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L.A. v. J.A., A-3226-14T2. (2016)

Court: Superior Court of New Jersey Number: innjco20160623354 Visitors: 10
Filed: Jun. 23, 2016
Latest Update: Jun. 23, 2016
Summary: NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION PER CURIAM . Defendant J.A. appeals from a February 24, 2015 final restraining order (FRO) entered against him under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to-35. The trial court's decision was based on a domestic violence complaint filed by defendant's wife, L.A., alleging harassment, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4, as the predicate offense for the injunctive relief sought. On appeal, defendant challenges bo
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

Defendant J.A. appeals from a February 24, 2015 final restraining order (FRO) entered against him under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to-35. The trial court's decision was based on a domestic violence complaint filed by defendant's wife, L.A., alleging harassment, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4, as the predicate offense for the injunctive relief sought. On appeal, defendant challenges both the trial judge's findings of a predicate act of domestic violence and the need for an FRO. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

I.

On February 24, 2015, the trial judge conducted a hearing at which defendant was represented by counsel and plaintiff appeared without counsel. The judge asked plaintiff to explain the facts leading up to her request for a restraining order. Plaintiff stated that she and defendant were married in 2005, and had two children together, ages seven and five. The parties separated in December 2014, when they filed cross-complaints against each other alleging acts of domestic violence. Those cross-complaints were then "dismissed and converted to civil restraints."

Plaintiff next described the incidents that led up to her filing this second domestic violence complaint against defendant, and the basis of her request for an FRO. First, plaintiff testified to an incident that occurred on January 21, 2015. Due to a miscommunication about transportation arrangements for the children's parenting-time exchange, plaintiff and defendant crossed paths on the road and pulled into the parking lot of a TD Bank. Plaintiff testified that defendant came up to her car and said repeatedly, "give me my kids' f*****g stuff, you f*****g bitch." Plaintiff got out of her car and spoke to the children, telling them "daddy's just mad," and the children eventually got into defendant's truck.

According to plaintiff, when she attempted to get back into her car, defendant came to her door and put his hand out to prevent her from closing it. Defendant told her he would "spend as much time as he possibly can making my life miserable." To prevent defendant from blocking her car door, and because she felt threatened, plaintiff "spit in his face to try to get him out of the door so I could close it to leave." Defendant then spit back in her face. Plaintiff explained that she felt threatened during this incident because "[h]e's not supposed to be coming up to me under the civil [restraints], he's not supposed to be [in] contact with me, not supposed to be that close to me." On cross-examination, plaintiff conceded that the parties directed profanity at each other during the marriage and that at times she called defendant a "f*****g a**hole."

Plaintiff stated that defendant then took the children home with him for his "overnight." She did not immediately report the incident to the police because her "children come first" and she "didn't want them to see their father getting arrested."

Second, plaintiff testified that when her boyfriend was visiting her on January 24, she received a text message from defendant at 9:42 p.m. stating, "He better not be in my house." Plaintiff interpreted this as a threat that defendant was "going to do something." Plaintiff looked out the window and observed defendant stop, get out of his truck, and then walk over and stand in front of her friend's car. Defendant left approximately ten minutes later, and when plaintiff and her boyfriend went outside they noticed his car had two flat tires. The police were called, and on January 28, plaintiff applied for, and obtained, a temporary restraining order (TRO).

Plaintiff also testified to a prior history of domestic violence. In August or September, 2014, she was awakened by noise during the night and found that defendant had punched holes in the walls, ripped off kitchen cabinets, and scattered broken beer bottles about the kitchen floor. This incident caused her to feel terrified and call the police. In early January, 2015, defendant returned home and discovered that all her bras and underwear were stolen. Plaintiff attributed this incident to defendant because "[n]obody else has a key to my house, there was no forced entry, and nothing else was missing or taken. ..." Additionally, defendant "call[ed] her a f*****g bitch and a f*****g whore in front of [the two children] all the time." He also continually drove past her house, in violation of the civil restraints. This caused her to feel "[u]nsafe," because "his behavior is just getting more and more erratic, it's ... his anger."

Yet another incident occurred on January 30, 2015, when plaintiff dropped the children off at defendant's house for visitation. Defendant came outside waving plaintiff's child support check. Plaintiff got out of the car and approached defendant to get the check. As she approached, defendant ripped up the check. He then told her to wait while he got another one. Plaintiff testified that defendant "[w]ent and got another check, and said to me again I slashed his tires, I'll do it again, and yours are next." Plaintiff stated that her tires were slashed a few days later. When asked by the court why she needed a restraining order, plaintiff responded "I don't feel safe."

Defendant also testified at trial. He denied slashing plaintiff's tires or her boyfriend's tires or even knowing what kind of car her boyfriend drove. Defendant also denied stealing her bras.

With respect to the incident in the TD Bank parking lot, defendant explained that when he went to retrieve the children's belongings from plaintiff's car, "she said get your f*****g hands off my car," and continued to spew similar profanities. They were screaming at each other when plaintiff spit in his face. He then approached plaintiff's car, held her back from entering it, and spit at her. Defendant returned to his truck and left with the children.

Defendant admitted punching holes in the walls the previous summer, but said he did so out of anger when he found naked pictures of plaintiff that she had sent to another man. Defendant denied ever threatening plaintiff. He also stated that the parties commonly cursed at each other during the marriage.

