PAMELA K. CHEN, District Judge.
Plaintiff Ruth Myers ("Plaintiff") brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of the Social Security Administration's ("SSA") denial of her claim for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB"). The parties have cross-moved for judgment on the pleadings. (Dkts. 19, 22.) Plaintiff seeks reversal of the Commissioner's decision and an immediate award of benefits, or alternatively, remand for further administrative proceedings. The Commissioner seeks affirmance of the denial of Plaintiff's claims. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings and denies the Commissioner's motion. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Order.
On December 12, 2012, Plaintiff filed an application for DIB, claiming that she has been disabled since April 12, 2012, due to injuries she sustained when a step broke and she fell down a flight of stairs at work. These injuries caused Plaintiff to suffer severe back and leg pain, numbness, dizziness, and foot/leg weakness. (Tr. 10, 31, 99-100, 104, 152-59, 216.)
After the SSA denied Plaintiff's application for review, Plaintiff filed an administrative appeal with the Appeals Council. (Tr. 6.) The Appeals Council denied review on July 25, 2016. Based upon this denial, Plaintiff filed this action on August 16, 2016, seeking reversal or remand of ALJ Wexler's December 2, 2014 decision.
Unsuccessful claimants for disability benefits under the Social Security Act (the "Act") may bring an action in federal district court seeking judicial review of the Commissioner's denial of their benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). In reviewing a final decision of the Commissioner, the Court's role is "limited to determining whether the SSA's conclusions were supported by substantial evidence in the record and were based on a correct legal standard." Talavera v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation omitted). "Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Selian v. Astrue, 708 F.3d 409, 417 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted)). In determining whether the Commissioner's findings were based upon substantial evidence, "the reviewing court is required to examine the entire record, including contradictory evidence and evidence from which conflicting inferences can be drawn." Id. (quotation omitted). However, "it is up to the agency, and not this court, to weigh the conflicting evidence in the record." Clark v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 143 F.3d 115, 118 (2d Cir. 1998). If there is substantial evidence in the record to support the Commissioner's findings as to any fact, those findings are conclusive and must be upheld. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see also Cichocki v. Astrue, 729 F.3d 172, 175-76 (2d Cir. 2013).
To receive DIB, claimants must be disabled within the meaning of the Act. Claimants establish disability status by demonstrating an inability "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3). The claimant bears the initial burden of proof on disability status and must demonstrate disability status by presenting medical signs and findings, established by "medically acceptable clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques," as well as any other evidence the Commissioner may require. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(5)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(D). However, the ALJ has an affirmative obligation to develop the administrative record. Lamay v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 562 F.3d 503, 508-09 (2d Cir. 2009). This means that the ALJ must seek additional evidence or clarification when the claimant's medical reports contain conflicts or ambiguities, if the reports do not contain all necessary information, or if the reports lack medically acceptable clinic and laboratory diagnostic techniques. Demera v. Astrue, No. 12 Civ. 432, 2013 WL 391006, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2013); Mantovani v. Astrue, No. 09 Civ. 3957, 2011 WL 1304148, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. March 31, 2011).
In evaluating disability claims, the ALJ must adhere to a five-step inquiry. The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps in the inquiry; the Commissioner bears the burden in the final step. Talavera, 697 F.3d at 151. First, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is currently engaged in "substantial gainful activity." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If the answer is yes, the claimant is not disabled. If the claimant is not engaged in "substantial gainful activity," the ALJ proceeds to the second step to determine whether the claimant suffers from a "severe impairment." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). An impairment is determined to be severe when it "significantly limits [the claimant's] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). If the impairment is not severe, then the claimant is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. However, if the impairment is severe, the ALJ proceeds to the third step, which considers whether the impairment meets or equals one of the impairments listed in the Act's regulations (the "Listings"). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii); see also 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1.
If the ALJ determines at step three that the claimant has one of the listed impairments, then the ALJ will find that the claimant is disabled under the Act. On the other hand, if the claimant does not have a listed impairment, the ALJ must determine the claimant's "residual functional capacity" ("RFC") before continuing with steps four and five. The claimant's RFC is an assessment that considers the claimant's "impairment(s), and any related symptoms . . . [which] may cause physical and mental limitations that affect what [the claimant] can do in the work setting." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). The ALJ will then use the RFC determination in step four to determine if the claimant can perform past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If the answer is yes, the claimant is not disabled. Otherwise, the ALJ will proceed to step five, at which the Commissioner then must determine whether the claimant, given the claimant's RFC, age, education, and work experience, has the capacity to perform other substantial, gainful work in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If the answer is yes, the claimant is not disabled; otherwise, the claimant is disabled and is entitled to benefits. Id.
