NOT FOR PUBLICATION

ORDER

MARGO K. BRODIE, District Judge.

Plaintiffs Florence Maratea and Anthony Maratea commenced the above-captioned action on May 6, 2014, against Defendants General Growth Properties and Staten Island Mall (collectively "GGP") in New York state court, asserting negligence claims based on a slip-and-fall incident. Plaintiffs allege that Florence Maratea fell and sustained injuries in the parking lot of the Staten Island Mall, located in Staten Island, New York (the "Premises"), because of the hazardous conditions maintained by GGP or its agents. On August 22, 2014, GGP, the owner of the Staten Island Mall, removed the action to this Court based on diversity jurisdiction. (Notice of Removal, Docket Entry No. 1.) On October 14, 2015, GGP filed a third-party complaint against Third-Party Defendant Universal Protection Service, LLC ("UPS"), the security services provider, seeking contribution and indemnification for any damages owed to Plaintiffs. (Third-Party Compl. ("GGP Compl."), Docket Entry No. 76.) GGP asserts claims for breaches of contract, detrimental reliance, common law indemnification, and contribution, pursuant to New York Civil Practice Law and Rules §§ 1401, 1402. (Id.) On April 5, 2016, UPS filed a second third-party complaint against Second Third-Party Defendant ABCO Maintenance, Inc. ("ABCO"), the general maintenance provider, asserting claims for common law contribution and indemnification for any damages owed to Plaintiffs. (Second Third-Party Compl., ("UPS Compl."), Docket Entry No. 194.)

On January 12, 2018, GGP,1 UPS,2 and ABCO,3 all moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to resolve claims vis-à-vis the others. For the reasons set forth below, the Court cannot decide the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment at this time as it would require the adjudication of facts and legal issues overlapping with Plaintiffs' underlying claims.

I. The moving parties' claims overlap with Plaintiffs' claims

Under Illinois state law, it is well-established that courts may not determine facts or legal issues in duty to defend or indemnify cases that implicate the merits of the underlying action.4 See Am. Alternative Ins. Co. v. Lisle-Woodridge Fire Prot. Dist., 2014 WL 2601675, at *5 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. June 9, 2014) ("[I]t is inappropriate for a court considering a declaratory judgment action to decide issues of ultimate fact that could bind the parties to the underlying litigation." (citation omitted)); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Shelton, 176 Ill.App.3d 858, 863 (App. Ct. 1988) (stating that, under Illinois law, the declaratory judgment court "must not determine disputed factual issues that are crucial to the insured's liability in the underlying personal injury lawsuit"); see also Lexington Ins. Co. v. Bd. of Educ. of Lake Forest Cmty. High Sch. Dist. 115, No. 11-CV-556, 2012 WL 74778, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 2012) ("Under this so-called `prematurity doctrine,' declaratory judgment should not be used to force the parties to an injury action `to have a dress rehearsal of an important issue expected to be tried in the injury action.'" (citation omitted)).

Although the above principle is traditionally invoked where the underlying personal injury action and the insurance or indemnification action are in separate courts or proceedings, the Court finds the rationale for the rule equally applicable in this case. Plaintiffs have not moved for summary judgment and have not had an opportunity to state their views as to the facts and legal conclusions asserted by GGP, UPS, and ABCO. Therefore, the Court cannot determine whether Plaintiffs dispute any of the facts asserted by the moving parties, including those that are likely crucial to Plaintiffs' claims.5 In addition, the determination of the rights and claims as between GGP, UPS, and ABCO, implicate Plaintiffs' underlying claims.

GGP's and UPS' claims against each other expressly implicate Plaintiffs' claims against GGP.6 For example, Subsection f. of the Insurance and Indemnification section of the Security Agreement between the GGP and UPS states that "[w]hen a slip, trip or fall claim arises, [GGP] shall tender such claims to the janitorial vendor unless [UPS] is implicated in such claim as a result of its negligence or misconduct."7 (Security Agreement 19, annexed to Michael D. Newsome Decl. in Supp. of GGP Mot. as Ex. N, Docket Entry No. 68-14.) The parties do not dispute that UPS provides security rather than janitorial services to GGP, and that Plaintiffs' claims are based on a slip and fall. Based on the Security Agreement, it appears that GGP therefore cannot tender any claims for indemnification to UPS unless UPS was negligent or engaged in misconduct. However, a determination as to UPS' negligence or misconduct implicates Plaintiffs' underlying claims as Plaintiffs allege that GGP or its agents were negligent in the maintenance of the Premises. (See Pls. Compl. ¶ 44, annexed as Ex. A to Notice of Removal, Docket Entry No. 1.) If the Court finds UPS negligent, Plaintiffs may benefit from and rely on such a determination. Conversely, if the Court finds that UPS was not negligent or did not engage in any misconduct, Plaintiffs' claims against GGP may be negatively impacted — if GGP's agents, whether UPS or ABCO, did not act negligently, it would likely be more difficult to find GGP itself to have been negligent in either maintaining the Premises8 or overseeing those entrusted with maintenance. As this example illustrates, the Court cannot decide the pending motions for summary judgment without resolving factual or legal issues crucial to Plaintiffs' underlying claims.

II. Conclusion

For the reasons discussed above, the Court cannot decide the pending cross-motions for summary judgment by GGP, UPS, and ABCO. Accordingly, the Court stays the motions and marks them off the motion calendar pending a decision on the merits of Plaintiffs' underlying claims.

SO ORDERED.