NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff Richard Giammona appeals from the March 26, 2013 supplement to the amended final judgment of divorce, which dealt with equitable distribution of the marital assets, entered after a two-day trial at which both parties testified. After reviewing the record in light of the contentions advanced on appeal, we affirm substantially for the reasons set forth by Judge Harold U. Johnson, Jr. in his comprehensive oral opinion.

The parties' only child was born in 1990,1 they married in 1999, and plaintiff filed a divorce complaint February 29, 2012. At the time of divorce, the judge determined that plaintiff, the primary breadwinner during the marriage, received $52,000 per year,2 including his work as a Sears service technician and his military disability income. The judge found that defendant Mary E. Giammona earned $30,000 working forty-two weeks a year as a school cook. He thus determined that plaintiff earned approximately 65% and defendant 35% of their joint income. Both parties are in their forties. The judge found that defendant had a shortfall in her budget of $151 per week. The judge nonetheless awarded defendant limited duration alimony of only $100 per week for a term of only five years, although the parties lived together for twenty-three years including a thirteen-year marriage.

The parties acquired several joint and individual assets before and during their marriage including a marital home, vehicles, bank accounts, a pension plan, and a personal injury settlement. The judge found that a $222,137 joint bank account had been funded primarily by gifts to plaintiff from his father in 2005 and 2006 in the amount of $185,000. He deemed $185,000 to be an exempt asset belonging solely to plaintiff. The remainder of $37,137 was divided equally between the parties.

The judge allowed defendant to keep $17,000 she had withdrawn from a second joint bank account on January 3, 2012.3 The remaining money in that account as well as another bank account containing $10,584, solely in plaintiff's name, was divided evenly between the parties, as were four other bank accounts totaling approximately $2000.

Plaintiff purchased the $77,000 marital home in 1995 when defendant was pregnant. They lived in the home together. No appraisals of the home were provided by either party, and the judge ordered that it be sold, with defendant to receive 65% of the proceeds and plaintiff the remaining 35%.

Defendant also had a PERS4 pension based upon her fifteen years of service. She testified that the pension was worth about fifteen thousand dollars, although neither party had the pension appraised. The judge awarded it solely to defendant after plaintiff testified he did not want her pension. The judge also awarded defendant 100% of her $80,000 personal injury award,5 which was consistent with plaintiff's testimony: "I don't want her award that she got when she fell."

The parties acquired four vehicles during their marriage. The trial judge distributed a 2012 Honda Accord plaintiff purchased for approximately $20,0006 and a 1995 Dodge pick-up truck to plaintiff. He awarded defendant a 2010 Kia Soul. The fourth vehicle, a 2006 Harley Davidson, the judge ordered appraised, awarding the parties 50% of its appraised value or the proceeds of its sale.

The trial judge determined that plaintiff should contribute one-third of the $7,500 that defendant requested for legal fees.

Plaintiff argues that the equitable distribution unfairly favored defendant, in particular the award of 65% of the home and 100% of her pension.

The scope of appellate review of the Family Part's order is limited. This court owes substantial deference to the Family Part's findings of fact because of that court's special expertise in family matters. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998). Thus, "`[a] reviewing court should uphold the factual findings undergirding the trial court's decision if they are supported by adequate, substantial and credible evidence on the record.'" MacKinnon v. MacKinnon, 191 N.J. 240, 253-54 (2007) (alteration in original) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 279 (2007)).

On appellate review, no special deference is owed to the trial judge's legal conclusions. Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995). However, we "`should not disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge unless . . . convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice'" or upon a determination that the trial court "has palpably abused its discretion." Parish v. Parish, 412 N.J.Super. 39, 47 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting Cesare, supra, 154 N.J. at 412). A family judge's decision should be reversed only when it is necessary to "`ensure that there is not a denial of justice' because the family court's `conclusions are [] "clearly mistaken" or "wide of the mark."'" Id. at 48 (alteration in original) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008)).

Equitable distribution is controlled by N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.1. That statute requires a determination of those assets eligible for distribution, followed by a valuation and equitable allocation of the eligible assets. Rothman v. Rothman, 65 N.J. 219, 232 (1974). "Where the issue on appeal concerns which assets are available for distribution or the valuation of those assets, it is apparent that the standard of review is whether the trial judge's findings are supported by adequate credible evidence in the record." Borodinsky v. Borodinsky, 162 N.J.Super. 437, 443-44 (App. Div. 1978) (citing Rothman, supra, 65 N.J. at 233). "[W]here the issue on appeal concerns the manner in which allocation of the eligible assets is made . . . it would seem reasonable to conclude that . . . an appellate court may determine whether the amount and manner of the award constituted an abuse of the trial judge's discretion." Borodinsky, supra, 162 N.J. Super. at 444.

Upon the dissolution of a marriage, New Jersey recognizes "equitable distribution of the property, both real and personal, which was legally and beneficially acquired by . . . either [party] during the marriage. . . ." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(h). In determining equitable distribution, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.1 provides a list of factors for consideration by the court, including:

Furthermore, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.1 also requires that in all cases where the court awards equitable distribution,

Judge Johnson considered each relevant factor enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.1 and specifically noted his findings, including credibility findings, in his oral opinion of February 6, 2013. We affirm substantially for those reasons, adding only the following comments.

Factor (f) of N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.1 requires the judge to consider the economic circumstances of the parties, which would include plaintiff's exempt asset of $185,000. Plaintiff argues that the trial judge abused his discretion in distributing the marital home 65% to defendant and 35% to plaintiff because four years prior to the couple's marriage, he had paid 100% of the down payment and closing costs for the house, a total of approximately $12,000.

Assets subject to equitable distribution are not necessarily limited to those acquired during the marriage. Weiss v. Weiss, 226 N.J.Super. 281, 287 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 114 N.J. 287 (1988). Rather, "for the purpose of triggering a right of equitable distribution a marital partnership may be found to have commenced prior to the marriage ceremony, where parties have adequately expressed that intention and have acquired assets in specific contemplation of their marriage." Ibid. Additionally, "the `shared enterprise' of marriage may begin even before the actual marriage ceremony through the purchase of a major marital asset such as a house and substantial improvements to that asset." Ibid. The facts in Weiss are similar as the husband also paid the down payment and closing costs of the marital home, which was in his sole name, from his own funds prior to marriage.

Landwehr v. Landwehr, 111 N.J. 491 (1988), supports the trial judge's decision to grant defendant the entire personal injury settlement award.7 The Court stated that "the portion of a personal injury award or settlement that simply reimburses marital assets that were lost because of a spouse's injury should be subject to equitable distribution" and thus "to the extent that a personal injury causes such income to be lost and such assets to be expended for medical expenses, both partners are entitled to recover." Id. at 502. Thus, "N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 is not intended to force a victim of personal injuries to share the proceeds he or she receives for the pain and suffering and disabilities arising out of those injuries." Id. at 500-01. Plaintiff did not demonstrate that defendant's injury caused the loss of any marital assets.

Judge Johnson carefully considered the proper statutory factors in light of the facts as he found them to be. He awarded a modest alimony in light of his equitable distribution determinations. See N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b)(10) (requiring the judge to consider the "equitable distribution of property ordered" when awarding alimony). He did not abuse his discretion in dividing the assets of the marriage and his valuation of those assets was based on substantial credible evidence in the record.

Affirmed.