Plaintiff's claim of disability stems from injuries she sustained on April 12, 2012, when she fell down a flight of stairs at work. Plaintiff alleges that the injuries caused her to suffer back and leg pain, numbness, dizziness, and foot/leg weakness. (Tr. 10, 31, 99-100, 104, 152-59, 216.)
A magnetic resonance imaging ("MRI") performed on May 18, 2012 of Plaintiff's lumbar spine revealed a diffuse disc bulging
In July 2012, Plaintiff's treating doctor, Dr. Jean Claude Compas, prescribed a walking cane for Plaintiff, based on the results of the MRI. (Tr. 211.) Dr. Compas, who treated Plaintiff on a monthly basis from August 2012 to March 2013, repeatedly stated that Plaintiff's condition was guarded, that she was not able to resume her work activities (Tr. 210, 217 219-21), and that she could not sit for more than six hours, nor stand or walk for more than two hours, as required for sedentary work, noting evidence of a limited range of motion, spasm and tenderness in the paralumbar area, and limping or antalgic gait
On October 6, 2012, Dr. Michelle Rubin, a board-certified neurologist, reviewed the May 18, 2012 MRI of the lumbar spine and diagnosed a left postlateral disc herniation at L4-5 superimposed on annular bulging resulting in a mass effect on the ventral thecal sac, especially the left, including the region of the emerging left L5 nerve root,
On October 4, November 29 and December 13, 2012, Dr. Conrad Cean administered several nerve root block injections on the right and the left of the spine, between L2-L3, L3-L4 and L4-L5, and completed epiduriography
On February 25, 2013, Dr. John Fkiaras examined Plaintiff at the request of the SSA. (Tr. 292-94.) Plaintiff reported to Dr. Fkiaras that she had experienced lower back pain since an April 2012 work injury, that she had trouble walking, climbing stairs, standing, and lifting, and that sitting for a long period of time also exacerbated her low back pain. (Id.) Plaintiff reported using oral medications (Tramadol, Cyclobenzaprine, and Tylenol #4), but that they did not provide relief from pain, and Dr. Fkiaras noted that Plaintiff was to be scheduled for back surgery. (Id.) Dr. Fkiaras observed, upon examination, that Plaintiff was wearing a back brace and that her gait was antalgic with or without use of a cane, which Dr. Fkiaras observed was medically necessary for weight-bearing and balance. (Id.)
Dr. Fkiaras also observed that Plaintiff was able to rise from a chair without difficulty, but that she was unable to walk on her heels and toes, and that flexion of the lumbar spine was limited to 50 degrees. (Tr. 294.) Dr. Fkiaras found supine straight leg raising positive on the left at 50 degrees and seated straight leg raising was positive on the left at 60 degrees. He also found pain to the light touch on the bilateral lumbar region, and muscle strength 4/5 in the bilateral lower extremities. (Id.) Dr. Fkiaras diagnosed lower back pain, and opined that Plaintiff had a "marked" limitation for lifting, carrying, pushing, pulling, squatting, kneeling and crouching due to lower back pain. (Id.) Dr. Fkiaras further opined that Plaintiff had a "moderate" limitation for walking and a "moderate-to-marked" limitation for standing, bending, and climbing stairs. (Id.) Plaintiff was further directed by Dr. Fkiaras to avoid activities that would require sitting for extended periods of time. (Id.)
