KEVIN McNULTY, District Judge.
Plaintiff Tanya Kaminski ("Kaminski") brings suit against three groups of defendants:
Her Complaint asserts nine causes of action, including a claim of conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("§ 1983") against all defendants. The State Defendants removed this action from state court, citing this Court's federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Now before the Court are Kaminski's motion to remand the action to state court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447, and for reimbursement of just costs and fees, as well as separate motions of the State Defendants, the CWA Defendants, and the Individuals to dismiss this removed action for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
For the reasons stated below, I will deny Kaminski's motion to remand. I will partially grant the motions of the State Defendants, CWA Defendants, and Individuals to dismiss the complaint. Finally, I will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Kaminski's remaining state law claims.
On November 22, 2017, Kaminski filed a civil complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County against the State Defendants, CWA Defendants, and Individuals. It alleges as follows:
The plaintiff, Tanya Kaminski, was employed by the DMVA and the Youth Challenge Academy ("Academy") as a teacher. (Compl. ¶¶ 1-2). The Academy is a school located in Fort Dix, New Jersey, which is operated by the DMVA. (Id. at ¶ 2). Kaminski worked at the Academy for eight years until she was terminated. (Id. at ¶ 1).
On October 28, 2015, Kaminski "learned that she was pregnant and reported it to her employer at the Academy." (Id. at ¶ 15). According to Kaminski, upon learning of her pregnancy, the "Defendants . . . with discriminatory intent, embarked upon a plan to deprive [Kaminski] of her rights and to terminate her employment in violation of her rights" to employment and maternity leave. (Id. at ¶¶ 17, 19). Part of that plan, says Kaminski, included "Defendants using their positions of power to influence students to file false complaints as a ploy and pretext to unlawfully terminate" her. (Id. at ¶ 19). She alleges that Defendants urged students to complain about her in writing, "reviewed and edited their writings" (id. at ¶ 20), and "met with students on multiple occasions to make sure that their statements met with their narrative" (id. at ¶ 22).
Kaminski was a member of CWA International Union, specifically CWA Local 1038. Pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") with DMVA, (id. at ¶ 3), she filed a grievance in connection with her termination. The union represented Kaminksi against the DMVA during the grievance and arbitration process. (Id. at ¶ 3-5). Kaminski alleges that at her arbitration proceeding, the CWA Defendants "failed to advance the argument that the purpose of the termination was to deprive [Kaminski] of her rights, allowing improper matters to be considered, failing to call material witnesses, and did not adequately and fairly represent [Kaminski] during the proceedings." (Id. at ¶ 23).
That Complaint asserts nine claims, only one of which (the Fifth) invokes federal law:
(Compl. ¶¶ 29-81 (emphasis added)).
The Complaint seeks the entry of an Order declaring the opinion and award of the arbitrator vacated, damages for lost front and back pay, punitive damages, damages for pain and suffering, attorney's fees, costs of suit, and u[s]uch other relief as this Court may deem equitable and just."
On January 2, 2018, a copy of the Complaint and Summons was served upon the State Defendants. (Notice of Removal ¶ 3) (citing Exhs. B, C, and D). On February 1, 2018, the State Defendants filed a Notice of Removal based on this court's federal question jurisdiction over the § 1983 claim. (Id. at ¶ 2 (citing Compl. ¶¶ 21, 22, 25-27, 30)). See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction). The CWA Defendants consented to the removal of the action. (Id. at ¶ 6).
One week later, on February 8, 2018, the State Defendants and the CWA Defendants filed separate motions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss the Complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim. (ECF Nos. 2, 3). On March 2, 2018, Kaminski filed her opposition to the defendants' motions to dismiss, (ECF No. 6), slightly out of time. (The untimeliness is excused on the grounds stated in the accompanying letter. (ECF No. 6-2).)
