Not for Publication

OPINION

ESTHER SALAS, District Judge.

Before the Court are four motions to dismiss the Amended Complaint (D.E. No. 10, Amended Complaint ("Am. Compl.")) of pro se Plaintiff Eric J. Rhett ("Plaintiff"): the motions of the New Jersey State Treasurer, et al. (D.E. No. 23); Nancy A. Berryhill (D.E. No. 29); Fireman's Fund Insurance Company (D.E. No. 42); and Howard Pecker (D.E. No. 45) (collectively, "Defendants"). The Court has considered the parties' submissions1 and decides the motion without oral argument. See L. Civ. R. 78.1(b). For reasons discussed below, the motions are GRANTED.

I. Factual Background

The Court will "set out facts as they appear in the [Amended] Complaint," see Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 358 n.1 (3d Cir. 2012), but at times the handwritten Amended Complaint is difficult to follow (see, e.g., Am. Compl. at 22 ("When you revisit an already final and mandated claim like in hereof, you must give present and updated defense presentation from the retroactive original meritorious claim.")). In general, Plaintiff apparently alleges that Defendants violated his rights under the "U.S. Constitution, Article XIV, Section 1"3 in subjecting him to medical examination and refusing to grant him Social Security Benefits. (See generally id. at 3). Plaintiff's "Cause of Action" states:

(Id. at 3). Among other allegations, Plaintiff submits that his condition of "congenital muscular dystrophy" qualifies him to receive Social Security benefits for the duration of his life; and that his condition prevents him from performing physical work "SS Judge Dean W. Determan said [he] can still do." (See id. at 5). Regarding relief—in a section entitled "the relief upon which [he] is entitled to be granted"—Plaintiff seeks to "correct the clerical error, declaring Plaintiff is not entitled [to disability benefits];" to "penalize each . . . doctor[];" an "order that it is not required for Plaintiff to be medically re-examined;" and the "amount of $577,720.00." (See id.). The Amended Complaint apparently does not include factual allegations linking Plaintiff's claims to the named defendants or supporting his legal conclusions. (See generally Am. Compl.).

Defendants have moved to dismiss, arguing that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under Rule 8(a) (see, e.g., D.E. No. 23-1 at 19 ("There is not a single factual allegation in the Amended Complaint to support Plaintiff's claims.")) and that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction (see, e.g., D.E. No. 30 at 6 ("Because Plaintiff has not exhausted the administrative process, this Complaint should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.")).

II. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a complaint contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." But, to survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the complaint must contain "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A complaint cannot suffice "if it tenders [only] `naked assertion[s]' devoid of `further factual enhancement,'" because while Rule 8 "does not require `detailed factual allegations,' . . . it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 & 557).

Pursuant to the pleading regime established by Twombly and Iqbal, the Court of Appeals for this Circuit has promulgated a three-pronged test of the sufficiency of a complaint. See Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010). First, the Court considers "the elements a Plaintiff must plead to state a claim." Id. Second, the Court distinguishes the facts from the legal conclusions contained in the complaint, as the latter "are not entitled to [an] assumption of truth." Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680). That is, a complaint's "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements," Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, cannot "nudge[] [a plaintiff's] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible," Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Finally, the Court considers the complaint's remaining well-pleaded factual allegations and "determine[s] whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief." Santiago, 629 F.3d at 130 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

Throughout this process, the Court is "required to accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them after construing them in the light most favorable to the nonmovant." See, e.g., McDermott v. Clondalkin Grp., Inc., 649 F. App'x 263, 266 (3d Cir. 2016). And, further, "[i]n considering the defendants' motion to dismiss, the . . . Court [i]s required to interpret the pro se complaint [particularly] liberally. . . ." See, e.g., Sause v. Bauer, 138 S.Ct. 2561, 2563 (2018).

III. Analysis

A. Jurisdiction

As a threshold matter, the Court concurs (see, e.g., D.E. No. 30 at 6) that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims to the extent that they seek social security benefits on non-constitutional grounds. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (permitting judicial review "after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security" (emphasis added)). To the extent that Plaintiff's claims seek Social Security benefits on non-constitutional grounds, the Court is "unable to separate the merits of [those claims] from [a] claim for final disability benefits;" and, accordingly, the Court "lack[s] jurisdiction to hear [the claims] absent a final decision by the Commissioner." See Fitzgerald v. Apfel, 148 F.3d 232, 235 (3d Cir. 1998).

In contrast, the Court "ha[s] jurisdiction over [Plaintiff]'s due process [and equal protection] claim[s] to the extent that []he s[eeks] some other form of relief." See id. (emphasis added); Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 108-09 (1977) ("Constitutional questions obviously are unsuited to resolution in administrative hearing procedures and, therefore, access to the courts," even despite a failure to exhaust admonitive remedies, "is essential to the decision of such questions." (emphasis added)). Here, Plaintiff does seek other forms of relief, such as to "penalize each . . . doctor[];" an "order that it is not required for Plaintiff to be medically re-examined;" and the "amount of $577,720.00." (See Compl. at 5).

B. Failure to State a Claim

Nonetheless, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim: The facts alleged in the Amended Complaint do not permit the Court "to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant[s] [are] liable for the misconduct alleged." See, e.g., Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Amended Complaint, for instance, does not include any factual allegations linking Plaintiff's claims to the named defendants. (See, e.g., D.E. No. 42-2 at 4 ("[The Amended Complaint] fails to identify a single factual allegation that supports a valid cause of action against Fireman's Fund."); see generally Am. Compl.). One possible exception is the Commissioner of Social Security, to whom Plaintiff apparently attributes a "clerical error" and whose officials Plaintiff accuses of "fail[ing] to do [their] job[s]." (See Am. Compl. at 5). But these are "mere conclusory statements"—"unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s]"— which are insufficient to state a claim. See, e.g., Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Defendants' motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, therefore, must be granted. See, e.g., Young v. New Sewickley Twp., 160 F. App'x 263, 266 (3d Cir. 2005) (ruling that a plaintiff's "conclusory allegation that . . . conduct deprived him of his rights under the Equal Protection Clause was insufficient even under the liberal notice pleading standard of Rule 8(a)" (emphasis added)).4

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants' motion to dismiss: The Amended Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice. In addition, Plaintiff's motion "bringing suit against United State District Court" (D.E. No. 32) and motion "to Dismiss Representation of Craig Carpenito ETC." (D.E. No. 46)—for which the Court can discern no legal or factual basis— are DENIED.

To the extent Plaintiff can cure any deficiencies identified in this Opinion, Plaintiff may do so within thirty days in a final, amended complaint. But the Court may dismiss the Amended Complaint with prejudice or close this case "if a timely amendment is not forthcoming within that time," see Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2000)), or if Plaintiff fails to cure any deficiencies identified in this Opinion.

An appropriate order will accompany this Opinion.