NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiffs appeal an October 24, 2014 Law Division order granting summary judgment to defendant Grace Orthodox Presbyterian Church (GOPC) and dismissing the complaint. We affirm.

I.

We discern the following undisputed facts from the record and view the facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to non-moving party. Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995). On April 3, 2011, plaintiff Elizabeth Rockhill slipped on a sidewalk adjacent to GOPC's property and sustained significant injuries. Rockhill and her husband subsequently filed a complaint alleging that GOPC's negligent maintenance of the sidewalk was a direct and proximate cause of Rockhill's injuries.1

Discovery revealed that prior to 2012, GOPC's property had been used exclusively for the religious purposes of GOPC's congregation. In 2012, a youth dance group requested permission to use the church's basement in exchange for the payment of a fee. GOPC agreed to permit the group to use the basement initially for $75 per session and later for $90 per session. The group used the basement approximately once per week over a six month period and paid GOPC a total of $2055 during 2012. GOPC terminated the agreement because the group did not leave the basement after each session in an acceptable condition. It is undisputed that prior to permitting the group to use the basement in 2012, GOPC had never previously leased any portion of its property to anyone.

GOPC filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that plaintiffs' complaint should be dismissed because GOPC had no legal duty to maintain the sidewalk that Rockhill claimed caused her fall and injuries. Plaintiffs opposed the motion. The court heard oral argument and granted the motion, finding that GOPC did not have a duty to maintain the sidewalk because at the time of the accident GOPC did not use its property for commercial purposes as defined in Stewart v. 104 Wallace St., Inc., 87 N.J. 146 (1981). This appeal followed.

II.

When reviewing an order granting or denying summary judgment, we apply the same standard that the trial court applies in ruling on a summary judgment motion. State v. Perini Corp., 221 N.J. 412, 425 (2015) (citing Town of Kearny v. Brandt, 214 N.J. 76, 91 (2013); Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp. v. Nowell Amoroso, P.A., 189 N.J. 436, 445-46 (2007)). In considering a motion for summary judgment, "both trial and appellate courts must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, which in this case is plaintiff." Bauer v. Nesbitt, 198 N.J. 601, 605 n.1 (2009) (citing R. 4:46-2(c); Brill, supra, 142 N.J. at 540).

Summary judgment is proper if the record demonstrates "no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment ... as a matter of law." Burnett v. Gloucester Cty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 409 N.J.Super. 219, 228 (App. Div. 2009). Issues of law are subject to the de novo standard of review, and the trial court's determination of such issues is accorded no deference. Kaye v. Rosefielde, 223 N.J. 218, 229 (2015) (citations omitted).

Here, the facts are not disputed. We therefore first address the established legal principles applicable to a determination of liability for injuries caused by an alleged failure to maintain a sidewalk. In Stewart, the Supreme Court held that "[c]ommercial property owners are ... liable for injuries on the sidewalks abutting their property that are caused by their negligent failure to maintain the sidewalks in reasonably good condition." Stewart, supra, 87 N.J. at 150. The Court limited its holding "to owners of commercial property" and noted that, "[a]s for the determination of which properties will be covered by [its holding] ..., commonly accepted definitions of `commercial' and `residential' property should apply, with difficult cases to be decided as they arise." Id. at 159, 160. Since Stewart was decided, our courts "have grappled with what was or was not commercial property, but ... have not deviated ... from the basic principle that residential property owners are not liable for sidewalk injuries." Luchejko v. City of Hoboken, 207 N.J. 191, 204 (2011).

To determine whether property is commercial or residential we will "[o]rdinarily ... address the nature of the ownership of the property" and will consider "[f]or example, if the property is owned for investment or business purposes." Dupree v. City of Clifton, 351 N.J.Super. 237, 242 (App. Div. 2002) (citations omitted), aff'd, 175 N.J. 449 (2003). If property is owned by a religious organization, we "look to the nature of the use of the property and not the nature of the ownership." Id. at 242-43; see also Mohamed v. Iglesia Evangelica Oasis De Salvacion, 424 N.J.Super. 489, 493 (App. Div. 2012) (stating that a religious organization's "use of [its] property ... determines its classification for the purposes of abutting sidewalk liability").