Meanwhile, on February 27, 2018, Kaminski filed a motion to remand the case to state court and award just costs and fees incurred as a result of the improper removal. (ECF No. 4). The Complaint, she says, must be remanded because the Eleventh Amendment bars this court from hearing claims against the State, (id. at 2-5); because the State is not a "person" amendable to suit under § 1983, (id. at 8); and because this Court should abstain under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (id. at 6-7). The State Defendants and CWA Defendants oppose Kaminski's motion to remand. (ECF Nos. 9, 10).
Because the motion to remand implicates this Court's subject matter jurisdiction, I will address it first.
Defendants removed this case pursuant to the federal removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441. "[T]he party asserting federal jurisdiction in a removal case bears the burden of showing, at all stages of the litigation, that the case is properly before the federal court." Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 193 (3d Cir. 2007). Removal is strictly construed and doubts are resolved in favor of remand. See Samuel-Bassett v. Kia Motors Am., Inc., 357 F.3d 392, 396 (3d Cir. 2004). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), a defendant may remove a civil action from the state court if the case could have been brought originally in federal court.
A district court has original jurisdiction through one of two means: diversity jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), which is not applicable here, or federal-question jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which is determined by the well-pleaded complaint rule. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, "federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiffs properly pleaded complaint." Id.
Here, the State Defendants filed their Notice of Removal based on this court's federal-question jurisdiction. (Notice of Removal ¶ 2). See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Specifically, the State Defendants maintain that this Court has federal question jurisdiction because Kaminski has asserted claims under the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("§ 1983"). (Notice of Removal 1 2). Kaminski, however, argues that this case must be remanded to state court "on the basis of no federal jurisdiction." (ECF No. 4-1, Pl. Br. 2).
On its face, the Complaint pleads that the defendants violated Kaminski's constitutional rights by depriving her of her alleged "rights to employment and maternity leave and in violation of her rights with discriminatory intent." (Compl. ¶¶ 17-19). Count Five, which may be read as a two-part § 1983 claim, asserts that (1) the Defendants acted under color of state law to deprive Kaminski of said constitutional rights, and (2) the Defendants engaged in this deprivation together, as a conspiracy. (Id.). A § 1983 claim, of course, presents a federal question. Kulick v. Pocono Downs Racing Ass'n, Inc., 816 F.2d 895, 897 (3d Cir. 1987); Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772, 775 (3d Cir. 2004); Manor Investments, Ltd. v. Pharmacy Operations, Inc., No. CIV.A. 09-1178, 2010 WL 9912483, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 2010).
Count Five, although it is the only federal-law count in the Complaint, presents a sufficient basis for original jurisdiction, and therefore for removal.
The Eleventh Amendment incorporates a general principle of sovereign immunity which bars citizens from bringing suits for damages against any state in federal court.
The Eleventh Amendment is forum-specific; it bars a claim from being brought in a federal court. A State may therefore waive its "Eleventh Amendment federal-forum immunity by removing the action to federal court." See Lombardo v. Pennsylvania, Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 540 F.3d 190, 198 (3d Cir. 2008); see also Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979).
The State, by removing the action to this Court, has in effect waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity from a federal-court suit. The State retains its right, however, to assert any other defenses that could have been asserted in a state court action, including sovereign immunity. Id.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint, in whole or in part, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The moving party bears the burden of showing that no claim has been stated. Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005). In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must take all allegations in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Worth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975); Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts, Inc. v. Mirage Resorts Inc., 140 F.3d 478, 483 (3d Cir. 1998); see also Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) does not require that a complaint contain detailed factual allegations. Nevertheless, "a plaintiff's obligation to provide the `grounds' of his `entitlement to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Ati. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Thus, the factual allegations must be sufficient to raise a plaintiff's right to relief above a speculative level, such that it is "plausible on its face." See id. at 570; see also Umland v. PLANCO Fin. Serer., Inc., 542 F.3d 59, 64 (3d Cir. 2008). A claim has "facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). While "[t]he plausibility standard is not akin to a `probability requirement' . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has explained the Twomblyikbal standard on several occasions. See, e.g., Argueta v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 643 F.3d 60, 70-73 (3d Cir. 2011); Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 129-30 (3d Cir. 2010). In doing so, it has provided a three-step process for evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion:
Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012).
