how much of the money from the operations of the clubs that Watman received derived from the trademarks. Accordingly, a trial on damages is necessary to determine the value of the trademarks that were fraudulently conveyed, including the value derived from their subsequent licensing and exploitation.

In view of the dilatory tactics and recalcitrant behavior engaged in by defendants throughout this litigation, we find that Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in confirming so much of the referee's report as recommended precluding defendants from proffering any documentary evidence or non-expert witnesses at trial. Nor did Supreme Court abuse its discretion in denying Watman's cross motion to amend his answer. He acknowledges that the only affirmative defenses sought to be added are merely "application[s] of the law" (see generally Bag Bag v Alcobi, 129 A.D.3d 649 [1st Dept 2015]).