The judge placed his oral opinion on the record at the conclusion of the hearing. He found "good cause to believe that [] plaintiff's life, health and well-being have been endangered by defendant's acts" as well as an "intent to harass." The judge also stated, "I am concerned for [plaintiff's] safety and well-being, as she should be and therefore, I am going to enter a final restraining order in this case."

The judge found plaintiff to be honest and credible in her testimony. He pointed to her candor in revealing interactions that did not place her in the best light, such as spitting in defendant's face and cursing. The judge also cited plaintiff's reaction to some of defendant's responses, finding that her "animation" was indicative of defendant lying during his testimony. In contrast, the judge found defendant's testimony "contrived." Addressing defendant's assertion that he did not slash the boyfriend's tires, or even know the boyfriend's car was there on January 24, the judge stated, "I don't think you told me the truth." The judge elaborated:

So there was an intent to go to that house. There was certainly a communication slashing the tires. And there was the admission to her when she said you said it to her ... you slashed the tires and yours are next. And even though hers are next, and that came after entry of the TRO, I'm not using that to base my judgment, but that goes to her credibility, that goes to her forthrightness.

The judge thus found that defendant "committed the predicate act of harassment by not only on January 21[] setting forth the tirade of words that he spewed upon her, but also by showing up at the house on ... January 24[]. I don't think those tires were slashed coincidentally, based on her observation." The judge further found that "[t]here's an escalation happening," and that plaintiff required the FRO for her safety.

II.

To obtain an FRO under the PDVA, a plaintiff must establish two key elements by a preponderance of the evidence. First, a plaintiff must prove that defendant committed one of the predicate offenses, as enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a). Second, if a predicate offense is shown, plaintiff must also show that a restraining order is necessary for the protection of the victim. Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J.Super. 112, 125-27 (App. Div. 2006); see also J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 475-76, 488 (2011); L.M.F. v. J.A.F., Jr., 421 N.J.Super. 523, 536 (App. Div. 2011).

In reviewing an FRO issued by the Family Part following a bench trial, our scope of review is limited. The Family Part's findings are binding on appeal, "when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998). Such deference is particularly appropriate in cases where the evidence is largely testimonial in nature and hinges upon a court's ability to make assessments of credibility and veracity based on its observation of testifying witnesses. Id. at 412. A trial judge, rather than an appellate court, has a better opportunity to evaluate credibility. Ibid.; see also S.D. v. M.J.R., 415 N.J.Super. 417, 429-30 (App. Div. 2010). We also bear in mind the expertise of trial court judges, who routinely hear many domestic violence cases in the Family Part. Cesare, supra, 154 N.J. at 413. We therefore will not disturb the "factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge unless [we are] convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice." S.D., supra, 415 N.J. Super. at 429 (quoting Cesare, supra, 154 N.J. at 411).

In his appeal, defendant argues that the record is "[bare] as to any pattern of abuse or controlling behavior on the part of [] defendant/husband towards [] plaintiff/wife." Defendant bases this argument on his contention that there has been a breakdown in communication between the parties that is not solely attributable to him. Additionally, defendant claims that plaintiff is equally blameworthy for the incidents leading to the entry of the FRO and that the trial court erred in finding that it was he who engaged in a pattern of abuse. Defendant also contends the record is "[bare]" as to any communication or conduct that would constitute harassment under the statute. He further asserts the court's finding was erroneous because there is no previous history of domestic violence between the parties. We cannot agree.

Defendant's current "spin" on the facts is consistent with his hearing testimony, but the trial judge did not credit defendant's version of the January 24 incident. Instead, the judge found defendant's testimony incredible, and that his conduct on that date was undertaken for the improper purpose of harassing plaintiff.

Although he did not specifically so state, we infer that the judge also credited plaintiff's testimony concerning the prior acts of domestic violence. Defendant admitted that, due to anger, he previously punched holes in the walls of the home where the parties resided with their two young children. Despite the fact that civil restraints had been put in place due to earlier allegations of domestic violence, defendant admittedly cursed and physically prevented plaintiff from closing her car door during the January 21 incident.

Harassment is one of the predicate acts for a finding of domestic violence. See N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19a(13). Harassment occurs when "with purpose to harass another," a defendant "[m]akes ... a communication or communications" in a "manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm," N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4a, or "[e]ngages in any other course of alarming conduct ... with purpose to alarm or seriously annoy" the victim. N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4c.

The record amply supports a finding that defendant's entire course of conduct on January 24 was undertaken for the purpose of alarming or seriously annoying plaintiff, and he succeeded in doing so. N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4c. Viewed in context, defendant's text message to plaintiff, telling her that "[h]e better not be in my house," was a "communication" made for the purpose of harassment and was made in a "manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm." N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4a. Moreover, a finding that defendant damaged plaintiff's boyfriend's tires is not inconsistent with an intent to harass her. Indeed, the situation bespeaks a dual purpose: to inflict harm on the boyfriend while simultaneously annoying or alarming plaintiff.

We find no error in the judge's decision to enter the FRO. The parties had ongoing conflicts over support and visitation issues, and were likely to have future interactions. Although civil restraints were in effect in the parties' matrimonial litigation, they had proved ineffective, and the trial judge was concerned about defendant's escalating misconduct. We agree with the trial judge that a FRO was necessary to prevent defendant from engaging in future harassment. See N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29b; J.D., supra, 207 N.J. at 476.

Affirmed.

Source:  Leagle

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