"In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of the public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant's claims are based upon these documents." Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010); see also In re Asbestos Products Liability Litigation (No. VI), 822 F.3d 125, 134 & n.7 (3d Cir. 2016); Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006) ("In evaluating a motion to dismiss, we may consider documents that are attached to or submitted with the complaint, and any matters incorporated by reference or integral to the claim, items subject to judicial notice, matters of public record, orders, and items appearing in the record of the case.").
State Defendants and CWA Defendants have moved to dismiss the entirety of Kaminski's complaint. (ECF Nos. 2, 3). Because the complaint's § 1983 claim is the only federal claim before the court, I will address it first, beginning with the threshold issue of amenability to suit as it applies to State Defendants and, in their official capacities, defendants Hayes, Ragucci, Knight, Hoyd, and Sweeney (the "Government Officials"). Next, I consider whether the Government Officials are subject to suit under § 1983 in their personal capacities.
I first consider the motion to dismiss brought by the State Defendants, joined by the Individuals, Ragucci, Hayes, and Knight, based on amenability to suit under § 1983.
Kaminski brings claims against all defendants under § 1983 for conspiring to "deprive[] Plaintiff of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the United States Constitution." (Compl. ¶¶ 58-62). Section 1983 provides as follows:
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added).
A state and its departments are not considered "persons" amenable to suit under § 1983, Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 67-70 (1989). State officials, acting in their official capacities, are likewise not considered "persons." Id. at 71-72. The analysis is distinct from, but closely related to that under the Eleventh Amendment, which bars § 1983 suits for damages against "governmental entities that are considered `arms of the state' for Eleventh Amendment purposes," which are "no different from a suit against the State itself." Will, 491 U.S. at 70-71.
The DMVA is a department of the state of New Jersey. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 38A:3-1 ("The Department of Military and Veterans' Affairs shall be a principal department in the executive branch of the State Government."). Therefore, a suit against the DMVA is a "suit against the state itself." Will, 491 U.S. at 70-71 (1989). Because the State of New Jersey is not considered a person under § 1983, neither is the DMVA. Id. By extension, defendants Hayes, Ragucci, Sweeney, Hoyd, and Knight, who at all times relevant to this matter were officials of the DMVA or its sub-department, the Academy, (see Compl. ¶¶ 6-10), are not amenable to suit in their official capacities under § 1983. Id. at 71-72.
The Complaint lists the Government Officials, i.e., Hayes, Ragucci, Sweeney, Hoyd, and Knight, as defendants. It does not explicitly state that Kaminski sues them in their personal capacities. (See Compl. ¶¶ 6-10).
"In personal capacity suits, a plaintiff seeks to impose personal liability upon an individual officer and recover from the personal assets of that officer. Therefore, the Eleventh Amendment is not implicated because the State is not the real party in interest." Garden State Elec. Inspection Servs. Inc. v. Levin, 144 F. App'x 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2005). To determine whether a suit is against a defendant in his or her personal capacity, the court examines "the complaints" and the "course of proceedings" to determine the nature of the liability plaintiff has sought to impose. Id. at 251.
This Complaint fails to specify either way whether individual defendants are sued in their personal or official capacity. (See Compl. ¶¶ 6-10). I view the Complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, however, and consider the context. A brief cannot amend a defective complaint, but it is nevertheless suggestive that in her briefing, Kaminski recognizes that the State is not a `person' under § 1983, but asserts that the claims against the individuals "are against `persons' within the meaning of the statute." (ECF No. 4 at 1). In addition, all of the individual Government Officials assert qualified immunity, "a defense available only for governmental officials when they are sued in their personal, and not in their official, capacity." Melo v. Hafer, 912 F.2d 628, 636 (3d Cir. 1990), aff'd, 502 U.S. 21 (1991). Compare id. with Garden State, 144 F. App'x at 252 (considering the fact that the government official did not raise personal immunity defenses in concluding they were not sued in their personal capacities). Both the plaintiff and the relevant defendants, then, appear to interpret the ambiguous language of the Complaint to encompass claims against the individual state officials in their personal capacities. In the interest of efficiency, to the extent necessary, the Complaint will be deemed amended. I will assume for purposes of this Opinion that the individual Government Officials are sued in their personal capacities.