In April and May 2013, Dr. Compas referred Plaintiff to a neurosurgeon, Dr. Ramesh Babu, to evaluate Plaintiff's back disorder. (Tr. 263-64, 301-04, 312-13, repeats at Tr. 387-88, 413, 419, 424, 481-82.) A MRI performed on May 14, 2013 of the lumbar spine revealed a stable appearance of the left paracentral
On May 22, 2013, Dr. Ramesh Babu submitted documentation to support authorization for a laminectomy,
On September 19, 2013, Dr. Compas noted that Plaintiff reported chronic pain in her lower back which radiated to her legs. (Tr. 319, repeats at Tr. 444, 446, 486, 488.) Dr. Compas again completed a medical report form in which he stated that Plaintiff was not able to perform any type of work that required her to sit for six hours, or to stand or walk for two hours, as required for sedentary work, even with periodic alternation between sitting and standing to alleviate pain. (Tr. 324-27.) On October 19 and 22, 2013, Dr. Compas completed a request for a three-pronged walker and another four weeks of home-attendant services for Plaintiff. (Tr. 329-30, 338, 447, 487.)
On November 18, 2013, Plaintiff reported to Dr. Compas that she had been in another motor vehicle accident on October 26, 2013, and reported pain radiating down her left leg at a score of 10 out 10 (Tr. 449, repeats at Tr. 490.) That same day, Dr. Compas issued a letter in which he opined that Plaintiff had been totally disabled since April 12, 2012 due to lumbar radiculitis and a herniated disc, noting that her prognosis was "guarded" and she was not able to resume her activities (Tr. 448, repeats at Tr. 489.)
On December 9, 2013, Dr. Compas completed another medical report in which he opined that Plaintiff could not carry more than ten pounds, and that she could not sit for six hours, nor stand or walk for two hours, as required for sedentary work, noting evidence of spasm, tenderness in the paralumbar area, and decreased range of motion post lumbar spine laminectomy. (Tr. 407-10.)
On December 19, 2013, Plaintiff complained to Dr. Compas that the Oxycodone prescribed to her worked for the pain, but "made her itchy". (Tr. 450-51, repeats at Tr. 491-92.) Plaintiff reported significantly more pain in her left leg, with decreased strength and paresthesia.
On February 21, 2014, Dr. Compas completed yet another medical form in which he opined that Plaintiff could sit for less than six total hours, stand and/or walk less than two hours, occasionally lift and/or carry less than ten pounds in an eight-hour workday, with periodic alternating between sitting and standing to alleviate pain. Dr. Compas again noted evidence of a limited range of motion and tenderness in the paralumbar area, as well as an antalgic gait. (Tr. 493-96.) On January 17 and February 24, 2014, Dr. Compas again noted that Plaintiff complained of severe pain radiating to the left leg, that she had difficulty getting up from a seated position and that she walked with a cane/walker. Dr. Compas certified that Plaintiff required a home attendant for four weeks. (Tr. 499-502, repeats at Tr. 506-07.)
On February 11, 2014, Dr. Mathew Lefkowitz performed a bilateral lumbar facet joint injection. (Tr. 549, repeats at Tr. 555.) On February 24, 2014, Dr. Lefkowitz performed a radiofrequency rhizotomy
On April 21, May 16, and June 16, 2014, Plaintiff returned to Dr. Compas who repeatedly observed that Plaintiff had an antalgic, limping gait and walked with the aid of a three-pronged walker, that she used a back brace, and that she had decreased range of motion and muscle spasms. Dr. Compas also directed Plaintiff to continue to use a three-pronged walker. (Tr. 509-15.) On July 21, 2014, Dr. Compas examined Plaintiff, who reported that she was taking Oxycodone daily to cope with her pain; Dr. Compas again prescribed a three-pronged walker for Plaintiff. (Tr. 535-36.)
On September 4, 2014, Plaintiff reported to Dr. Compas that she was experiencing constant back pain, but that it was no longer radiating. (Tr. 516-19.) Dr. Compas opined that Plaintiff was totally incapacitated. (Tr. 520.) On September 9, 2014, Dr. Compas completed another medical form in which he reported that Plaintiff could sit for less than six total hours, stand and/or walk less than two hours, occasionally lift and/or carry less than ten pounds in an eight-hour workday. (Tr. 537-40.) Dr. Compas again noted evidence of a limited range of motion, spasm, and tenderness in the paralumbar area, and limping. (Id.)
The ALJ's decision followed the five-step evaluation process established by the SSA to determine whether an individual is disabled. (Tr. 10-19.) At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not engage in substantial gainful activity between her alleged onset date (April 12, 2012) through the date of ALJ's decision (December 2, 2014). (Tr. 12.) At step two, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff suffered from lumbar degenerative disc disease, and post-surgical repair and depression disorder, which qualified as severe impairments. (Id.)