The issue of whether a nonprofit religious organization's use of its property is properly deemed commercial for determining sidewalk liability has been considered in various contexts. See, e.g., Brown v. St. Venantius Sch., 111 N.J. 325, 338 (1988) (holding that operation of a private school on church property was a commercial use for determining sidewalk liability); Restivo v. Church of St. Joseph of the Palisades, 306 N.J.Super. 456, 468 (App. Div. 1997) (finding a church's leasing of its property constituted a commercial use), certif. denied, 153 N.J. 402 (1998); Christmas v. City of Newark, 216 N.J.Super. 393, 402 (App. Div.) (finding church's leasing of its property to a donut shop rendered it commercial property for determining sidewalk liability), certif. denied, 108 N.J. 193 (1987); Lombardi v. First United Methodist Church, 200 N.J.Super. 646, 648 (App. Div.) (holding that a church's use of its property solely for religious purposes does not constitute a commercial use for determining sidewalk liability), certif. denied, 101 N.J. 315 (1985). In Dupree, we defined the standard for determining whether a nonprofit religious organization's use of its property is deemed a commercial use for purposes of sidewalk liability:

Here, it is undisputed that GOPC is a nonprofit religious organization that owned the property abutting the sidewalk upon which Rockhill fell and was injured. It is also undisputed that at all times prior to the April 3, 2011 accident, and for the approximately one-year period following the accident, GOPC used its property exclusively for the religious activities of its parish and for no commercial purposes whatsoever. We are convinced that based upon those undisputed facts GOPC was not a commercial user of its property, and the trial court correctly concluded that GOPC was entitled to a dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint as a matter of law. Ibid.

We reject plaintiffs' contention that GOPC's use of its property should be deemed commercial because it might have rented its property prior to the accident if a prospective lessee had made an acceptable offer. Plaintiffs argue that because GOPC accepted the youth group's offer to lease the basement in 2012, it would have accepted a similar offer if it had been made in 2011, and therefore it was engaged in commercial use of its property in 2011 at the time of accident. Plaintiff's argument is founded upon pure speculation and not evidence or any favorable inferences that could be drawn from the evidence. As a result, it did not require a denial of GOPC's summary judgment motion. Hoffman v. Asseenontv. Com, Inc., 404 N.J.Super. 415, 426 (App. Div. 2009) ("Competent opposition [to a summary judgment motion] requires `competent evidential material' beyond mere `speculation' and `fanciful arguments.'" (quoting Merchs. Express Money Order Co. v. Sun Nat'l Bank, 374 N.J.Super. 556, 563 (App. Div.), certif. granted, 183 N.J. 592 (2005), appeal dismissed per stipulation, 217 N.J. 591 (2006))).

Moreover, it is undisputed that prior to the accident GOPC never sought tenants for its property, was not engaged in the business of leasing its property, and was not involved in any commercial activities on its property. These facts do not permit a logical conclusion that GOPC used any part of its property for commercial purposes on or prior to the date of Rockhill's accident.

We also reject plaintiffs' contention that GOPC's alleged commercial use of GOPC's property for the first time approximately one year after the accident requires the conclusion that GOPC is liable for Rockhill's injuries.2 The "commercial/residential distinction" is in part intended "to provide guidance and predictability for the overwhelming majority of property owners." Luchenjko, supra, 207 N.J. at 210. It allows "commercial owners ... [to] know that clearing their abutting sidewalks is a cost of doing business and that failure to do so can lead to liability" and permits owners who do not use their property for commercial purposes to "safely rely on the fact that they will not be liable unless they create or exacerbate a dangerous sidewalk condition."3 Ibid.

We are convinced that under the circumstances presented here, where GOPC never used its property for commercial purposes prior to the accident, that its subsequent use of the property is not relevant to our determination of GOPC's liability.4 We instead consider only the use of the property on April 3, 2011, to define GOPC's liability because plaintiffs allege that GOPC was negligent for failing to maintain the sidewalk on that day. See generally Cartel Capital Corp. v. Fireco of New Jersey, 161 N.J.Super. 301, 313 (App. Div. 1978) (stating a duty "in terms of the ordinary negligence case" is "the exercise of `that degree of care which a reasonably, prudent person would have exercised under the circumstances existing at the time of the'" alleged negligence) (emphasis added), remanded by 81 N.J. 548 (1980). In addition, to hold otherwise would deprive GOPC of its justifiable reliance upon its status as a residential user and concomitant knowledge that it would not be liable for any failure to maintain the sidewalk on the date of Rockhill's accident. Luchenjko, supra, 207 N.J. at 210.

Affirmed.