DAVID N. HURD, District Judge.
On May 12, 2015, a Memorandum-Decision & Order (the "May 12 MDO" or "MDO") issued resolving cross-motions for summary judgment made by the parties to this consolidated action.
In particular, the May 12 MDO denied motions for partial summary judgment by plaintiffs Town of Halfmoon ("Halfmoon"), County of Saratoga ("Saratoga"), and the Saratoga County Water Authority ("SCWA") (collectively "plaintiffs") on the issue of defendant General Electric Company's ("GE") liability under state and federal law.
GE has moved for reconsideration of the May 12 MDO, arguing that a proper application of the doctrine of conflict pre-emption requires plaintiffs' New York Navigation Law claim to also be dismissed. Plaintiffs oppose. The motion will be considered on the basis of these submissions without oral argument.
GE has moved pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 54(b), which provides that a district court's non-final order "may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties' rights and liabilities." FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b).
"Rule 54(b) gives district courts broad discretion to reconsider, reverse, or modify interlocutory orders previously entered in a case."
GE contends reconsideration is warranted here to correct a clear error of law. Specifically, GE asserts the May 12 MDO erred in concluding that the petroleum exclusion found in the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 ("CERCLA"), works to preclude dismissal of plaintiffs' Navigation Law claim on the basis of conflict preemption. Def.'s Mem., ECF No. 277-2, 4-6.
As an initial matter, GE is correct to note that Polychlorinated Biphenyls ("PCBs"), the chemical compounds at the heart of this case, are considered a type of "hazardous substance" covered by CERCLA's broad reach.
But CERCLA's scope of coverage is not limitless. "CERCLA's definition of hazardous substance does not include petroleum, or the hazardous substances normally found in refined petroleum, including unadulterated waste oil."
Instead, liability for the discharge of petroleum must be established in accordance with the relevant state law. New York's Navigation Law provides that "[a]ny person who has discharged petroleum shall be strictly liable, without regard to fault, for all cleanup and removal costs and all direct and indirect damages, no matter by whom sustained. . . ." N.Y. NAV. LAW § 181(1).
This statute, which is to be "liberally construed to effect its purposes," broadly defines "petroleum" as "oil or petroleum of any kind and in any form including, but not limited to, oil, petroleum, fuel oil, oil sludge, oil refuse, oil mixed with other wastes and crude oils, gasoline and kerosene." N.Y. NAV. LAW §§ 172(15), 195.
GE asserts these distinctions in scope of coverage are irrelevant, since plaintiffs "do not and could not contend that the[] resuspended PCBs are outside the reach of CERCLA." Def.'s Mem. at 6. But that is not quite the argument plaintiffs advanced at the summary judgment stage. Rather, as the May 12 MDO notes, plaintiffs claimed the discharges are issue should be covered under
To be sure, "the primary purpose of the exclusion for petroleum, which is defined principally in terms of crude oil and crude oil fractions, was to exclude from CERCLA's coverage `spills or other releases strictly of oil,' not releases of hazardous substances mixed with oil."
It is against this backdrop that the May 12 MDO identified a genuine factual dispute over whether the relevant discharges from the Hudson Falls and Fort Edward plants were petroleum-based" or, instead, were PCBs that may have become mixed with petroleum.
Indeed, "[t]he imposition of [] hazardous waste contamination liability under state law, on facts that would not, for whatever reason, support CERCLA liability, is expressly authorized by CERCLA."
The question of whether, and to what extent, the contamination at issue in this case gives rise to liability that may fall within CERCLA's petroleum exclusion is one that has been reserved for trial. GE's renewed arguments here do not provide a sufficient basis for reconsidering the logic of that conclusion.
Therefore, it is
ORDERED that
GE's motion for reconsideration (ECF No. 277) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.