At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff's impairments, either singly or in combination, did not meet or medically equal any of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Id.) In reaching this determination, the ALJ focused on Listings 1.00 ("Musculoskeletal"), and 1.04 ("Disorders of the spine"), and found that Plaintiff's impairments did not meet the severity criteria in either listing because "no treating or examining physician has indicated findings that would satisfy the requirements of any listed impairment." (Id.) More specifically, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's impairments did not meet the severity criteria for 1.04, citing MRI scans of the lumbar spine performed in May of 2012 and May of 2013—both of which revealed diffuse bulging at L4-L5 with a superimposed disc herniation and bulging at L5-S1, with no evidence of foraminal narrowing, a protrusion at L4-L5 with minimal nerve root compression
The ALJ therefore proceeded to determine Plaintiff's RFC, finding that Plaintiff was able to perform a range of sedentary work, with additional limitations noting that Plaintiff can "occasionally climb ramps or stairs, never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds, occasionally balance and stoop, [and] never kneel, crouch and crawl with an unlimited ability to push/pull", and that she has "the ability to perform simple, routine, repetitive tasks, low stress jobs, which means no work at fixed production rate pace, with work that is checked at the end of the workday or workweek rather than hourly or throughout the day." (Tr. 14.) In reaching this RFC determination, the ALJ accorded less weight, and also rejected, the medical opinions of the primary treating physician, Dr. Compas, finding that "[t]he opinions of Dr. Compas are partially consistent with the treatment records, which include clinical signs of musculoskeletal impairments", and that "the opinions offered [by Dr. Compas] are not supported by the EMG/NCV study, which suggested no evidence of lumbosacral radiculopathy . . . and the treatment record that frequently noted moderate improvement." (Tr. 16.) The ALJ further found that because Dr. Compas is a "family doctor and not a specialist in the field", the ALJ would only accord "some weight" to Dr. Compas's medical opinion. (Id.)
The ALJ further accorded limited weight to the medical evidence and opinion of Dr. Fkiaras, the physician who performed a consultative internal medicine examination at the request of the SSA, including his findings that the claimant "had marked limitations in lifting, carrying, pushing, pulling, squatting, kneeling, crouching," "moderate limitations in walking[,] and moderate to marked limitations in bending, climbing stairs and standing[,] and [that Plaintiff] should avoid activities that require sitting for extended periods". (Id.) The ALJ discounted these opinions because they were offered prior to Plaintiff's surgery, and the ALJ found them unsupported by subsequent records that "suggest[ed] moderate improvement." (Id.) The ALJ acknowledged that her determination of Plaintiff's RFC did not accord with Plaintiff's own description of the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms, which the ALJ found was "not entirely credible." (Tr. 17.)
At step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff is unable to perform any past relevant work, as Plaintiff previously worked as a "Caretaker", an "unskilled job that requires a medium exertional capacity", which the ALJ acknowledged was greater than Plaintiff's exertional capacity. (Id.)
At step five, after determining Plaintiff's RFC, based on age, education, and work experience, and after consulting the vocational guidelines and a vocational expert, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff could make a successful adjustment to sedentary work existing in significant numbers in the national economy. (Tr. 18-19.) On that basis, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled from the alleged onset date (April 12, 2012) through the date of the ALJ's decision (December 2, 2014). (Tr. 19.)
Plaintiff challenges the ALJ's decision on three grounds. First, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing to afford proper weight to the opinions of Plaintiff's treating physician, Dr. Compas, and to the opinions of the SSA's own consultative examining physician, Dr. Fkiaras. (Pl.'s Br., Dkt. 23, at ECF 16-22.)
For the reasons stated below, the Court finds that the ALJ committed reversible error in failing to develop the record to properly determine Plaintiff's RFC and in evaluating Plaintiff's statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and functionally limiting effects of her symptoms. Furthermore, the Court finds that the ALJ's error in this regard is grounds for remand to further develop the record and issue a new decision, as explained more fully herein.