To state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must plausibly allege, first, the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and, second, that the alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law. See Harvey v. Plains Twp. Police Dept, 635 F.3d 606, 609 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted); see also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Section 1983 is not in itself a source of substantive rights, instead providing a remedy for violations of rights protected by other federal statutes or by the U.S. Constitution. City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985). Therefore, in evaluating a § 1983 claim, a Court must first "identify the exact contours of the underlying right said to have been violated" and determine "whether the plaintiff has alleged a deprivation of a constitutional right at all." Id. (citing Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n. 5, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998))." Keslosky v. Borough of Old Forge, 66 F.Supp.3d 592, 613-14 (M.D. Pa. 2014).
Count Five does allege generally that defendants violated Kaminski's "rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the United States Constitution." (Compl. ¶ 61) Elaborating, it specifies that the defendants "conspired to terminate the Plaintiff to withhold her of her maternity leave." [sic] (Compl. ¶ 62) And it states that the defendants "committed these actions by concocting a rouse [sic] where they sought out complaints against the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff's students never complained on their own volition of the Plaintiff." (Compl. ¶ 63) The Complaint does not state or suggest any basis for concluding that such rights have their source in a federal statute or clause of the United States Constitution.
Kaminski in her brief asserts that defendants "conspired together to lose her arbitration case." (ECF No. 6 at 2) Count Five, however, contains no such allegation, and the CWA Defendants argue that I therefore should not consider it as a theory of § 1983 liability. (ECF No. 8, 2). I agree. In any event, however, it does not specify a constitutional claim.
Casting the § 1983 claim as one of conspiracy does not save it. "[A] § 1983 conspiracy claim is not actionable without an actual violation of § 1983." Cherry v. Borough of Tuckerton, No. 16-505, 2016 WL 7030428, at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 1, 2016) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Stallings v. Cruz, No. 15-7488, 2016 WL 3067438, at *3 n.2 (D.N.J. May 31, 2016) ("Civil conspiracy is [merely] a vehicle by which § 1983 liability may be imputed to those who have not actually performed the act denying constitutional rights . . . . As a result, a § 1983 conspiracy claim is not actionable without an actual violation of § 1983.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Count Five is therefore dismissed.
I have dismissed the single federal claim pled in the Complaint, and diversity of citizenship is not alleged. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 1332. The only potential basis for this court's subject matter jurisdiction over Kaminski's state law claims would be supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Because this case is in the earliest stages and no federal claims remain, I will exercise my discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction over all state law claims alleged in the Complaint. See id. § 1367(c)(3).
At this point, the plaintiff, who never sought this federal forum in the first place, has two options:
For the foregoing reasons, Kaminski's motion to remand, (ECF No. 4), is denied as presented. The motions of State Defendants, CWA Defendants, and the Individuals to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim, (ECF Nos. 3, 2, 13), are granted, without prejudice to the submission, within 45 days, of a properly supported motion to amend the complaint.
(id. ¶¶ 59-63).
On behalf of defendant Franklin, CWA Defendants raise an affirmative defense that Franklin, as a union officer, is not personally liable for her actions taken on behalf of CWA Defendants. (ECF No. 3-1, 25-26). This defense, too, I need not reach. This Circuit has held, however, that "the law is clear that individual union officers are not personally liable to third parties for actions taken on behalf of the union in the collective bargaining process." Carino v. Stefan, 376 F.3d 156, 159-60 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that an attorney hired by a union to represent union members in arbitration hearings, held pursuant to a CBA, was immune to suit); see Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401 (1981).