First, the ALJ erred when she concluded that because the "claimant takes Gabapentin and reportedly gets physical therapy" and "only sees a primary care physician for her back impairment", Plaintiff's treatment was "fairly conservative" and the "diagnostic testing was relatively mild." (Tr. 17.) In concluding that Plaintiff's treatment for her pain was "conservative", the ALJ failed to consider that: (1) Plaintiff was prescribed, and took, Voltaren gel, Oxycodone, and Gabapentin, among other medications, for her pain (Tr. 21, 35-36, 180, 218, 450-51, repeats at Tr. 491-92; Tr. 535-36); (2) Plaintiff had to undergo spinal surgery and physical therapy from June through July 2013, requiring a home attendant for four weeks post-surgery (Tr. 331-36, repeats at Tr. 341-42; Tr. 318, 339-40); (3) Plaintiff again required a home attendant for eight weeks following surgery, and "still" had constant "chronic back pain" (Tr. 314-17, repeats at Tr. 443, 445, 484-85; Tr. 329-30, 338, 447, 487) (4) after Plaintiff's surgery, Dr. Lefkowitz performed a therapeutic bilateral lumbar facet joint injection (Tr. 549), radiofrequency rhizotomy of the medial branches of the left lumbar areas (Tr. 547), and radiofrequency ablation, none of which alleviated Plaintiff's pain (Tr. 365, 516-19) and (5) Drs. Lefkowitz and Compas observed no improvement in Plaintiff's pain level or ambulation following the surgery (Tr. 329-30, 338, 447, 487, 497-502, 509-15, 535-36, 552). Therefore, the ALJ's conclusion that Plaintiff's treatment was "fairly conservative" was not supported by substantial evidence. Medick v. Colvin, No. 16 Civ. 341, 2017 WL 886944, at *12 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2017) (holding that ALJ's finding of "conservative" treatment was not supported by the record, where "the ALJ does not explain why plaintiff's course of medication . . . is considered conservative treatment, [and] there is no evidence that more aggressive treatment options were available or determined to be medically appropriate for plaintiff"); see also Hamm v. Colvin, No. 16 Civ. 936, 2017 WL 1322203, at *25 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2017) (holding that ALJ erred in deeming plaintiff's treatment "conservative" where "the ALJ has pointed to nothing in the record to suggest that Plaintiff was an eligible candidate for more aggressive medical treatment, such as surgery").
The ALJ's approach in this case violated the basic rule that "[t]he ALJ is not permitted to substitute his [or her] own expertise or view of the medical proof for the treating physician's opinion" or a qualified expert. Greek v. Colvin, 802 F.3d 370, 375 (2d Cir. 2015). This is particularly true in light of the fact that the ALJ only gave the opinion of the treating physician, Dr. Compas, "some weight" because he "is a family doctor and not a specialist" and gave Dr. Fkiaras's opinion "limited weight" because his opinion "was offered prior to the claimant's surgery and is not supported by subsequent records that suggest moderate improvement." (Tr. 16.) The ALJ could have sought another consultative examination for Plaintiff after her surgery to evaluate the nature of Plaintiff's treatment and pain symptoms, see Burger v. Astrue, 282 F. App'x 883, 885 (2d Cir. 2008) ("Indeed, the relevant regulations specifically authorize the ALJ to pay for a consultative examination where necessary to ensure a developed record.") (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(d)-(f)), but it was legal error for the ALJ to "make[] an RFC determination in the absence of supporting expert medical opinion". Legall v. Colvin, 13-CV-1426, 2014 WL 4494753, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2014) (quoting Hilsdorf v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 724 F.Supp.2d 330, 347 (E.D.N.Y. 2010)). Therefore, the case should be remanded for further development of the record.
Second, the ALJ failed to properly evaluate Plaintiff's credibility. At the administrative hearing, Plaintiff testified about the pain and limitations caused by her claimed disability, including that:
Additionally, the record is replete with Plaintiff's reports of her pain to her treating physicians. (See Tr. 31-32, 43-44, 152-54, 179-80, 191-94, 197-217, 244-47, 249-68, 273-74, 283-87, 292-95, 300-06, 312-17, 319, 322-27, 329-30, 337-40, 343-44, 352-53, 355-60, 365-72, 375-80, 385-86, 420-21, 422, 427-34, 439, 441-45, 449-57, 493-502, 512-19, 535-40.) Despite this evidence, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's statements concerning her pain, and the limitations caused by her pain, were "not entirely credible." (Tr. 17; see also id. ("While the claimant testified that she does very little at home and cannot walk without a cane or walker, her allegations of limitation are not well supported.").)
In fact, at the ALJ hearing, ALJ Wexler stated on the record that she felt that "the diagnostic testing [was] not matching up to [Plaintiff's] testimony." (Tr. 41.) However, the only bases for this negative credibility determination that the Court can ascertain from the ALJ's opinion are: (1) her finding of "fairly conservative" treatment (discussed supra) and (2) that "the claimant testified [at the ALJ hearing] that she receives some help with activities of daily living . . . [she] is able to prepare simple meals . . . [but] cannot get in the shower and cannot wash by the sink. Yet during the consultative examination, the claimant reported that . . . [she] cook[ed] daily, clean[ed] four times a week, [did] laundry once a week, shop[ped] three times a week, shower[ed] and dresse[d] daily." (Tr. 13.) ALJ Wexler ultimately concluded that "[b]ased on the entire record, including the testimony of the claimant . . . the evidence also establishes that the claimant retains the capacity to function adequately to perform many basic activities associated with work". (Tr. 17 (emphasis added).) This was error.
As an initial matter, the ALJ has an affirmative obligation to develop the administrative record. Lamay, 562 F.3d at 508-09. It was not proper for the ALJ to discredit Plaintiff's testimony regarding the limitations of her disability without asking Plaintiff to clarify the seeming contradictions between her statements at the consultative examination and her testimony at the ALJ hearing. Williams on Behalf of Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255, 260-61 (2d Cir. 1988) ("A finding that the witness is not credible must nevertheless be set forth with sufficient specificity to permit intelligible plenary review of the record. The failure to make credibility findings . . . fatally undermines the [Commissioner's] argument that there is substantial evidence adequate to support [the] conclusion that claimant is not under a disability.").
Further, under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529, an ALJ must consider the Plaintiff's statements of the debilitating effects of her pain to the extent those statements are "reasonably . . . consistent with" all of the evidence. Beyond showing that a medical impairment could reasonably be expected to cause the symptoms of which the applicant complains—which Plaintiff showed in this case, according to the ALJ (Tr. 17)—an applicant has no burden to further "substantiate" or "support" her subjective statements of pain. See Meadors v. Astrue, 370 F. App'x 179, 184 (2d Cir. 2010) ("[The Claimant's] allegations [of the limiting effects of her symptoms] need not be substantiated by medical evidence, but simply consistent with it. The entire purpose of § 404.1529 is to provide a means for claimants to offer proof that is not wholly demonstrable by medical evidence." (quoting Hogan v. Astrue, 491 F.Supp.2d 347, 353 (W.D.N.Y. 2007) (brackets omitted))); Caffrey v. Astrue, No. 06 Civ. 3982, 2009 WL 1953008, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2009) ("An adjudicator is expressly prohibited at this step from rejecting a claimant's allegations solely because objective medical evidence does not substantiate them.") (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2)).
The Court finds that, given Plaintiff's extensive testimony about her pain, and that the available medical evidence corroborates Plaintiff's subjective claims of pain, the ALJ erred in discounting Plaintiff's testimony. Rockwood v. Astrue, 614 F.Supp.2d 252, 271 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) ("[A]n individual's symptoms can sometimes suggest a greater level of severity of impairment than can be shown by the objective medical evidence alone.") (citing SSR 96-7P); cf. Cichocki, 729 F.3d at 177 ("[W]here [the Court] is `unable to fathom the ALJ's rationale in relation to evidence in the record, especially where credibility determinations and inference drawing is required of the ALJ,' we will not `hesitate to remand for further findings or a clearer explanation for the decision.'") (quoting Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 469 (2d Cir. 1982)).
In sum, the Court finds that the ALJ committed reversible error by: (1) failing to accord appropriate deference to the medical opinions of Plaintiff's treating physicians and the SSA's consulting physician; (2) substituting her own opinions for those of the qualified medical experts; and (3) improperly assessing the credibility of Plaintiff's statements regarding the pain and restrictions she experiences as a result of her claimed disability. The Court therefore remands this case for further proceedings consistent with this Order.
For the reasons set forth above, the Court grants Plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings and denies the Commissioner's cross-motion. The Commissioner's decision is remanded for further consideration consistent with this Order. The Clerk of Court is respectfully requested to enter judgment and close this case.
SO ORDERED.
